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China has a unique stock market structure characterized by investment barriers and 
capital control separating domestic investors from foreign investors in the A-share 
and the B-share markets. This thesis studies two topics relatively unexplored on 
China’s segmented A and B-share markets.  
 
One topic is regarding China’s A and B-share markets’ reaction to regulatory 
changes and policy adjustments from 1995 to 2003. By relating the daily return 
outliers to the explanatory events identified by news reports and financial analysis 
articles, I find that about 50% of largest return outliers are ‘caused’ by regulatory 
changes or policy adjustments. Estimation of a modified GARCH (1,1)-M model 
indicates some asymmetric market responses to certain categories of regulatory 
events in the segmented A and B-share markets. For instance, both the A and B-
share markets respond positively to the market demand boosting policies and 
measures, but the B-share markets display stronger reaction and also rise statistically 
significantly one trading day before the news is announced. For stock market supply 
expansion, domestic investors respond negatively to the A-share market expansion 
news while foreign investors respond positively to the B-share market expansion 
news. The results also suggest that the regulatory constraint on price limit has been 
associated with reduced volatilities in the A-share markets but not in the others. And 
I find a stronger spillover effect of regulatory event impacts from the A-share 
markets to the B-share markets. The overall results indicate that the foreign B-share 
investors are more sensitive to the regulatory changes and have some information 




Another topic addresses the impacts of China’s domestic dual listings on valuation 
and liquidity. The empirical results uncover utterly different market responses to 
domestic dual listings in the segmented A and B-share markets. After dual listings 
on the B-share markets, the corresponding A-share prices decrease persistently, with 
or without considering market covariance risk. The A-share cumulative abnormal 
return drifts downwards and reaches -27.8% 150 trading days after the B-share 
listing dates. While upon the announcements of dual listings on the A-share markets, 
the corresponding B-share prices rise statistically significantly. But the B-share price 
hikes seem only transient. No only do the B-share prices drop on the first two A- 
share trading days, but also the B-share abnormal returns in the post-announcement 
and post-listing periods are negative and statistically insignificant. The panel 
regression also finds that no B-share structural change occurs in the A-share post-
event periods. Liquidity effects of domestic dual listings are also found to be 
different. For the shares already listed on the A-share markets, trading volumes drop 
statistically significantly in the post dual listing periods.  While for the shares 
previously listed on the B-share markets, trading volumes increase statistically 
significantly in the post dual listing periods. These findings can be explained by the 
B-share discounts and are consistent with liquidity hypothesis. However, market 
segmentation hypothesis, corporate governance hypothesis and order flow migration 
hypothesis can not be used in China’s unique institutional background. In addition, I 
find some evidences of information leakage before the dual listing announcements in 
the domestic A-share markets while not the foreign B-share markets.  
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1.1 Market segmentation in China 
The emerging Chinese stock markets have exhibited many puzzling characteristics 
and segmentation is certainly one of the most prominent. China has a stock market 
structure characterized by investment barriers and capital control separating 
domestic investors from foreign investors in the A-share and the B-share markets 
to protect domestic firms from foreign control. Unlike other stock markets, the 
markets available to domestic and foreign investors were completely segmented 
before early 2001, when the B-share markets were opened to domestic individual 
investors with foreign currency savings. And contrary to the existing evidences 
that the shares offered to foreign investors are traded at premiums relative to the 
shares offered to domestic investors in other countries, China’s foreign B-shares 
are unique in that they are traded at large and persistent discounts relative to the 
domestic A-shares (Baily et al., 1999).  
 
Previous studies on the behaviors of China’s segmented A-share and B-share 
markets have focused on two main tracks: the B-share price discount puzzle (see, 
e.g., Ma, 1996; Sun and Tong, 2000; Mei et al., 2005) and the information 
linkages and asymmetries between the A and B-share markets (see, e.g., Chui and 




This thesis investigates two issues which are relatively unexplored on China’s 
segmented A and B-share markets by academic researchers. In particular, I study 
China’s A and B-share markets’ responses to regulatory changes and policy 
adjustments and the valuation and liquidity impacts of domestic dual listings.   
 
1.2 Policy-driven markets  
The Chinese government imposed segmentation on the domestic A and B-share 
markets to enable it to best perform the social welfare function (Gordon and Li, 
2003). Anecdotal press accounts report that the Chinese stock markets have 
reputation of ‘policy-driven’ markets as government involvement is 
disproportionately large in stock markets (Heilmann, 2002). It is not surprising as 
China’s stock markets have developed in an economy in its transition from a 
central planned system to a market oriented system.  
 
However, as far as I know, no systematic and comprehensive empirical study has 
been done to examine the impacts of regulatory change and policy adjustment 
announcements on China’s segmented stock markets. This study attempts to fill 
the void by exploring the A and B-share markets’ responses to regulation and 
policy related news, a special kind of market-wide public information.  
 
By relating the daily return outliers to the explanatory events identified by news 
reports and financial analysis articles, I find that about 50% of largest return 
outliers are ‘caused’ by regulatory changes or policy adjustments. Estimation of a 
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modified GARCH (1,1)-M model indicates some asymmetric market responses to 
certain categories of regulatory events in the segmented A and B-share markets. 
For instance, both the A and B-share markets respond positively to the market 
demand boosting policies and measures, but the B-share markets display stronger 
reaction and also rise statistically significantly one trading day before the news is 
announced. As for stock market supply expansion, domestic investors respond 
negatively to expansion news of the A-share markets but foreign investors 
respond positively to those of the B-share markets. The results also suggest that 
the regulatory constraint on stock price floating range has been associated with 
reduced volatilities in the A-share markets but not in the B-share markets. And I 
find a stronger spillover effect of regulatory event impacts from the A-share 
markets to the B-share markets than that from the B-share to the A-share markets. 
The overall results indicate that the foreign B-share investors are more sensitive to 
the regulatory changes and have some information advantages over domestic A-
share investors with regards to regulatory change and policy adjustment news, a 
kind of market-wide public information. 
 
1.3 Domestic dual listings  
A dozens of listed companies in the Mainland of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) have issued and listed two different classes of shares on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Both A and B-shares are 
identical in terms of voting power and dividend claims with local A-shares 




Motivation for studying the impacts of China’s domestic dual listings arises from 
the increasing literature on the international dual listings as large amount of 
companies have their shares listed on the foreign stock exchanges. A few theories 
have been involved to explain the motivation and market responses of dual listings, 
such as liquidity hypothesis and corporate governance hypothesis (see, e.g., 
McConnell et al., 1996; Doidge et al., 2004). Can these theories be applicable in 
China given its unique institutional features? And whether are the impacts of 
domestic dual listings different in the A and B-share markets given the large and 
persistent B-share discounts? Therefore, the Chinese stock markets provide an 
interesting forum for investigating the impacts of domestic dual listings on 
valuation and liquidity.  
 
The empirical results uncover utterly different market responses to domestic dual 
listings in the two segmented submarkets. After dual listings on the B-share 
markets, the corresponding A-share prices decrease persistently, with or without 
considering market covariance risk. The A-share cumulative abnormal return 
drifts downwards and reaches -27.8% 150 trading days after the B-share listing 
dates. While in the B-share markets, upon the announcements of dual listings on 
the A-share markets, the corresponding B-share prices rise statistically 
significantly. But the B-share price hikes seem only transient. No only do the B-
share prices drop on the first two A-share trading days, but also B-share abnormal 
returns in the post announcement and post listing periods are negative and 
statistically insignificant. The panel regression also finds that no structural change 
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for B-shares occurs in the post event periods. Liquidity effects of domestic dual 
listings are also found to be different. For the shares already listed on the A-share 
markets, trading volumes drop significantly in the post dual listing periods.  While 
for the shares previously listed on the B-share markets, trading volumes increase 
significantly in the post dual listing periods. These findings can be explained by 
the B-share discounts and consistent with liquidity hypothesis. However, market 
segmentation hypothesis, corporate governance hypothesis and order flow 
migration hypothesis can not be used in China’s unique institutional background. 
In addition, I find some evidences of information leakage prior to the dual listing 
announcements in the domestic A-share markets while not the foreign B-share 
markets.  
 
1.4 Organization of this thesis  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of China’s segmented A and B-share markets. In 
particular, I discuss the development of China’s two stock exchanges, ownership 
structure, state control, and characteristics of the segmented A and B-share 
markets.  
 
Chapter 3 forms the main part of this thesis and investigates the reaction to 
regulatory changes and policy adjustments in China’s segmented A and B-share 




Chapter 4 is also the main part of this thesis, which explores the impacts of 
domestic dual listings on valuation and liquidity of China’s segmented A and B-
shares by using event study and panel regression methodologies. 
 




Overview of China’s Segmented Stock Markets 
2.1 Development of two stock exchanges  
There are two national stock exchanges in the Mainland of the PRC – the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, which commenced operation on 19 December 1990 
with eight A-shares listed, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which inaugurated 
on 3 July 1991 with six A-shares traded. From 1992, the Chinese government 
allowed selected lists of firms to issue tradable B-shares to foreign investors.  The 
B-share of Shanghai Vacuum Electron which listed on the SHSE on 21 February 
1992 is China’s first B-share available to non-Chinese investors. Subject to 
regulators’ approval, a China domiciled company may list it’s A and B-shares on 
the SHSE or the SZSE. However, each company’s shares are restricted to one of 
the exchanges, i.e. no company can cross list on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. And short-sale of shares is illegal in Chinese stock markets.  
 
Trading is continuously conducted by an order-driven computerized matching 
system. In addition to providing places and facilities for trading, the main duties 
of the exchanges also include formulating trading rules, publishing trading 
information, reporting to regulatory and supervisory authorities and taking 
temporary measures to suspend or stop trading. Both exchanges are now open 
Monday to Friday. The morning session is from 09:15 am to 09:25 am being the 
time for centralized competitive pricing and from 09:30 am to 11:30 am the time 
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for consecutive bidding. The afternoon session is from 13:00 pm to 15:00 pm also 
being the time for consecutive bidding. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the annual market capitalization and as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), number of listed companies and investors of China’s A 
and B-share markets.  
 
Table 2.1 
Market Size Statistics of China’s Stock Markets  
(1992-2003)  
 





  Number of  
Investors
Year (RMB bil) (% of GDP) (RMB bil) Companies     (mil) 
1992 104.8  4.1%  2,586.4  53  2.2  
1993 354.1  10.3%  3,450.1  182  7.8  
1994 369.1  7.9%  4,669.1  291  10.6  
1995 347.4  5.9%  5,851.1  323  12.4  
1996 984.2  14.4%  6,833.0  530  23.1  
1997 1,752.9  23.4%  7,489.4  745  33.3  
1998 1,950.6  24.7%  7,900.3  851  39.1  
1999 2,647.1  32.0%  8,267.3  949  44.8  
2000 4,809.1  53.8%  8,935.7  1088  58.0  
2001 4,352.2  44.7%  9,731.4  1160  66.5  
2002 3,832.9  36.4%  10,517.2  1287  68.8  
2003 4,245.8  36.3%  11,689.8  1287  70.3  
 




As indicated in Table 2.1, the total size of China’s stock markets has grown 
rapidly since their establishment in the early 1990s. The total market capitalization 
increases from RMB 104.8 billion at the end of 1992 to RMB 4,245.8 billion at 
the end of 2003, with the market capitalization as a percentage of GDP increases 
from 4.1% to 36.3% during the same period. The number of listed firms increases 
from 53 at the end of 1992 to 1287 at the end of 2003 and the number of investors 
increases from 2.2 million to 70.3 million for the same period.  
 
2.2 Ownership structure and state control 
One of the unique features of China’s emerging stock markets is related to the 
ownership structure of listed companies, which is classified according to the 
ownership property of the shareholders and consists of state shares, legal person 
shares, employee shares and public shares. State shares are shares owned by 
central government, local state government and government authorized agencies 
on behalf of the government. Legal person shares refer to shares held by other 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), by government controlled financial institutions, 
or by the foreign partners of a corporatized foreign joint stock company. 
Individuals are prohibited from holding state shares and legal person shares. 
Employee shares are those shares issued to companies’ staff at lower prices when 
compared to the A shares sold to public shareholders.1  Public shares include the 
A-shares restricted to Chinese citizens for trading, the B-shares which are also 
                                                 




traded on the SHSE or the SZSE but restricted to foreign investors till early 2001 
and oversea listed shares (the H-shares traded in Hong Kong, the N-shares traded 
in New York and the S-shares traded in Singapore, etc). 
 
State shares and legal person shares are not listed on the two national stock 
exchanges and non-tradable to prevent the supposed leakage of state assets. 
Employee shares are also non-tradable, but can be converted into public A-shares 
if (a) public A-shares has been issued for at least three years; and (b) conversion 
has been approved by the stock exchanges. Only public A-shares and B-shares are 
traded on the two national stock exchanges. Since most of the legal person shares 
are owned by the SOEs, the government remains the dominant status of state’s 
ownership of listed companies by separating tradable and non-tradable shares.  
 
The ownership structure of the Chinese listed companies from 1992 to 2003 is 
presented in Table 2.2. On average, the tradable A-shares and B-shares comprise 
only 22.9% and 5.8% of the total shares outstanding, while state shares and legal 
person shares account for 40.9% and 23.6% of the total shares outstanding, 
respectively. The proportion of public A-shares increases from 15.9% in 1992 to 
26.7% in 2003, while the proportion of public B-shares decreases from 14.9% in 
1992 to 2.7% in 2003.  In sum, about two thirds of the total issued shares of the 
Chinese listed companies are non-tradable with most take the form of state shares 
and legal person shares. The state still controls the majority shareholding of the 





Ownership Structure of China’s Listed Companies  
(1992-2003)  
 














1992  42.1%  26.6%  1.2% 70.0% 15.9% 14.9% 0.0%  30.8% 
1993  49.1%  20.7%  2.5% 72.2% 15.8% 6.4% 5.6%  27.8% 
1994  43.3%  22.5%  1.1% 67.0% 21.0% 6.1% 6.0%  33.0% 
1995  38.7%  24.6%  1.1% 64.5% 21.2% 6.7% 7.7%  35.5% 
1996  35.4%  27.2%  2.2% 64.8% 21.9% 6.4% 6.9%  35.2% 
1997  31.5%  30.6%  3.2% 65.3% 22.8% 6.0% 5.7%  34.6% 
1998  34.3%  28.3%  3.3% 65.9% 24.1% 5.3% 4.7%  34.1% 
1999  36.1%  26.6%  2.3% 65.0% 26.3% 4.6% 4.0%  35.0% 
2000  38.9%  23.8%  1.6% 64.3% 28.4% 4.0% 3.3%  35.7% 
2001  46.2%  18.3%  0.8% 65.3% 25.3% 3.1% 6.4%  34.7% 
2002  47.2%  17.3%  0.8% 65.3% 25.7% 2.9% 6.1%  34.7% 
2003  47.4%  16.6%  0.7% 64.7% 26.7% 2.7% 5.9%  35.3% 
Average  40.9% 23.6% 1.7% 66.2% 22.9% 5.8% 5.2% 33.9%
 
Sources: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook, various issues  
 
Another unique feature of China’s emerging stock markets is that the government 
exerts strict control of share issues on the stock markets. Under the old quota 
system, the State Planning Committee (SPC), in conjunction with the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) set the national quota for the amount 
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of new shares in China. The quota was then allocated among the provinces 
according to criteria that support regional development goals, in consideration of 
provincial industrial mixes. On 17 March 2000, China unveiled new rules for 
applying for initial pubic offerings (IPOs), abolishing its old quota system. 
However, stock exchange listings are still under strict state control as it is the 
CSRC that has the power to determine the rules and timing of the approval of the 
IPO applications.  
 
2.3 Segmented A and B-share markets  
The A and B-share markets were intentionally segmented from the beginning of 
China’s stock market development. The A-shares were restricted to domestic 
investors and traded in China’s local currency, Renminbi (RMB), while the B-
shares were restricted to foreign investors till early 2001 and traded in U.S. dollar 
on the SHSE and in Hong Kong dollar on the SZSE. The restrictions imposed in 
China are unique, as the markets available to domestic and foreign investors were 
completely segmented. While in most other countries, the stock market 
segmentation is partial where foreign investors are only allowed to buy the foreign 
class of shares and domestic investors can trade both of the local and foreign 
shares.2
 
                                                 
2  For detailed description of market segmentation in other countries, please refer to 
Hietala (1989) on Finland, Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) on Thailand, Stulz and 
Wasserfallen (1995) on Switzerland and Domowitz et al. (1997) on Mexico. 
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On 19 February 2001, the CSRC announced that Chinese citizens would be 
allowed to own B-share stocks traded on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. However even after this regulatory change, B-share trading by Chinese 
domestic investors are still constrained by the availability of foreign currencies as 
Chinese currency Renminbi is still not convertible for capital account transactions. 
Only domestic individual investors can trade B-shares and domestic institutional 
investors are still banned from trading of the B-shares. Therefore till now the 
China’s A and B-share markets are still largely segmented as evident by the large 
and persistent foreign B-share discounts comparing to the prices of the domestic 
A-shares issued by the same listed companies (Karolyi and Li,  2003). While in 
most other countries, the foreign shares are traded at premiums (Bailey et al., 
1999).  
 
In addition to the ownership property and trading currency differences, there are a 
number of differences between the A and B-shares. First, the B-share markets 
have not expanded as rapidly as the A-share markets. Table 2.3 lists the market 
scale and trading statistics of China’s A and B-shares as at the end of 2003, 
respectively. By the end of 2003, there are 1261 companies that issued A-shares 
but only 111 companies that issued B-shares. The A-share float market 
capitalization for the tradable shares is RMB 1,230.6 billion and the B-share float 
market capitalization is only RMB 87.3 billion. The annual turnover value is RMB 
3,127.0 billion for the A-shares but only RMB 84.5 for the B-shares in 2003. 
Overall, the B-share markets are much smaller than the A-share markets in terms 





Market Scale and Trading Statistics of China’s A and B-share Markets  
(As at the end of 2003) 
 
 A –share B -share 
 SHSE SZSE Total SHSE SZSE Total
Number of 
Stocks 770 491 1,261 54 57 111
 Issued Shares 1
(bil) 407.6 173.3 580.8 9.5 9.5 19.0
Tradable Shares 








779.7 450.9 1,230.6 40.4 46.8 87.3
Trading Volume 
(bil ) 263.3 136.0 399.2 6.0 11.1 17.1
Turnover Value 
(RMB bil) 2,054.1 1,072.9 3,127.0 28.3 56.2 84.5
 
Notes:  
1. Number of issued shares which include both tradable and non-tradable shares 
2. Market capitalization calculated based on the issued shares 
3. Market capitalization calculated based on the tradable shares only 
 
Sources: Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book 2003, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 
2003 and the CSRC website: http://www.csrc.gov.cn  
 
Second, the information disclosure requirements are higher for the companies 
with B-shares than those for the companies with only A-shares. The financial 
statements of A-share firms should be prepared according to the PRC generally 
accepted accounting principles (PRC GAAPs) and audited by locally certified 
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accountants. The financial statements of B-share firms must follow the 
International Accounting Standards (IASs) and audited by international audit 
firms. The IASs are more conservative than the PRC GAAPs. China’s dually 
listed firms need to prepare two sets of financial statements with the differences 
between the two sets of numbers disclosed in the PRC GAAP statements (Chen, 
Ferdinand and Su, 1999). 
 
Third, the A-share markets are overwhelmed by individual investors while the B-
share markets have much larger participation by institutional investors, especially 
before the B-share markets’ opening to domestic individual investors. As at the 
end of 2000, 99.59% of the A-share investors registered with the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange are individual investors while the rest 0.41% are institutional investors. 
5.72% of investors in the Shanghai B-share market are institutional investors. On 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, institutional investors constitute 0.49% and 6.41% 
of the total registered A and B-share investors at the end of 2000, respectively.3 
Table 2.4 shows the shareholder composition in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
during the period from 1992 to 2003. The proportion of institutional investor 
increases gradually from 0.13% in 1992 to 0.52% in 2003 in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange A-share market and decreases from 28.37% in 1992 to 1.63% in 2003 
in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange B-share market, with the sharp drop occurs in 
2001.  It is generally believed that in China foreign institutional investors have 
more sophisticated analytical tools in processing the stock market information (see, 
e.g., Chui and Kwok, 1998; Sjöö and Zhang, 2000).   
                                                 
3 Data are collected from the Shanghai Securities Year Book 2000 and the Shenzhen Stock 




Shareholder Composition in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange  
(1992-2003) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
A-share Investors 
(thousand) 1,050.5 3,532.8 4,830.0 5,550.4 10,895.8 16,097.8 19,010.9 21,859.2 28,303.9 31,652.2 32,593.2 33,213.3 
— Individual 1,049.1 3,522.2 4,807.2 5,519.0 10,853.0 16,018.8 18,924.7 21,788.1 28,164.7 31,497.6 32,425.7 33,040.6 
     by percentage 99.87% 99.70% 99.53% 99.43% 99.61% 99.51% 99.55% 99.67% 99.51% 99.51% 99.49% 99.48% 
— Institution 1.4 10.5 22.7 31.4 42.7 79.0 86.2 107.2 139.2 154.60 167.50 172.7 
     by percentage 0.13% 0.30% 0.47% 0.57% 0.39% 0.49% 0.45% 0.49% 0.49% 0.49% 0.51% 0.52% 
B-share Investors 
(thousand) 3.7 8.8 11.0 22.3 93.6 102.5 106.3 113.3 129.0 555.9 581.7 601.5 
— Individual 2.6 6.8 8.0 18.6 89.1 96.1 99.4 105.8 120.8 547.0 572.4 591.6 
     by percentage 71.63% 77.09% 72.77% 83.53% 95.16% 93.78% 93.42% 93.37% 93.59% 98.39% 98.39% 98.37% 
— Institution 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.7 4.5 6.4 7.0 7.5 8.3 8.9 9.4 9.8 
     by percentage 28.37% 22.91% 27.23% 16.47% 4.84% 6.22% 6.58% 6.63% 6.41% 1.61% 1.61% 1.63% 
  




Fourth, domestic A-share investors have less alternative investment opportunities 
as comparing to foreign B-share investors. China is still in the early stage of 
capital market development. Domestic investors’ access to foreign capital markets 
is limited by non-convertibility of currency under capital account transactions and 
administrative barriers. So that for domestic A-share investors, the main 
investment alternatives are bank deposits and bonds. While in China the interest 
rates paid on bank deposit are not a market-determined interest rates and very 
unattractive. Gordon and Li (2000) argue that the Chinese government effectively 
‘taxes’ Chinese saver by setting interest rates below world levels. In other words, 
China engages in financial repression. And the bond market is concentrated in 
government bond with low liquidity. Bailey (1994) among others suggests that the 
required rate of return is lower for Chinese A-share investors than for foreign B-
share investors.  
 
Fifth, the information channels are different between domestic A-share investors 
and foreign B-share investors. Xu (2000) points out that “foreign investors 
reportedly have better access to timely updates on the Chinese economy from 
media such as Reuters and other financial services”. Local investors also have 
their information sources, such as ‘network of relationship’ and ‘word of mouth’. 
The information environment of the A-share markets is more ‘informal’, giving 





At last, for the A-shares, the settlement takes place on the same day (T+0) of a 
transaction among members of exchanges and the next trading day (T+1) between 
broker and his or her customer. As for the B-shares, the settlement takes place 3 
trading days after the day of a transaction (T+3) as payment is made in foreign 




Reaction to Regulatory Changes and Policy Adjustments in 
China’s Emerging Stock Markets4
 
3.1 Introduction  
Stock markets are continuously flooded with new information, such as 
macroeconomic statistics releases, political events and regulatory changes. The 
linkages between public information and stock markets are well documented in 
the literature (see, e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1994; Boyd et al., 2005). Market-
wide public information may play a larger role in the emerging Chinese stock 
markets due to a higher level of government intervention (Kutan and Yuan, 2002). 
When the government authorities change policies and rules regarding the stock 
market regulation, share prices are likely to respond with unusual movements. 
Anecdotal press accounts tend to confirm that daily fluctuations in China’s stock 
markets are importantly affected by government regulatory changes and policy 
adjustments (Walter and Howei, 2001). 
 
China provides an ideal case for investigating the effects of government 
regulatory changes and policy adjustments on stock market movements for several 
reasons: (1) since their launch around 1990, China’s emerging stock markets have 
                                                 
4  A joint paper with Ding Lu entitled “Reactions to regulatory changes and policy 
adjustments in an emerging stock market: China” based on the content of this chapter has 
been published in Global Stock Markets and Portfolio Management, edited by S. 
Motamen-Samadian, London: Palgrave Press, 2006. I thank anonymous referees for their 
valuable comments and suggestions. 
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been exposed to various announcements of policy and regulatory changes as the 
whole economy being transformed from a central planned system to a market 
based one; (2) the Chinese stock markets are characterized by frequent and large 
daily spikes. Given the intensity and frequency of the information shocks, the 
substantial daily movements of China’s stock prices provide a database with 
potential to generate robust observations of market reaction patterns; and (3) what 
makes the topic more fascinating is the segmentation of China’s stock markets, 
where two classes of shares, the A-shares and the B-shares are traded, which 
provides an opportunity to investigate whether they have different responses to 
regulatory changes and policy adjustments.  
 
The existing empirical literature has explored the impacts of one or several 
regulatory events in China’s stock markets (see, e.g., Su and Fleisher, 1998; 
Karolyi and Li, 2003). The studies by Walter and Howei (2001) and Fan et al. 
(2003) are descriptive in nature. To the best of my knowledge, no systematic and 
comprehensive empirical study has been done to examine the regulatory and 
policy impacts on China’s emerging stock markets. This chapter attempts to fill 
the void.  
 
In this chapter, I investigate the stock market reaction to regulatory changes and 
policy announcements in China during the period from 1995 to 2003.  By relating 
the return outliers to the associated events identified by news reports and financial 
analysis articles, I find that around 50% of largest return outliers can be explained 
by regulatory events, which motives a further more systematic investigation of 
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market responses to certain categories of regulatory changes and policy 
announcements. A modified GARCH (1,1)-M model is used to analyze the 
Chinese A-share and B-share market reaction to various categories of regulation 
related announcements.  
 
The results show that (1) the A (B)-share markets respond positively to the market 
demand boosting policies and measures, but the B-share markets display stronger 
reaction and also rise statistically significantly one trading day before the 
announcements; (2) the A (B)-share markets respond negatively to the disciplinary 
actions and strengthening of supervision which reduces demand and mean return 
of the Shanghai B-share market continues to be statistically significant one trading 
day after the news; (3) all submarkets respond positively to the transaction cost 
cut announcements, but with smaller magnitudes as compared to those of other 
administrative measures; (4) in response to the news of A (B)-share market supply 
expansion, the A (B)-share market returns drop (rise) on the announcement days; 
and (5) the imposition of daily price change limit on 16 December 1996 decreases 
return volatilities in the A-share markets but does not moderate stock volatilities 
in the B-share markets.  
 
By including the cross-market regulatory event dummy variables in the modified 
GARCH (1,1)-M model, the empirical test results show a stronger spillover effect 
in relation to the regulatory changes and policy adjustments from the A-share 
markets to the B-share markets than that from the B-share markets to the A-share 




The overall findings indicate that the B-share markets are more sensitive to the 
regulatory changes and policy announcements governing both the A and B-share 
markets and foreign B-share investors have some information advantages 
regarding this type of market-wide public information over domestic A-share 
investors.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview 
of regulatory framework and reports the performance of stock market indices in 
China. Section 3.3 describes the regulatory news, reviews the literature and forms 
the research hypotheses. Section 3.4 presents a modified GARCH (1,1)–M model 
methodology and the empirical results that testify the impacts of various 
categories of regulatory events on stock market movements in China’s segmented 
A and B-share markets. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary and 
discussion in Section 3.5.  
 
3.2 Institution background and stock index performance 
3.2.1 Regulatory framework governing China’s stock markets 
The evolution process of regulatory framework governing the Chinese stock 
markets has been heavily influenced by the political-economic dynamism in 
China’s transition from a central planned system to market oriented one. The 
regulatory framework has evolved from a diversified system to a centralized 




Stage 1: The initial stage (before October 1992) 
At this stage, the Chinese stock markets were mainly regulated by the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC) under the assistance of the State Commission for the 
Restructuring of the Economic Systems (SCRES) and the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
governments. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) were also involved in the regulation of listed firms and financial 
intermediaries in China’s stock markets. There were overlapping responsibilities 
among various government authorities.    
 
Stage 2: Gradual establishment of a national system (October 1992 to April 
1998) 
The establishment of the State Council Securities Committee (SCSC) and the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in October 1992 is a milestone 
in China’s regulatory framework building process. At this stage, the SCSC with its 
members, including the PBOC, the MOF and the SPC and the CSRC were 
responsible for centralized regulation. And the SCSC was the immediate 
supervisory body over the CSRC, which was as a specialized independent 
regulatory body in charge of day-to-day monitoring of the stock markets and 
market participants. The local people’s governments were also authorized to carry 





Stage 3: Formation of a centralized regulatory framework (April 1998 
onwards) 
When the SCSC was dissolved in 1998, the CSRC was upgraded to the equivalent 
rank of a ministry with extensive centralized authority powers, playing a leading 
supervisory role in the regulation of local agencies, the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges, brokerage houses and public listed companies. According to the 
People’s Bank Law implemented since 1998, the PBOC transferred all its 
supervisory powers over the securities industry to the CSRC. China’s first 
Securities Law, which took effect in July 1999, further strengthened the CSRC’s 
regulatory powers over China’s stock markets. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges, as the organizers of the securities markets, exercise front line 
regulation under the direct leadership of the CSRC. Therefore, a centralized 
regulatory system governing securities markets was formed to remove the 
inconsistencies and inefficiencies apparent in the old regulatory system.  
 
However, as observed by Walter and Howie (2001), there has been a continuous 
power struggle among the PBOC, the MOF and other bureaucracies over the 
control of the Chinese stock markets. So despite the centralized organizational 
restructure, the institutional framework still remains partially fragmented.  
 
In the backdrop of this evolving regulatory framework, China’s stock markets 
have been seen as ‘policy-driven’ markets (Heilmann, 2002). Initially the stock 
markets were developed instrumentally for reform of the SOEs. The government 
selected some SOEs to be corporatized and listed on the stock markets. The 
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segmentation of the tradable and non-tradable shares ensures the continuous 
control by the state. The segmentation of the A and B-shares reflects the official 
policy to restrict the control of domestic listed companies by foreign investors and 
to prevent manipulation of China’s emerging A-share markets by foreign players. 
Since their launch, China’s stock markets have manifested a particular regulatory 
style distinctively different from that of other stock markets (Zhang, 2001). The 
regulatory policies are imbued with the spirit of state planning, state control and 
state interest. Frequent regulation and policy changes have been oriented towards 
supporting the SOEs and stabilizing the stock markets. Direct government 
interventions in trading have been a norm, featured by various administrative 
measures.  
 
What worsens the efficiency of regulatory system is the conflicting policy 
missions assigned to the CSRC. As noted by Heilmann (2002), the CSRC’ policy 
missions to provide preferential capital access for the SOEs and to increase the 
value of state assets constantly conflict its role of being an impartial supervisory 
and regulatory authority. At the times when the development of the SOEs or stock 
markets is chosen as the priority objective, regulation will be relaxed and 
standardization of market practices will be compromised. On the other hand, when 
regularity is set as priority objective, the strengthening of the regulation and 
supervision will result in the stagnation and turmoil of the market, hurting the 
normal development of the stock markets.  These conflicting objectives of stock 
market regulators exert impacts on regulatory policies. As a result policy changes 
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frequently and there is no consistent regulatory yardstick, which further weakens 
the effectiveness of market regulation (Zhang, 2001)5.  
 
3.2.2 Performance of stock market indices  
Daily closing prices of four submarket indices, i.e., Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite A-share index (SHA), Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A-share 
index (SZA), Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite B-share index (SHB), and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite B-share index (SZB) are used as proxies for 
market performance. All the index price data are obtained from Datastream 
International database.  
 
Panel A of Table 3.1 gives a summary of the descriptive statistics of the daily 
returns of SHA, SHB, SZA and SZB for the sample period from1995 to 20036. 
Daily return is calculated as log difference change of the index price: 
100)ln(ln 1 ×−= −titt PPR                                                                       (3.1)            
where  is the daily return for the market index and  is the daily closing 




                                                 
5 Zhang Yujun is President and CEO of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The quote is from 
his speech titled “The PRC securities market: an overview of its regulatory capability and 
efficiency”, presented at the conference on Financial Reform in China, 11-13 September 
2001.  
 
6 The sample period starts from 1995 as one of the event data sources, People’s Daily 




Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of China’s Submarket 




Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
   SHA SZA SHB SZB
 Mean 0.036 0.043 0.022 0.049
 P-value for Mean=0 (0.3520) (0.2948) (0.6385) (0.3249)
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Maximum 27.851 25.942 12.184 12.448
 Minimum -18.427 -19.632 -13.085 -16.699
 Standard Deviation 1.895 1.984 2.255 2.398
 Skewness 0.996* 0.387* 0.432* 0.246*
 Kurtosis 31.020* 23.695* 8.234* 9.553*
 Jarque-Bera (JB) 77,167* 41,943* 2,752* 4,223*
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
   SHA SZA SHB SZB
SHA  1.0000*  
SZA  0.8902*  1.0000*  
SHB  0.4110*  0.4026*  1.0000* 
SZB  0.4361*  0.4372*  0.7582*  1.0000*
 
Notes:  
1. Daily return is calculated as 100)ln(ln 1 ×−= −titt PPR , where  is the closing 
index price on day t.  
tP
 




The results indicate that the mean returns for all the four submarkets are not 
statistically significantly different from zero. The standard deviations of Shanghai 
and Shenzhen A-share markets are lower than those of Shanghai and Shenzhen B-
share markets, showing that in general the B-share markets are more volatile than 
the A-share markets during the sample period. The parameters for Skewness are 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that stock market returns are not 
symmetrically distributed. The coefficients of Kurtosis are also statistically 
significant, suggesting that extreme daily return movements are frequently 
observed in all SHA, SZA, SHB and SZB markets. The Jarque-Bera statistics that 
test the hypothesis of normal distribution are all rejected at the 1% significance 
level.  
 
Panel B of Table 3.1 provides pair-wise correlation matrix of submarket returns. 
All coefficients are positive and statistically significant. At the same time the 
correlations between the two A (B)-share market indices are higher than those 
between A and B-share indices on the same exchanges.  
 
Figure 3.1 plots the daily closing prices of SHA, SZA, SHB and SZB indices. To 
make a better visual comparison of their behaviors, the normalized index closing 
prices are used7.   
 
                                                 
7 To normalize the closing price series of the four indices, all the daily closing prices are 
divided by the closing price of corresponding submarket as at the first trading day of the 
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Note: Closing prices as at 2 January 1995=100.  
Source: Datastream International database  
 
Figure 3.1 clearly shows similar movement patters of SHA (SHB) and SZA (SZB) 
markets and different patterns between the A and B-share submarkets on the 
SHSE or the SZSE. The prevalence of large daily index price movements is 
visible. Also there are the presences of high volatile periods. For example, for 
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both Shanghai and Shenzhen B-share markets, first half of 2001 is an extremely 
volatile period. There is a dramatic run-up in B-share indices after the CSRC 
allowed the domestic investors with U.S. or Hong Kong dollars to purchase B-
shares. 
 
3.2.3 The news that rocks stock markets  
By reviewing the coincident news reports and financial analysis articles to identify 
the proximate causes for the largest daily index returns, Cutler et al. (1989) 
estimate the fraction of the variation in stock movements that can be attributed to 
public news and Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) analyze the type of news that 
rocks the stock markets during the Asian Crisis.  Similarly, Kim and Mei (2001) 
identify jump return dates in Hong Kong stock market and reckon the frequent 
association between the largest stock market movements and political news.  
 
Motivated by this strand of empirical studies, a modified ARIMA outlier detection 
procedure of Vandaele (1983) is used to identify dates with fifty largest outliers in 
index returns and assess the coincidence between return hikes and regulatory 
changes or policy adjustments reported by the newspaper media. 8  A similar 
approach has been used by Lo and Chan (2000) to analyze the shocks in ‘Greater 
                                                 
8 As a robustness check, I also use a less sophisticated approach of Culter et al. (1999) to 
match the largest daily index returns to their ‘causes’. The results are similar to those 
reported in Table 3.2. The advantage of using ARIMA outlier detection procedure is its 
ability to identify level shifts and trend in stock market movements, which are however, 
not exist in the return series I examine in this chapter. Vandaele (1983) provides a 




China’ stock markets. They observe that most return outliers in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen B-share markets are driven by local events, such as government policy 
announcements.  
 
To identify the events that ‘cause’ the market return hikes, I check the relevant 
news reports and financial analysis articles on People’s Daily (the most 
authoritative newspaper in China with the highest circulation rate, whose online 
search function is available at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn), China Securities, 
Securities Times and Shanghai Securities (three official securities market 
publications authorized by the CSRC), and China Securities Bulletin (a Hong 
Kong-based financial press available at Factive information service provided by 
Reuters and Dow Jones).9 An event is defined to ‘cause’ or ‘match’ with return 
outliers if two criteria are met: (1) the event falls on the same day or one trading 
day before the outlier date and (2) reported by at least one news report and 
financial analysis article to explain the unusual stock market movement. The 
appendix 2 presents the dates, sizes and t-values for the fifty largest return outliers 
and their associated event dates and contents.10 For a number of outlier dates with 
                                                 
9 Inclusion of China Securities Bulletin into the data sources makes it possible to match 
the return outliers with market rumors about possible regulatory changes and political 
events, which sometimes may not appear on the official media of Mainland China to 
explain the large stock market movements. Interviews with some Chinese domestic equity 
analysts and investors confirm that such information is generally accessible to domestic 
investors through the brokerage houses in the forms of informal handouts, ‘word of 
mouths’ or internet forums.  
 
10 Following Culter et al. (1999) I identify fifty largest daily movements for each of the 
index return series. When I assess thirty and seventy outliers, the proportions of return 
outliers attributed to regulatory events are close to those reported in this section. There is 
an AR(1) item for the SHB returns and a MA(1) item for the SZB returns. No AR or MA 




no plausible explanation of extreme daily returns provided by news reports and 
financial analysis articles, the event entries are left empty.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the classification of the ‘causes’ of the fifty largest daily return 
outliers.11 Authorities’ regulatory changes and policy adjustments ‘cause’ more 
than 60% of return outliers for SHA market and about 50% for SZA, SHB and 
SZB markets. A further perusal of outlier causing regulatory events indicates that 
most are related to (1) demand boosting policy and measure; (2) disciplinary 
action and strengthening of supervision; (3) market supply expansion and (4) 
transaction cost adjustment. In Table 3.2, I further classify the regulatory events 
into the above four categories, with the rest put under the ‘others’ category. 
Several largest market shifts are brought out by ‘market rumor/ expectation’ about 
the regulatory change and policy adjustment. Rumors about political issues, such 
as the health of China’s leader Deng Xiaoping, also rock the market a few times. 
6%, 8%, 10% and 8% of return outliers in SHA, SZA, SHB and SZB are related to 
political events, respectively. ‘Macroeconomic data announcement’ could be used 
to match only 0-2 cases of 50 return outliers, the result seems to complement 
Kutan and Yuan (2003) who uncover that macroeconomic news release dummy 
variable has no statistically significant impact on China’s stock markets in general.  
I also find that for each submarket two return outliers occur on the first trading 
days after the long Chinese New Year pubic holidays. 2%, 12% and 4% of daily 
                                                 
11 The percentages for all ‘causes’ categories may add up to more than 100% since certain 
return outliers can be explained by more than one events by the media reports and 
financial analysis articles, therefore outlier dates may be coded under multiple categories 
of ‘causes’.  
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return outliers in SZA, SHB and SZB are associated with the fluctuation in other 
stock markets, for most cases, the Hong Kong stock market.  
 
Table 3.2 
Classification of ‘Causes’ of Fifty Largest Daily Return Outliers in 
China’s Submarkets (1995-2003) 
 
 SHA SZA SHB SZB 



















































Market Rumor / Expectation 6 (12%)
5 
(10%)




– Government regulation change and       






















































No Specific Reason 7 (14%)
12 
(24%)
    8 
(16%) 
   11 
(22%)
 
Note: The percentages for all ‘causes’ categories add up to more than 100% since certain 




The main finding of this section is that about half of daily return outliers in 
China’s stock markets are closely associated with the regulatory changes or policy 
adjustment announcements, as reported by the news reports and financial analysis 
articles. In contrast, Kaminsky (1998) finds that about half of the largest U.S. 
stock market swings are unrelated to the arrival of public news. This section 
provides a general picture of the importance of regulatory events in influencing 
the Chinese stock market movements, which motivates a further study of the 
market responses to certain categories of regulatory events.  
 
3.3 Literature review, news description and hypothesis development 
3.3.1 Public news arrival and stock market behavior 
Pubic news may reveal new information not previously incorporated in asset 
prices, so that stock returns may change as market participants process the newly 
received information (Bomfirm, 2003). Stock market responses to the arrival of 
market-wide public information, such as announcements about political events 
and macroeconomic data, have been verified by voluminous empirical evidences. 
For instance, Chan and Wei (1996) find that political news increases the stock 
return variation of both ‘blue-chip’ and ‘red-chip’ shares in Hong Kong, but a 
consistent pattern of impacts of favorable or unfavorable news on returns could be 
observed only for the ‘blue-chip’ shares other than the ‘red-chip’ shares of China-
originated companies. Edmonds and Kutan (2002) use ‘disaggregated’ dummies 
combined with GARCH (1,1) model to identify the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on Japanese stock market returns. Flannery and Protopapadakis 
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(2002) employ a GARCH (1,1) methodology to analyze the effects of 
macroeconomic data releases on aggregate stock returns and find news related to 
six out of seventeen candidates of macroeconomic series’ announcements do 
influence index returns.  Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) investigate the news 
that rocks the stock markets during the Asian Crisis and uncover that the 
movements can be triggered by news of neighboring countries. Kutan and Yuan 
(2003) examine the impacts of public information arrival on the emerging Chinese 
A and B-share markets and find that trade related announcements have more 
statistically significant impacts on stock returns than those related to the releases 
of macroeconomic data and monetary and fiscal policy news. Their findings also 
show that trade announcements have larger effects on the B-share markets than on 
the A-share markets.  
 
Regarding the stock market responses to public news related to government 
regulation, Umlauf (1993) investigates the impact of the announcements of stamp 
duty rate changes on the Swedish stock market. Jones and Seguin (1997) 
document the effect of U.S. transaction commission deregulation on stock price 
behavior. A few studies have explored several regulatory events in China’s stock 
markets. Ma (1996) shows that the reactions to the CSRC’ s market support 
policies announced on 30 June 1994 are stronger in the A-share markets than in 
the B-share markets. 12  Friedmann and Sanddorf-Köhle (2002) report that the 
introduction of price limit on 16 December 1996 is followed by decreased return 
                                                 
12 The CSRC announced a set of market support policies including (1) a ban on new 
listings of A-shares for the rest of 1994; (2) the provision of a US$ 1.15 billion credit line 
for qualified securities firms to encourage trading and (3) supporting the establishment of 
new mutual funds and possible foreign participation in the domestic A-share market etc.  
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volatilities in the A-share markets but not in the B-share markets. Karolyi and Li 
(2003) document positive price response to the announcement of opening the B-
share trading to domestic investors on 19 February 2001.  
 
Walter and Howei (2001) and Fan et al. (2003) describe a number of government 
regulatory events and the associated market responses in China’s stock markets, 
which have reputation of ‘policy-driven’ markets. As noted by Kutan and Yuan 
(2003), market-wide public information related to the government intervention 
may play a larger role in the emerging Chinese stock markets due to the nature of 
the economy system. However, till now there is no systematic empirical analysis 
on various regulatory events in China’s emerging stock markets.  
 
Following the growing number of public information literature which studies the 
stock market responses to various kinds of public news and the different markets’ 
responses to same kind of pubic news, this chapter intends to investigate the 
following questions:  
 
(1) What are the market responses to certain categories of regulatory changes and 




(2)  Whether the market responses to a specific category of news are different in 
the A-share and B-share markets?  This question is also related to the 
segmentation and information asymmetry issues in China’s stock markets.13  
 
3.3.2 Regulatory news description  
It is difficult if not impossible to keep track of all the regulatory changes and 
policy adjustments in China’s emerging stock markets. In this study, I focus on 
regulatory events related to four issues, including (1) demand boosting policy and 
measure; (2) disciplinary action and strengthening of supervision which results in 
decreased demand; (3) market supply expansion and (4) transaction cost 
adjustment. As reported in Section 3.2.3, these four categories of regulatory 
events have been identified by news reports and financial analysis articles to 
explain a number of daily return outliers in all four submarkets. What is more 
important is that changes in stock market demand, supply and transaction costs are 
the explanatory factors for stock market movements in traditional finance 
literature. Interest rate is another important explanatory factor identified to be 
closely related to stock market movements by the previous studies, therefore is 
included in this study as a control variable.14  
 
                                                 
13  Whether the submarkets in China are segmented or integrated and what are the 
information linkages and asymmetries between the submarkets have attracted much 
attention in the literature. See Yang (2003) for a review of recent studies.  
 
14 The review on the impacts of market demand, supply, transaction cost and interest rate 
on stock returns is presented in Section 3.3.3.  
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The dates and contents of these four categories of regulatory events and interest-
rate adjustments are results of a search of People’s Daily, China Securities, 
Securities Times, Shanghai Securities and China Securities Bulletin. In this study, 
the announcement day is defined as the earliest day on which disclosure of the 
relevant news is made to the general public. In the case when a chain of similar 
regulatory events occurs on consecutive days, the first day would be chosen as the 
event day if these events can be identified to be related to the same issue. In some 
cases, when the information is released after the trading hours of stock exchanges, 
the following trading days would be referred to align them with the returns that 
they should affect. I also shift the event days related to a few announcements that 
occur on the non-trading days, aligning them with the first subsequent trading 
days’ stock returns. Appendix 3 lists the full records of the event days and their 
contents.  
 
The sample regulatory news series, the mnemonic abbreviations and the numbers 
of events in each category over the years (1995 to 2003) are listed in Table 3.3 to 
give a general and succinct picture of regulatory events in the sample period. It is 
noted that there are more regulation related announcements in the A-share markets 
comparing to the B-share markets. And there are periods with relatively more 
government regulatory interventions, such as year 1996 for the A-share markets 
and year 2001 for the B-share markets. A brief description for each kind of news 







Number of Sample Regulatory Events in China’s Submarkets  
(1995-2003) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
 Panel A: A-share markets 
DBP: 
 
2 3 1 0 3 3 1 2 2 17 
DSS: 
 
2 6 3 1 1 3 4 0 0 20 
MSE: 
 
2 5 5 0 2 1 3 4 0 22 
TCC: 
 
0 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 6 
Total 6 16 10 2 6 7 9 7 2 65 
 Panel B: B-share markets 
DBP: 
 
0 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6 
DSS: 
 
1 3 1 1 0 0 4 1 0 11 
MSE: 
 
0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 6 
TCC: 
 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
Total 1 6 4 4 2 1 7 3 0 30 
 
Notes:  
DBP: Demand boosting policy and measure 
DSS:  Disciplinary action and strengthening of supervision 
MSE: Market supply expansion  





(1) Demand boosting policy or measure  
The news is defined to be classified under this category if it is headline news on at 
least one of data source media publications and reported by news reports and 
financial analysis articles that the policy or measure would result in increased 
market demand15.  
 
At the times when the stock market sentiments are low, the government 
regulatory authorities try to ‘stabilize the market’ or ‘save the market’ by 
adopting various administrative measures. One category of the measures to 
vitalize the markets and maintain social stability is to boost the market demand. 
For instance, in a bid to ‘revitalize’ the gloomy markets, the CSRC opened more 
financial facilities for brokerage firms to expand their capital on 24 May 1999, 
and then lifted a ban on the SOEs, listed companies and insurance companies to 
enter the secondary stock markets on 9 September 1999.  
 
Some events are related to suspending of trading and cracking down of market 
manipulation in the Treasury bond futures market for the period from May to July 
1995. These regulatory events result in investors switching their investment funds 
from the Treasury bond futures market into the A-share markets and demand in 
the A-share markets increases.  
 
                                                 
15 Theoretically, events related to cutting transaction cost might also result in increased 
demand and could be classified under this category. In this study, transaction cost cut 
events are classified as a single category of events as it is one of the well-known 
regulatory mechanisms used by the securities market regulators in other countries. 
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(2) Disciplinary action and strengthening of supervision which reduces 
demand 
The news is defined to be classified under this category if it is headline news on at 
least one of data source media publications and reported by news reports and 
financial analysis articles that the specific disciplinary action and strengthening of 
supervision indicates the government authorities’ decision to reduce the 
destabilizing speculation and illegal trading, which results in reduced demand.  
 
As noted by Zhang (2001), at the times that stock markets become overheated and 
excessive speculation appears, the regularity of stock markets would become the 
key objective of the regulators. The authorities are forced to take extreme 
measures to suppress the markets and strengthen the supervision. For example, 
during the period from the end of 1996 to the first half of 1997, the markets were 
bullish and extreme volatile. The regulatory authorities issued various measures to 
suppress speculation and illegal activities. The stock market regulators announced 
to strengthen the ban on Chinese citizen buying B-shares on 11 December 1996 
and announced to tighten the monitoring of the securities houses soon after16.  
Further disciplinary actions and measures were taken in May and June 1996, as 
the SCSC, the PBOC and the State Office of Economic and Trade (SOET) jointly 
announced that the SOEs and listed companies were prohibited from trading 
stocks and the PBOC announced the prohibition of bank funds to be used for stock 
                                                 
16 Anecdotal evidences suggest that domestic investors had been able to open B-share 
accounts relatively easily before they were explicitly allowed to trade the B-shares. It is 
reported that Chinese investors began investing heavily though illegally in the B-shares 




trading.17  These result in consequent withdrawal of enormous sum of bank funds 
from the stock markets (Fernald and Rogers, 2002).  
 
(3) Market supply expansion 
The news is defined to be included under this category if it is headline news on at 
least one of data source media publications and be reported by news reports and 
financial analysis articles that the policy or statement shows the government 
authorities’ policy intention to speed up or slow down the market supply 
expansion.  
 
A few events are related to the announcements of quotas for the listing on the 
primary stock markets which indicate the authorities’ intention to expand the 
stock market supply.18 For example, the CSRC announced a new national quota of 
RMB 5.5 billion of A-share listing on 15 June 1995 and unveiled a new list of 18 
candidates who could issue B-shares on 9 February 1998.  
 
The government’s strategic objectives to solve the difficulties faced by the SOEs 
and reduce the state share holdings also have impact on market expansion speed. 
                                                 
17 In the early 1990s, the PBOC and other state-owned banks were permitted to establish 
their securities agencies and indirectly participate in the securities market. Not surprising, 
speculation and violation of regulation were rife due to the corruption. In December 1993, 
the State Council made a decision to separate the banks from the securities industry. The 
first step was the separation of the PBOC branches from securities firms. However, the 
regulation to segregate the banks and stock markets was not effective. The capital from 
banks still entered the stock markets illegally (Walter and Howie, 2001).  
 
18 Under the old quota system, the State Planning Committee (SPC) in conjunction with 
the CSRC set the national quota for the amount of new shares could be issued. And the 
authorities would choose and announce batch of B-share listing candidate companies 
from time to time.  
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On 22 September 1997, the authorities indicated a rapid stock market expansion 
plan marked by a proposition of diversified forms to restructure the SOEs. From 
middle 2001 to the first half 2002, there were series of policy announcements 
relating to the scheme of the state share reduction.  For example, on 14 June 2001, 
China unveiled rules aimed at cutting the state's holdings in firms to raise funds 
for social security. However, as the markets were in weak sentiments, on 22 
October 2001 the central government moved to temporally halt the state share 
reduction scheme. On 27 January 2002, a new plan to sell state shares was 
announced by the regulators. Then the government suspended once again the 
controversial scheme four days later. These announcements have implication to 
the A-share market expansion speed as once the state shares flow into the markets 
there would be huge enlarged market share supply (Walter and Howie, 2001). As 
indicated in Section 2.2, state shares represent more than 40% of total issued 
shares in recent years.  
 
(4) Transaction cost cut (stamp duty and commission etc)  
The news under this category is identified by searching the data source media 
publications and recording all the announcements related to the transaction cost 
cut, including stock transaction stamp duty and commission etc. 
  
Table 3.4 provides a summary of all the transaction cost cut announcements 
during the sample period, including the purposes of authorities’ regulatory 





























To stabilize the 
markets and increase 
investors’ confidence.
 
S2   28/05/1999   
 
01/06/1999    
 




To boost the B-share 
markets.  
 




S3   16/11/2001 
 
16/11/2001 
 B        0.3% 0.2% 
 
To stimulate share 
markets, which in 
weak sentiments.   
S4   24/01/2002 24/01/2002 AB      0.2% 0.1% 





C1   24/04/1996 24/04/1996 AB Note * To revive markets. 
C2    4/09/1996 03/10/1996    A       0.4%   0.35% To increases competitiveness. 
C3    6/12/2000 01/01/2001  B        0.6%  0.43% To activate the B-share trading. 
 A      0.43% <0.3% 
C4   05/04/2002 08/05/2002
 
 B      0.35% <0.3% 
To adopt flexible 




* The measures include (1) allow lower commissions on large trades according to the 
sizes of the deals; (2) the fee to open an individual account to trade foreign currency B-
shares would be cut to US$ 15 from US$ 25 and to open an institutional account to US$ 
75 from US$ 100; (3) unify fees for opening an account to trade domestic A-shares, with 
individuals paying RMB 40  and institutions paying RMB 400; (4) cut the annual trading 
fee for members as of 1996 by one-third. 
 




Table 3.4 shows that cutting stock trading related transaction costs is also an 
important regulatory mechanism adopted by the Chinese government to stimulate 
the markets. For example, when the markets were gloomy and in weak sentiments, 
on 16 November 2001 the MOF announced the stamp duty rate for A and B-
shares reduced to 0.2% from 0.4% and 0.3%, respectively in order to activate the 
stock markets.  
 
Table 3.5 reports the volume of securities transaction stamp duty revenue and as 
percentage of overall stamp duty and national fiscal revenues over the years 
(1995-2003). Majority of the stamp duty revenue comes from the securities 
transactions. But securities transaction stamp duty only contributes 0.4% to 3.6% 
of the total national fiscal revenue. The government decision to adjust the 
securities transaction stamp duty rate is not much influenced by the desire to 
increase or decrease fiscal revenue. The government authorities are more 
concerned about the stock market performance when making regulatory 
announcements to change the securities transaction stamp duty rates (Walter and 










Summary for Securities Transaction Stamp Duty Revenue  
(1995 -2003) 
 

















1995 624,220 4,680 2,638 0.4% 56.4% 
1996 740,800 14,670 12,799 1.7% 87.3% 
1997 865,110 26,630 25,076 2.9% 94.2% 
1998 985,300 23,850 22,575 2.3% 94.7% 
1999 1,137,720 28,230 24,807 2.2% 87.9% 
2000 1,336,011 52,190 48,589 3.6% 93.1% 
2001 1,638,604 33,700 29,131 1.8% 86.5% 
2002 1,890,364 17,940 11,195 0.6% 62.4% 
2003 2,046,610 21,500 12,774 0.6% 59.4% 
 
   Sources: China Statistics Yearbook, various issues  
 
Because some regulatory changes and policy adjustments are only relevant for the 
A or B-share markets, while some else are relevant for both the A and B-share 
markets, the event samples for the A and B-share markets are different for 
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categories (1)-(4). For example, the announcements to slow down the stock 
market supply expansion are related to the A-share markets only. 19
 
During the sample period, the PBOC cut interest rate eight times and State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT) announced to impose 20% tax on bank interest 
on 26 July 1999. The interest rate related announcements are also included in the 
empirical investigation as a control dummy variable for their possible impact on 
stock market movements.  
 
3.3.3 Formation of hypotheses  
In this section, I develop some research hypotheses to be examined in the 
modified GARCH (1,1)-M estimation.  
 
Impact of stock market demand and supply on stock returns 
According to the classic asset pricing models, stock price is the present value of 
the future cash flow so that the regulatory change and policy announcement would 
affect market performance only if it has an impact on the fundamentals (Mei et al., 
2005). While recent studies have provided supports for the downward-sloping 
demand curve hypothesis (see, e.g., Kaul et al., 2000; Biktimirov, 2004). Under 
this hypothesis, stock prices would be affected if the regulatory changes and 
policy announcements are associated with demand or supply shocks on the stock 
                                                 
19 All the announcements to slow down the market supply expansion are related to state 
share reduction plan. As state shares will be converted to A-shares while not B-shares so 
theoretically this category of regulatory changes is directly related to the A-share markets 
but not the B-share markets. While there might be cross-market effect, which will be 
discussed in Section 3.4.3.  
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markets. Specifically, a negatively sloped demand function would imply a positive 
(negative) price reaction after a regulatory event announcement which results in 
increased (decreased) stock demand, and a negative (positive) price reaction after 
a regulatory event announcement which results in increased (decreased) stock 
supply. Therefore, I establish the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1  
There are positive A (B)-share aggregate stock returns associated with the 
announcements of demand boosting policies and measures.   
 
Hypothesis 2 
There are negative A (B)-share aggregate stock returns associated with the 




Hypothesis 3  
There are negative A (B)-share aggregate stock returns associated with the 
announcements that speed up the stock market supply expansion.  
 
Hypothesis 4 
There are positive A-share aggregate stock returns associated with the 




Combined with the institutional background as mentioned in Section 3.3.2, 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 are estimated to be valid in China. The market demand 
boosting policies and measures are important administrative means used by the 
government authorities to stimulate the markets. In addition to channeling more 
capital to the stock markets, the announcements also increase the investors’ 
confidence level. The disciplinary actions and strengthening of supervision of 
stock market are used by the regulators to suppress the markets in the times with 
extreme speculation and illegal activities. In addition to the effect of withdrawal 
of illegal capital, stock markets view the disciplinary actions as bad news, which 
results in investors’ loss of confidence as reported by Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui 
(2005). They also find that following the announcements of the CSRC’s 
enforcement actions, there is a statistically significant drop in stock prices.  
 
The validity of Hypothesis 3 in China is a little bit complicated. Gordon and Li 
(2003) claim that the government intentionally suppresses the number of A-shares 
available for trading, reducing the supply to push up the prices for tradable A-
shares. Mei et al. (2005) document that non-fundamental components of A-share 
prices are related to the over speculation caused by limited supply. So it is logical 
to support hypothesis 3 for A-share markets as increased A-share market supply 
could reduce the supply shortage and over-speculation, which consequently have 
negative impact on the A-share prices. Also as noted in Section 3.3.2, the 
announcements to slow down the speed of market supply expansion were 
following the market expansion news, with the purpose to stabilize the markets.  




The B-share markets are smaller and less liquid than the A-share markets20. As 
the number of B-shares becomes larger, more foreign investors, especially foreign 
institutions will be interested in trading in the B-share markets as emphasized by 
Mei et al. (2005). On 9 September 1997, when the government authorities 
announced to expand B-share markets, they also indicated that one of the purposes 
was to boost trading of B-shares aimed at foreign investors. And the B-share 
market expansion announcements are always interpreted as government’s 
continued support for the B-share markets which are suffered from the small 
market size and liquidity problems. On 8 February 1998, the SCSC unveiled a 
new list of 18 candidates for issuing B-shares. A spokesman with the CSRC 
declared that it indicated the regulators’ intention to continue to secure a stable 
and regulated development for the B-share markets. Therefore, as for B-share 
markets, I have the following hypothesis 5 which is contrary to hypothesis 4: 
 
Hypothesis 5 
There are positive B-share aggregate stock returns associated with the 
announcements that speed up the stock market supply expansion.    
 
Impact of securities transaction cost on stock returns 
Under the standard asset pricing theory, an increase in securities transaction cost 
would cause asset price level to decrease. Therefore when information about 
transaction cost adjustment becomes publicly known it should be capitalized in 
                                                 
20 Please refer to Section 2.3 for detailed statistics data.  
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current stock prices (Saporta and Kan, 1997). Umlauf (1993) finds that stock 
market index falls in response to the announcements of stock transaction tax 
increases in Sweden. Saporta and Kan (1997) document that share prices move in 
the negative direction and by a statistically significant amount following the days 
that stamp duty rate changes are announced in U.K. Hu (1998) also finds that 
transaction cost adjustments have a negative impact on stock prices in four Asia 
stock exchanges.  
 
Following the above theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between 
stock returns and securities transaction cost adjustments, I will test hypothesis 6 
below. As noted in Section 3.3.2, stock trading related transaction cost cut is used 




There are positive A (B)-share aggregate stock returns associated with the 
transaction cost cut announcements.   
 
Impact of interest rate adjustment on stock returns  
The interest rate change has a real economic impact on stock prices, as it 
simultaneously affect both of the investors’ required rate of returns and listed 
firms’ cash flow (for example through borrowing costs). Another channel through 
which interest rate adjustment potentially affects stock prices relates to the stock 
market demand and supply. When the interest rate drops, there may be 
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substitution effect as investors transfer their investments from the interest-bearing 
assets, such as bank deposits into the stock markets, so that stock demand 
increases. And with lower interest charges, the companies may have less 
motivation to raise fund in the stock markets, which may slow down the stock 
supply expansion and therefore boost the stock prices under certain market 
conditions, such as the downward sloping demand curve. To sum up, there is 
negative (positive) response of stock prices to interest rate increase (decrease) 
announcements (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2003).  
 
Chen, Mohan and Steiner (1999) investigate the impact of discount rate changes 
on U.S. stock market and find that returns generally respond negatively and 
statistically significantly to the unexpected announcements. Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2003) demonstrate that an unanticipated rate cut of 25 basis points increases the 
level of stock prices by approximately 1 percent.  
 
Theoretically, interest rate cut could increase the A-share market prices through its 
impacts on A-share companies’ cash flow, domestic investors’ required rate of 
return, A-share market demand and supply. It could also increase B-share market 
prices event before B-shares’ opening to domestic investors as the B-share 
companies are also domiciled in Mainland China, so that B-share companies’ cash 
flow and B-share market supply expansion could be affected by Chinese domestic 







There are positive A (B)-share aggregate stock returns associated with the interest 
rate cut announcements.   
 
However the interest rate cut announcement effect may not be statistically 
significant in China. First as Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) note that stock prices 
only respond to unexpected changes while in China the announcements were 
generally followed by a series of policy debates and discussions.  Second, interest 
rate cuts may have little impact on cash flow of listed firms which are the SOEs 
and enjoying the beneficial not commercial bank interest rates. Third, the listing 
process in China differs substantially from other mature markets, where the public 
share offering is usually determined by the company itself and the exchange it 
seeks a listing. While in China due to the government’s control over IPOs and 
seasoned equity offerings, the aggregate stock supply would not be affected by 
interest rate changes no matter the companies have more or less motivation to 
raise money in the stock markets. Lastly, Chinese investors may find it necessary 
to save money in the banks even with lower bank interest rates, particularly given 
an aging population with limited pension coverage and substantial uncertainties 
associated with rapid economic reforms. So the investment substitution effect 
from bank deposit to stock markets is weaker in China, when comparing to other 
more developed markets (Fernald and Rogers, 2002). Such arguments constitute 
the intuition for the following hypothesis 8, which is contrary to the above 





There are no statistically significant A (B)-share aggregate stock returns 
associated with the interest rate cut announcements.   
 
3.4 Responses of stock market returns to regulatory events 
3.4.1 Methodology of modified GARCH model  
The findings in Section 3.2.3 indicate that in all four submarkets about half of 
return outliers can be explained by regulatory events. However, the shortfall is 
that it only shows the proportion contribution to the largest return outliers, but 
does not indicate to what extent various regulatory changes and policy 
adjustments affect the stock markets. To capture the stock market dynamics in 
response to the public information, many previous studies use a dummy variable 
approach to construct variable that aggregates announcements for a set of specific 
public news over time (Boyd et al., 2005). Regarding the econometrics framework, 
recent empirical tests of this strand of studies frequently employ modified 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models 
with event dummies as explanatory variables. Following Chen, Mohan and Steiner 
(1999) and Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), I assess and quantify the impacts 
of various categories of regulatory events on the daily aggregate stock returns 
using a modified GARCH (1,1) specification combined with regulatory dummy 
variables. The GARCH model is also justified by the key features of the 
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distribution of the stock index returns, for example, volatility clustering and fat 
tails.  
 
To choose between alternative GARCH (1,1) model specifications, I use both the 
Akaike information criterion and the Schwartz criterion and find that a modified 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity in Mean (GARCH–M) 
model (Nelson 1991) fit the data sample of this study better. Under the traditional 
GARCH (1,1)–M methodology, two distinct specifications for mean and variance 
are as follows: 
 
tttR εσαα ++= 10                                                                                 (3.2)      






−− ++= ttt εβσββσ                                                             (3.3) 
where 0β , 0, 21 >ββ and 121 <+ ββ .       
 
I modify the above GARCH-M model by adding AR (1) or MA (1) item in the 
conditional mean equation when needed.21 As sample statistics stated in Table 3.1 
shows that daily stock returns in all four submarkets are not normally distributed 
and exhibit large kurtosis, following Bollerslev (1986) I assume that standard 
error zt follows t-distribution. The conditional density function for zt, under the t-
distribution can be written as:  
                                                 
21 By using modified ARIMA outlier detection model in the Section 3.2.3, I find that 
returns in SHB (SZB) are best fitted with autocorrelation (moving average) item of order 
one, so that an AR (MA) of order 1 with GARCH (1, 1)-M model is estimated for SHB 





















vzf σσπ                   (3.4) 
Where Ω t-1 represents the set of information that is available at the 
beginning of time t. Γ ( ּ) is the gamma function and v is the degree of 
freedom of the t-distribution whose value is necessarily greater than 2.  
 
As 1/v approaches 0, the t-distribution approaches a standard normal distribution, 
but when 1/v > 0, the t-distribution has fatter tails than the corresponding normal 
distribution.  
 
The four categories of regulatory events are transformed into binary (0,1) dummy 
variables to facilitate the estimation of the impacts of the different kinds of 
regulatory news on the stock markets. These dummy variables are set to 1 when 
on a specific day there are relevant information releases and zero if there is no 
news related to that particular type of information. In particular, the dummy 
variable for DBP takes the value 1 whenever the demand boosting policy or 
measure is announced.  The variable DSS is equal to 1 when there is news 
capturing information on disciplinary action and strengthening of supervision, which 
results in a reduction of stock demand. As the news on market supply expansion 
can be partitioned into two types - those confirm to further expand stock supply 
and those indicate to slow down the speed of supply expansion. I create two 
dummy variables for this category of news. Dummy variable MSE+ (MSE-) takes 
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the value 1 on the days of announcements related to increase (decrease) of market 
supply expansion speed22 .  The variable for TCC is equal to 1 whenever the 
authorities announce to cut securities transaction cost. The variable for INT is set 
to 1 the time the PBOC announced to cut deposit and lending interest rates or the 
SAT declared to charge 20% tax on interest income and zero on all other days.   
 
The GARCH (1,1)-M model is then further augmented by including all above 
dummy variables for regulatory events and interest rate cuts in conditional mean 
equation. To account for pre-event or post-event impact, a one-day leading value 
and a one-day lagging value of dummy variables are also included23.  
 
There are evidences that number of non-trading days has statistically significant 
impact on volatility as information accumulates during weekends and holidays 
(Nelson, 1991). It is particular interesting in the Chinese stock markets, because 
they have unusually long periods of trading holidays around Chinese New Year, 
National Day holiday and Labor Day holiday. Table 3.6 shows the frequency 
distribution of number of non-trading days. The variable NTDt which indicates the 
number of non-trading days immediately before trading day t is included in 
conditional variance equation.  
                                                 
22 The alternative method is to set one dummy variable MSE for market supply expansion 
related news, which takes value of 1 when there is news that confirms to further expand 
the market supply and takes value of -1 when there is news that indicates to slow down 
the market expansion speed. As a robustness test, I use dummy variable MSE to replace 
MSE+ and MSE- in the empirical tests. The results for all other variables are substantially 
same. The coefficients for MSE are similar to those reported for MSE+.  
 
23 The leading (lagging) values of event dummy variables take the value of 1 on trading 





Frequency Distribution of Number of Non-trading Days in 
China’s Submarkets (1995 -2003) 
 
 SHA SZA SHB SZB 
Number of non-trading day Frequency 
1 3 3 6 13 
2 418 415 413 391 
3 9 11 13 27 
4 6 6 6 11 
5 2 2 2 5 
7 4 4 4 4 
8 0 0 1 1 
9 5 4 5 4 
11 2 2 2 2 
13 1 1 1 1 
16 5 6 5 6 
19 1 1 1 1 
 
Friedmann and Sanddorf-Köhle (2002) find that following the imposition of 10% 
daily price limit on 16 December 1996, there is a statistically significant reduction 
in the A-share return volatilities and but not in the B-share return volatilities. 
Following their methodology, in the conditional variance equation I add in another 
dummy variable LMT, which is set to 1 on days after 16 December 1996 and is 




The mnemonic abbreviations for the explanatory variables used in the modified 
GARCH (1,1)-M model and their definitions are listed in Table 3.7.   
 
Table 3.7 
Abbreviations and Definitions for the Explanatory Variables in 





Set to 1 - when there is news related to demand boosting policy and   
                measure 
Set to 0 - otherwise  
 
DSS 
Set to 1 -  when there is news related to disciplinary action and 
strengthening of supervision which results in demand reduction 
Set to 0 - otherwise 
 
MSE+
Set to 1 -  when there is news that confirms to further expand the market 
supply 
Set to 0 - otherwise 
 
MSE-
Set to 1 -  when there is news that indicates to slow down the speed of 
market expansion 
Set to 0 - otherwise 
 
TCC 
Set to 1 -  when the authorities announce to cut transaction costs 
Set to 0 - otherwise 
 
INT 
Set to 1 -  when the PBOC announces to cut deposit and lending interest 
rates or the SAT announces to impose tax on interest income 
Set to 0 - otherwise 
NTD Number of non-trading days immediately before trading day t 
LMT Set to 1 -  on days after 16 December 1996 (imposition of 10% price limit) 
Set to 0 - otherwise 
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3.4.2 Empirical results without cross-market dummies   
Table 3.8 reports the estimation results of the modified GARCH (1,1)-M models 
with dummy variables during the sample period from 2 January 1995 to 31 
December 2003. For SHA (B) and SZA (SZB) estimations, only the regulatory 
events relevant for the A (B)-share markets are included. 
 
Panel A of Table 3.8 presents the coefficient estimates in the conditional mean 
equation. All of the four coefficients for the GRACH-in-Mean item turn out to be 
positive, while only the coefficient for SZA is statistically significant. The results 
give weak evidences of the positive relationship between the conditional mean 
and volatility of index returns in China. With the exception of interest rate cut 
news, all other categories of events have statistically significant impacts on the 
stock market returns on the announcement days.  
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, for the A and B-share markets, there are statistically 
significantly positive aggregate stock returns in response to the announcements of 
demand boosting policies and measures.  The coefficients indicate that on days 
with this type of news announcements, stock returns increase 2.8%, 2.1%, 4.6% 
and 5.7% in SHA, SZA, SHB and SZB markets, respectively. What is remarkable 
is that the B-share markets not only display stronger reaction but also react 
statistically significantly one trading day before the news is announced. As for 
SHB market, the positive impact of demand boosting policies and measures 





Estimation Results of Modified GARCH (1, 1)-M Model without 
Cross-market Dummies (1995-2003) 
 
Coefficient SHA SZA SHB SZB 
Panel A: Conditional Mean Equation
GARCH 0.0202 0.0223** 0.0015 0.0012 
Constant -0.0050 -0.0092 -0.0073 -0.0028 
DBP(-1) 0.2456 0.0931 2.0763*** 0.5978* 
DBP 2.7790*** 2.0567*** 4.6420*** 5.7203***
DBP(1) -0.3951 -0.0845 2.4938*** 0.6590 
DSS(-1) -0.1363 0.0920 0.3507 -0.6500 
DSS -3.5743*** -3.0821*** -3.4795*** -2.9165***
DSS(1) -0.1339 -0.1849 -0.8098** -0.1110 
MSE+ (-1) 0.0125 0.1130 -0.0416 -0.0233 
MSE+ -3.4504*** -3.2989*** 4.2305*** 3.6264***
MSE+ (1) 0.2656 0.5473 0.1916 0.0686 
MSE- (-1) -1.2447*** -1.2443*** - - 
MSE- 4.0505*** 4.9635*** - - 
MSE-(1) 0.8501 1.0252 - - 
TCC(-1) 0.7057 0.3787 -0.1053 -0.4022 
TCC 1.2307*** 1.6409** 1.2241*** 0.7455** 
TCC(1) -0.5648 -0.5433 0.2758 0.1758 
INT(-1) -0.2212 -0.0548 -0.0138 -0.0662 
INT -0.3172 0.0131 -0.0227 -0.1442 
INT(1) 0.1173 0.0727 -0.0014 -0.0642 
AR(1)/MA(1) - - 0.0773*** 0.0594***
Panel B: Conditional Variance Equation
Constant   0.5691*** 1.0135*** 0.0368 0.0077 
ARCH(1)   0.2115*** 0.4659*** 0.3717*** 0.3850***
GARCH(1)   0.6770*** 0.5256*** 0.6013*** 0.5714***
NTD  0.4890*** 0.6724*** 0.8611 0.3491 
LMT -0.5725*** -1.0139*** 0.0318 0.0088 
     
t-dist. d.f. 4.1588*** 3.7874*** 2.1921*** 2.1186***
  
Panel C: Residual diagnostic tests
Q(8)     11.0690       12.2660         14.236 15.4870 
Q2(8)  0.9232         1.8959           3.535 4.8395 
ARCH-LM  0.1339         0.5587         0.6242 0.0764 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate that the test statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 




As for the events related to the disciplinary action and strengthening of 
supervision which reduces demand, it is not surprising to see that all four 
submarkets show dips of returns on the event days. On average, the conditional 
mean returns are -3.6%, -3.1%, -3.5 and -2.9% for SHA, SZA, SHB and SZB 
markets, respectively. The overall findings are in line with Hypothesis 2. I also 
note that for SHB market the negative impact continues to be statistically 
significant one trading day after the announcements.  
 
There are evidences of asymmetric reactions to news in relation to speeding up the 
market supply expansion of the A-share and B-share markets. For SHA and SZA 
markets, when there is this category of announcements, the A-share aggregate 
returns plunge 3.5% and 3.3%, which are consistent with Hypothesis 3. However, 
on the announcement days regarding the B-share market expansion, SHB and SZB 
markets rise 4.2% and 3.6%, respectively. This result supports Hypothesis 5 but 
not Hypothesis 3. It shows that an increase in the B-share market size is good 
news to the B-share investors.  
 
 The news indicating to show down the market supply expansion is only relevant 
for the A-share markets as discussed in Section 3.3.2. The coefficients on SHA 
and SZA markets show that the A-markets rise more than 4% on the 
announcement days, which are in line with Hypothesis 4. There are statistically 
significant negative stock returns one trading day before the news is announced. 
This is particular possible as slowing down the supply expansion measures, for 
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example, the suspension of state share reduction program is normally used as an 
administrative measure to stabilize the gloomy markets.   
 
The stock market reactions to news of transaction cost cuts are as expected in 
Hypothesis 6, evident in the statistically significant positive coefficients for 
dummy variable TCC in all submarkets. However, the relative smaller magnitudes 
of these coefficients, which are 0.7 to 1.6% in four submarkets, are worth noting. 
By employing Wald test, Chi-square statistics indicate the null hypotheses that 
magnitudes for the coefficients on TCC are same as those on DBP, DSS, MSE+ 
and MSE- are all rejected at the 1% significance level.   
 
In contrast to statistically significant impacts of regulatory changes, all the 
coefficients on the interest rate cut dummy variables (including leading and 
lagging variables) are not statistically significant. As the interest rate cut 
announcement effect is not observed, I reject Hypothesis 7 and support 
Hypothesis 8.  The seemingly insensitivity to interest rate related announcements 
may be explained by the phenomenon that the interest rate adjustments are usually 
well expected by the market through a series of policy debates and the special 
institutional background as discussed in Section 3.3.3. It may also be related to the 
small event sample size of interest rate changes in China, where bank saving and 
loan rates are governed by the PBOC and not market determined. While in 
developed countries, interest rate changes more frequently. In U.S. Federal 
Reserve discount rate would be adjusted to realign it to market rate or due to 
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy changes (Chen, Mohan and Steiner, 1999). 
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The insignificance of announcement effect should be interpreted with care as the 
empirical design of this study is only to test the interest rate cut announcement 
effect on stock returns. Whether the interest rate changes have mid-term or long-
term effect on the stock markets is beyond the scope of this study and left for 
further research.   
 
Turning to the estimates for the conditional variance equation, which are listed in 
Panel B of Table 3.8, the coefficients on the ARCH and GARCH items are 
statistically significant positive and their sums are very close to unity. The result 
indicates that in each submarket, conditional variance takes a long time to 
dissipate, that is, volatility is said to be ‘persistent’.  
 
The coefficients for number of non-trading days are positive and statistically 
significant for SHA and SZA markets, showing that the conditional volatilities 
increase with the number of non-trading days. The coefficients are also positive 
for SHB and SZB markets, but not statistically significant. These findings are in 
line with those of Friedmann and Sanddorf-Köhle (2002).  
 
The statistically significant negative coefficients for LMT in SHA and SZA 
markets suggest that the conditional variances decrease after the imposition of 
10% limit on daily price change since 16 December 1996. The results for the B-
share markets are inconclusive as coefficients are not statistically significant, but 
they certainly do not support that price limit reduces volatilities, the view held by 
conventional wisdom and most regulators. The ineffectiveness of price limit to 
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reduce variances of SHB and SZB markets is not unusual as critics have 
documented volatility spillover effect, i.e. price limit causes higher volatility 
levels on subsequent days. For example, Kim and Rhee (1997) find that price 
limits do not reduce volatilities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as volatility is 
merely temporarily contained and then ‘spill-over’ to subsequent days. Kim (2001) 
indicates that Taiwan stock market is more volatile under stricter price limits and 
concludes that restrictive price limits do not moderate stock volatilities. Chen, 
Kim and Rui (2005) find that price limit is particularly more restrictive for illiquid 
B-shares and document a large number of occasions where B-shares hit 10% price 
limit while the firms’ companion A-shares do not. The evidence found by Chen, 
Kim and Rui (2005) that the price limit is more restrictive in the B-share markets 
as compared to A-share markets may be used to explain why price limit in China 
is unsuccessful in damping the volatilities in the B-share markets as restrictive 
price limits do not moderate stock volatilities due to volatility spillover (Kim, 
2001). A thorough investigation of this issue by using company level data is a 
topic for further study. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the degrees of freedom v are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level, implying the appropriateness of employing the 
modified GARCH (1,1)-M model assuming the standardized errors zt under t-
distribution. And the relatively small degrees of freedom parameters for the t-
distribution (4.2, 3.8, 2.2 and 2.1 for SHA, SZA, SHB and SZB, respectively) 





Residual diagnostic test statistics are reported in Panel C of Table 3.8. The Ljung-
Box Q(8), Q2(8) and ARCH(1)-LM test statistics are all not statistically significant, 
indicating that the residuals are free of ARCH effect and autocorrelation problems. 
Therefore, these diagnostic test results show that the specifications of the mean 
and volatility equations in the modified GARCH (1,1)-M model are adequate to 
capture the time-varying nature of the index returns and I do not explore higher 
order GARCH models.  
 
 
3.4.3 Empirical results with cross-market dummies  
The literature on contagion and spillover effect stresses that in some cases one 
stock market moves with no particular information release in the market justifying 
that move, but just because there are shocks in another stock market (Kaminsky 
and Schmukler, 1999). Financial headlines frequently report that investors’ moods 
spread across the A-share and B-share markets within the domestic frontier 
(Walter and Howei, 2001). Yang (2003) among others documents the cross-
market information linkages between the A and B-share markets. In this section, I 
examine whether the A (B)-share markets response to the regulatory events in the 
B (A)-share markets or whether there is cross-market spillover effect associated 
with regulatory events.  
 
Table 3.9 shows the empirical results of parameter estimation for the modified 
GARCH (1,1)-M models with cross-market event dummy variables during the 




Estimation Results of Modified GARCH (1, 1)-M Model with 
Cross-market Dummies  
 
Coefficient SHA        SZA    SHB SZB 
Panel A: Conditional Mean Equation (corresponding market dummies)
GARCH 0.0208 0.0214** -0.0022 0.0076 
Constant -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0028 0.0001 
DBP(-1) 0.1018 0.0847 2.0579*** 1.3052***
DBP 2.2416*** 2.0195*** 4.6511*** 6.0534***
DBP(1) -0.3214 -0.0887 2.5631*** 1.7696* 
DSS(-1) -0.0314 0.0963 0.5306 -0.6861 
DSS -3.2594*** -3.0733*** -2.9977*** -3.0073***
DSS(1) -0.1169 -0.1721 -0.6654* -0.2871 
MSE+ (-1) 0.1775 0.1271 -0.0303 -0.0024 
MSE+ -3.1144*** -3.2460*** 4.2554*** 3.5610***
MSE+ (1) 0.2736 0.5385 0.2023 0.0359 
MSE- (-1) -1.1963*** -1.3064*** - - 
MSE- 4.0335*** 4.9115*** - - 
MSE-(1) 0.8138 1.0292 - - 
TCC(-1) 0.4637 0.1984 -0.1002 -0.3912 
TCC 1.4081*** 1.7219*** 1.2845*** 1.0784***
TCC(1) -0.5520 -0.5523 0.3033 0.3589 
INT(-1) -0.1089 -0.0220 -0.0207 -0.0026 
INT -0.0770 0.0014 -0.0176 -0.0126 
INT(1) 0.0233 0.0054 -0.0094 -0.0061 
AR(1)/MA(1)  - - 0.0776*** 0.0736***
Panel B: Conditional Mean Equation (cross-market dummies)
^DBP(-1) 0.0578 0.2022 -0.0704 0.0298 
^DBP 0.5813 0.6611 1.9383*** 1.7515***
^DBP(1) -0.4288 -0.4712 -0.0717 -0.0143 
^DSS(-1) -0.3144 -0.4595 -0.2905 -0.1295 
^DSS -0.9584 -0.6615 -0.5874*** -2.0203***
^DSS(1) -1.1703 -0.928** 0.0435 -0.5912 
^MSE+ (-1) -0.3343 -0.1949 0.0522 0.3719 
^MSE+ 0.5549 0.3296 -0.5916** -1.1568***
^MSE+ (1) -0.6898* -0.5596 -0.2533 -0.0773 
^MSE- (-1) - - -0.8304** -0.6260 
^MSE- - - 0.5849** 1.2000***





Table 3.9 (continued) 
Estimation Results of Modified GARCH (1, 1)-M Model with 
Cross-market Dummies  
 
Coefficient SHA        SZA    SHB SZB 
Panel C: Conditional Variance Equation
Constant  0.6033*** 0.9903*** 0.0236 0.0003***
ARCH(1)  0.2203*** 0.4714*** 0.4159*** 0.4300***
GARCH(1)  0.6693*** 0.5203*** 0.5763*** 0.4775***
NTD 0.5300*** 0.7129*** 2.6728 0.8541 
LMT -0.6063*** -0.9907*** 0.0208 0.0005 
  
t-dist. d.f. 4.0046*** 3.6998*** 2.2343*** 2.1454*** 
Panel D: Residual diagnostic tests
Q(8) 11.2810 12.1340 11.5643 7.6483 
Q2(8) 0.9491 1.8837 6.0977 3.0185 
ARCH-LM 0.1159 0.5293 1.8230 0.4868 
 
Notes:  
1. ***, ** and * indicate that the test statistics are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.   
2. ^ indicates cross-market dummy variable.  
 
In the conditional mean equations for SHA and SZA market, I add in ^DBP, ^DSS 
and ^MSE+ (including leading and lagging variables) as cross-market dummies, 
which take value of 1 whenever the specific kind of events occur only in the B-
share markets. Similarly, in the conditional mean equations for SHB and SZB 
market, I add in ^DBP, ^DSS, ^MSE+ and ^MSE- (including leading and lagging 
variables) as cross-market dummies, which take value of 1 whenever the events 
occur only in the A-share markets. The cross-market dummies take value of zero 
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the time when the news is relevant for both the A and B-share markets or 
whenever there is no news under the specific category24.  
 
Except the coefficients for the cross-market dummy variables, the coefficients for 
other variables as reported in Panel A, C and D of Table 3.9 are basically in line 
with those reported in Panel A, B and C of Table 3.8. This indicates that the 
findings in Section 3.4.2 are robust after including the cross-market dummies. As 
shown in Panel B of Table 3.9, the news releases in the A-share markets seem to 
have more cross-market spillover effects on the B-share market returns.  
 
In particular, on the days when the A-share market demand boosting policy or 
measure is announced, the conditional mean returns of SHB and SZB markets are 
also statistically significant positive (which is 1.9% and 1.8%, respectively). It 
seems that the favorable market sentiment arising from the A-share market 
demand boosting policies and measures could spillover to the B-share markets.  
 
On the days when the government authorities take disciplinary actions and 
strengthens the supervision of the A-share markets, SHB and SZB markets also 
drops statistically significantly. It seems that when the government authorities 
adopt the measures to curve the excess speculation and illegal trading in the A-
share markets, the investors’ panic mood may also spillover to the B-share 
markets.  
 
                                                 
24 I do not include cross-market dummy in relation to transaction cost cut announcements 
as most such events are relevant for both A and B-share markets.   
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Both SHB and SZB markets respond to the A-share market supply expansion 
news as the empirical results show that the coefficients on ^MSE+ are negative and 
statistically significant. This finding is interesting when compared to the positive 
and statistically significant coefficients on MSE+ (regulatory dummy variable 
related to the market supply expansion news in the B-share markets themselves). 
The coefficients on ^MSE- are positive and statistically significant. In sum, on the 
announcement days to speed up or slow down the A-share market supply 
expansion, the B-share market indices move in the same directions as the A-share 
market indices. The phenomenon shows that although A-share supply shocks have 
no direct implication for the B-share market fundamentals, the B-share investors’ 
psychological behaviors may be influenced by the market sentiments in the A-
share markets, and the stock index performance of B-share markets follows that of 
the A-share markets, which dominate the Chinese stock markets.  
  
In all, for the news related to demand boosting policies and measures, disciplinary 
actions and strengthening of supervision which reduces demand and market 
supply expansion, the cross-market spillover effects from the A-share markets to 
the B-share markets occur on the event days, evident by the statistically 
significant coefficients for ^DBP, ^DDS, ^MSE+ and ^MSE- for SHB and SZB 
markets. But the magnitudes of the parameters for cross-market A-share event 
dummies ^DBP, ^DDS and ^MSE+ are all smaller than those for B-share event 
dummies DBP, DDS and MSE+. Chi-square statistics of Wald-test further confirm 
that for SHA and SZA markets, the coefficients for each pair of regulatory event 
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dummies (^DBP v.s. DBP, ^DDS v.s DDS and ^MSE+ v.s MSE+) are different at 
the 1% significance level.  
 
However, the cross-market spillover effects from the B-share markets to the A-
share markets are weak. As for SHA market, the only statistically significant 
coefficient for the cross-market dummy variables is that for ^MSE+ (1), which is 
negative and indicates that SHA market return drops one trading day after market 
expansion news is announced in the B-share markets. The possible explanation is 
that after B-share market expansion, more A-share only companies will be dually 
listed on B-share markets. While B-shares are traded at large discounts to their A-
share counterparties and there will be a wealth transfer from the A-shareholders to 
B-shareholders. So that B-share market expansion might be a bad news for some 
domestic investors. As for SZA market, the only statistically significant 
coefficient for the cross-market dummy variable is that for ^DSS(1), which is 
negative and indicates that SZA market return drops one day after disciplinary 
actions and strengthening of supervision take place in the B-share markets. This 
phenomenon shows that the negative market sentiment arising from the B-share 
market disciplinary actions and strengthening of supervision could spillover to the 
A-share markets. 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
China’s emerging stock markets have reputation of ‘policy-driven’ markets as the 
government authorities have often intervened in the stock markets by floating new 
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policy changes and issuing new regulations (Fan et al. 2003). By relating the 
return outliers to the explanatory events identified by news reports and financial 
analysis articles, I find that around 50% of the largest return outliers can be 
attributed to regulatory news. The importance of regulatory events in explaining 
the Chinese stock market performance motivates the further investigation.  
 
A modified GARCH (1,1)-M model is employed to examine the aggregate index 
returns in China’s segmented A and B-share markets in response to a set of 
regulatory event dummy variables related to stock supply, demand and transaction 
cost adjustments.  
 
The A (B)-share markets respond positively to the market demand boosting 
policies and measures and negatively to the demand reducing disciplinary actions 
and strengthening of supervision events in the A (B)-share markets. All four 
submarkets rise in response to the transaction cost cut announcements. These 
findings are in line with traditional finance theories.  
 
One remarkable finding is the asymmetric announcement effects of market supply 
expansion news. In particular, the A-share markets drop in response to A-share 
market expansion news while the B-share markets rise on the B-share market 
supply expansion announcement days. These findings can be explained by the 
unique institutional background in China. As there are non-fundamental parts in 
the A-share prices, boosted by the controlled limited supply as documented by 
Mei et al. (2005), so that a supply increase would cause A-share indices drop.  
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And as the B-share markets are much smaller than the A-share markets, suffering 
from the illiquidity issue, their supply expansion would improve the liquidity of 
B-share markets, making them more attractive to foreign investors. Also the B-
share market expansion announcements are always interpreted as government’s 
continued support for the B-share markets (Walter and Howei, 2001).  
 
I also find that the B-share markets not only display stronger reaction but also 
react significantly positively one trading day before the B-share market demand 
boosting news is announced. And for the SHB market, the impacts continue to be 
statistically significant one trading day after the B-share market demand boosting 
announcements, and disciplinary actions and strengthening of supervision.  
 
When adding the cross-market dummy variables in the modified GARCH (1,1)-M 
model, I find spillover effects from the A-share markets to the B-share markets on 
the regulatory event days in relation to the A-share market demand boosting 
policies and measures, disciplinary actions and strengthening of supervision that 
reduces demand, and market supply expansion. While cross-market spillover 
effects from the B-share markets to the A-share markets are weak. As for SHA or 
SZA market, only one estimated coefficient on cross-market lagging dummy 
variable is statistically significant, indicating the spillover effects occur one day 
after the announcements.    
 
The overall results indicate that B-share investors are more sensitive to the 
regulatory events: not only to those occur in the B-share markets but also those 
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relevant only for the A-share markets. Similarly, Kutan and Yuan (2002) find that 
foreign investors in the B-share markets are more sensitive to political and trade 
related news than domestic investors in the A-share markets. The finding that the 
B-share market investors are more concerned about regulatory events is rational 
for the foreign investors who trade in emerging Chinese stock markets with 
reputation of ‘policy-driven’ markets. And as mentioned in Section 2.3, 
institutional investors play a larger role in the B-share markets. Since the portfolio 
for the foreign institutional investors are more diversified than the domestic 
individual investors, foreign institutional investors are more concerned about the 
market-wide systematic risks while not firm-specific risk. Nishiotis (1997) also 
proposes that foreign investors are more sensitive than local investors to changes 
in macro factors as foreign investors can adjust their investment portfolio across 
country borders easily when domestic investors are usually restricted to the their 
domestic market. Also in China, there are few investment alternatives for Chinese 
domestic investors (see, e.g., Ma, 1996; Sun and Tong, 2000).  
 
B-share investors also seem to have some information advantages over their A-
share counterparties. This could be attributed to the heterogeneous institutional 
features of the Chinese A and B-share markets as discussed in Section 2.3. In 
particular, the investor compositions and information channels are different in 
China’s segmented stock markets. The finding here is consistent with various 
pervious studies that support foreign investors have information advantages in the 
Chinese stock markets. Chui and Kwok (1998) argue that foreign investors may 
receive information about China faster than domestic investors due to information 
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barrier in China and foreign securities firms are likely to have more advanced 
technology for processing and analyzing information. Long et al. (1999) indicate 
that due to presence of institutional investors, the B-share markets tend to 
disseminate information smoothly, and hence B-shareholders are more informed 
than A-shareholders. Xu (2000) documents foreign investors have better access to 
timely updates on the Chinese economy from media such as Reuters and other 
financial services.  Yang (2003) points out foreign investors can be better 
informed in China’s emerging stock markets, challenging a widespread 
assumption of less informed foreign investors in the developed countries.   
 
The result reveals that the imposition of daily price limit is followed by decreased 
return volatilities in the A-share markets but not in the B-share markets. The 
failure of price limit to reduce the volatilities may be attributed to the illiquidity of 
the B-share markets. Chen, Kim and Rui (2005) indicate that illiquid B-shares are 
more inclined to hit price limit due to wider spreads and 10% price limit is more 
restrictive for the B-shares. As claimed by Kim (2001) too restrictive limits do not 
moderate volatilities, which merely temporarily contained and then ‘spillover’ to 
subsequent days.   
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in several respects. First it adds to the 
growing public information literature by linking stock market behaviors to a 
special kind of public information in China’s emerging stock markets. Second it 
complements the existing literature on the stock market segmentation in China. In 
particular, even within the country border and traded on the same stock exchanges, 
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the A and B-share markets may be affected by different regulatory events and 
have different responses to same category of regulatory events. Third, the market 
responses to the cross-market regulatory events provide a channel to explain the 
linkages between the segmented stock markets. Last, the findings also produce 
important implication and evidences for information advantages of B-share 
investors.  
 
This study deepens regulators’ understanding about stock market responses to 
different regulatory mechanisms and conveys important implication for the policy 
makers.  It highlights the importance of monitoring the ‘policy risks’ for domestic 
and foreign investors who invest in China’s emerging stock markets. B-share 
investors should also pay attention to the regulatory changes and policy 
adjustments in the A-share markets, as regulatory effects can spillover from the A-




Impacts of Domestic Dual Listings on Valuation and Liquidity: 
Evidence from China’s Stock Markets 25
 
4.1 Introduction 
China’s relatively newly emerged stock markets, which were established around 
1990, have a unique system of domestic dual listings. A number of China-
domiciled companies issued and listed two classes of tradable shares on domestic 
stock exchanges. The A-shares, denominated and payable in Chinese currency 
Renminbi can be held and traded by domestic individual and institutional 
investors and the B-shares, quoted and payable in U.S. or Hong Kong dollars were 
available only to foreign investors till February 2001. China is the only country 
identified by the International Finance Corporation that had completed segmented 
trading between domestic and foreign investors (Yang, 2003). Even after February 
2001, domestic individual investors can trade B-shares, the A and B-share markets 
remain largely segmented as domestic individuals’ access to foreign currencies 
continues to be limited by currency non-convertibility and by administrative 
barriers. What’s more, China appears to be an exceptional case where prices of 
                                                 
25 An earlier version of this chapter was presented in a joint paper with Ding Lu entitled 
“Impact of dual listings on valuation and liquidity: Evidence from Chinese A and B-share 
markets” at International Conference on Emerging Markets and Global Risk 
Management, 11-12 June 2004, Westminster University, London. A joint paper with Ding 
Lu entitled “Impact of dual listings on valuation and liquidity: Evidence from China’s 
stock markets” based on the content of this chapter has been published in The Journal of 
Economic Asymmetries 2(2), 2005. I thank the panel discussants and anonymous referees 
for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
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foreign B-shares are traded at substantial discounts to the domestic A-shares 
instead of the premiums predicted and documented for foreign shares in other 
countries (Baily et al., 1999). This anomaly has attracted much attention among 
researchers (see, e.g., Sun and Tong, 2000; Mei et al., 2005).  
 
With a growing number of companies going for dual listing across country 
borders, there has emerged an extensive literature on the motivation and market 
reaction to dual listing (see, e.g., Foerster and Kayolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999). Three 
traditional theories have been established, namely market segmentation hypothesis, 
liquidity hypothesis, and investor recognition hypothesis. It is generally believed 
that international dual listing can circumvent investment barriers, increase 
investors’ recognition and result in lower cost of capital and higher share value 
and liquidity (McConnell et al. 1996). Recently corporate governance hypothesis 
has evolved to shed more lights on the motivation of dual listing. For example, 
Doidge, et al. (2004) suggest that listing abroad may help controlling shareholders 
commit to limit their expropriation from minority shareholders and thereby 
increase the firm’s ability to take advantage of growth opportunities.  
 
A few studies examine the valuation and liquidity effects of domestic dual listing. 
Khan et al. (1993) and Baker et al. (1994) analyze the case of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the American Exchange (AMEX) listed firms that dually 
listed on the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE) or the Midwest Stock Exchange 
(MSE). They report statistically significant negative abnormal return after dual 
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listing and attribute it to the ‘fragmentation effect’ from listing a stock on more 
than one stock exchange.   
 
The impacts of domestic dual listings on China’s emerging stock markets are of 
particular interest. First, little evidence has been collected to understand how the 
domestic dual listings in China affect the valuation and liquidity of the shares 
already circulated on the segmented A and B-share markets. To the best of my 
knowledge, the only study to date is by Poon et al. (1998) who examine the 
impacts on A-shares around their B-share counterparties’ listing event dates.  
However, they only investigate one way impacts and short event periods. Second, 
due to the unique institutional features with ‘Chinese characteristics’ some dual 
listing theories can not be applied in China. While the research questions and 
empirical methodologies proposed by the previous dual listing literature could be 
employed in this study. Third, responses to China’s domestic dual listings are 
closely related with other lines of research focusing on China’s segmented stock 
markets, in particular, the B-share discount phenomenon.  
 
I exam the valuation and liquidity effects of domestic dual listings in China and 
find the utterly different market responses in the segmented A and B-share 
markets. The A-share prices decrease persistently after the B-share dual listing 
announcements. While upon the announcements of the A-share dual listing, B-
share prices respond with transient return hikes. The results of panel regression 
taking into account covariance risks are in line with those derived from event 
study and reveal there is (is no) structural change for A (B)-shares in the post 
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event periods. The A-share liquidity decreases while the B-share liquidity 
increases after dual listings. The findings can be explained by the B-share 
discounts and are consistent with liquidity hypothesis. Due to China’s unique 
institutional context, market segmentation, corporate governance and order flow 
migration hypotheses are not applicable in China. I also find some evidences of 
information leakage before the B-share dual listing announcements among 
domestic A-share investors. 
 
The remainder of chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
institutional features of the China’s domestic dual listing system, sample selection 
and the data sources. Section 4.3 reviews the relevant literature and develops the 
research hypotheses to be examined in this study. Section 4.4 presents the 
empirical methodologies and results regarding impacts of domestic dual listings 
on the share valuation and liquidity. Section 4.5 contains further investigation of 
valuation effects by using panel regression analysis. Summary and conclusion of 
the findings are shown in Section 4.6.  
 
4.2 Institutional background and data  
4.2.1 Features of China’s domestic dual listings  
Starting in 1992, the Chinese government allowed some domestic domiciled 
companies to issue B-shares to foreign investors. The B-share markets were 
designed from the beginning to serve as means of attracting foreign funds to the 
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Chinese economy and the leverage to promote the development of the stock 
markets.  
 
However, as noted by Walter and Howei (2001) among others, the B-share 
markets are not very attractive to foreign investors and they grow much slower 
than the A-share markets due to low liquidity, limited investment choices and 
poor information disclosure as compared to international standards. As at the end 
of 2003, there were only 111 companies that issued B-shares, while 1261 
companies issued A-shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange.  Since 1993, China companies have raised foreign capital 
through listings in Hong Kong (H-shares or red-chip shares), U.S. (N-shares) and 
other countries (such as S-shares in Singapore). Foreign investors can invest in 
Chinese companies in other jurisdictions with better enforcement of rules to 
protect minority investors’ rights. They can buy H-share, red-chip shares and N-
shares as substitutes for the B-shares traded on China’s domestic stock exchanges 
(see, e.g., Sun and Tong, 2000; Yang and Lao, 2005). 
 
 
To be listed on the B-share markets, a company must fulfill more requirements 
than those for A-share listing, such as it must have received approval from the 
relevant government authorities for its use of foreign exchange in business 
transactions and produce a stable and adequate supply of foreign currency to pay 
B-share dividend (Su and Fleisher, 1999). At the same time, to effectively 
eliminate the possibility for foreign investors to challenge the controlling 
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shareholders, the B-share investors are subject to certain ownership restrictions. 
For instance, an individual B-share investor is allowed to hold a maximum 25% of 
a firm’s outstanding shares. And the number of foreign B-shares issued can not 
exceed 49% of a firm’s total outstanding shares. What’s more, most of the listed 
companies are either state-owned enterprises or companies restructured with 
plural ownerships from their state-owned predecessors. As listed in Table 2.2, the 
tradable A and B-shares account for less than one third of total issued shares, with 
the non-tradable shares held by the government, legal persons and employees. 
Therefore the B-share investors are always minority shareholders in the Chinese 
listed companies. The agency cost problems are more complicated in the cases 
when the government or government agencies are majority shareholders of the 
listed companies.  
 
It is well known that the governments in both developed and developing countries 
often impose restrictions on shares available only to domestic investors to ensure 
domestic control of local companies. However, not like in most other countries, 
where the market segmentation is only partial, China’s A and B-share markets 
were rigidly segmented until early 2001 (Gao and Tse, 2004). From the beginning 
the A and B-share markets were designed for different sets of investors, the A-
share markets for domestic investors and the B-share markets for foreign investors. 
The International Finance Corporation has identified China as the only country 
that had completely segmented stock trading between domestic and foreign 
investors (Yang, 2003). In February 2001, the CSRC allowed Chinese citizens 
with foreign currency savings to open B-share accounts and trade B-shares. 
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However, the A and B-share markets remain largely segmented due to the foreign 
exchange controls and regulatory barriers. Domestic institutional investors are still 
barred from entering into the B-share markets. The existence of large and 
persistent price discrepancies between the A and B-share prices issued by the 
same domestic domiciled companies implies that the submarkets are still 
effectively segmented as arbitrage opportunities are severely limited (Karolyi and 
Li , 2003).  
 
What makes China’s domestic dual listing system more unusual is that instead of 
the premiums documented for foreign shares in other partially segmented stock 
markets, China appears to be the only case where foreign B-shares are traded at 
substantial discounts to the domestic A-shares (Baily et al., 1999).  
 
Another unique feature of China’s emerging stock markets is that domestic 
domiciled companies do not have the ‘freedom’ to issue shares in China. Before 
2000, the Chinese authorities adopted quota policy to determine the total amount 
of stock offerings and firms that can issue public shares in the A-share markets. 
Both aggregate amount of shares and total number of firms allowed to issue B-
shares were also decided by the government. Even the quota control system was 
changed to the approval system, public share offerings are still under strict control 
from the government as only the local governments or the ministries recommend 
listing candidates and the China Securities Regulatory Commission determines the 
rules and timings for the approvals of the IPOs applications. And the companies 
requesting foreign share listings are also required to obtain approvals from the 
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Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) or the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOC).  
 
For a limited liability company, the application for listing of its shares on the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange is subject to the CSRC’s approval26. Only 
after receiving the approval letter from the CSRC, the company is able to submit 
the listing application documents to the stock exchange. On the notification that 
the stock exchange has approved it listing application, the company must publish 
a notice to disclose the received listing approval from the stock exchange, and a 
prospectus including date of offering, the number of shares offered, offering price, 
a description of its business, risks to its business and financial information. In 
some cases, the company may also issue a share offering notice a few days before 
new share offering date. The date of listing is determined by the stock exchange 
together with the company. After the examination and verification by the stock 
exchange, the company must publish a listing notice approximate five days prior 
to the listing and trading of its shares.  
 
China’s dually listed firms need to prepare two sets of financial statements, one 
set according to the PRC generally accepted accounting principles and audited by 
locally certified accountants for the A-share investors and another set following 
the International Accounting Standards and audited by international audit firms 
for the B-share investors. The differences between the two sets of numbers are 
disclosed in the PRC GAAP financial statements (Chen, Ferdinand and Su, 1999). 
                                                 




The reasons for domestic dual listings on China’s segmented stock markets are 
quite different from those of international dual listings, which usually aim to 
overcome the market segmentation arising from cross-nation investment barriers, 
increase investors’ recognition and share liquidity. Dual listings on the China’s A 
and B-share markets are decided by the government as part of its strategic plan to 
restructure the SOEs, raising capital from domestic savings or foreign capitals 
overseas.  Both the A and B-share markets are domestic in nature and the barriers 
between them are mainly built on foreign exchange controls and restrictions on 
investor-types (Ma, 1996). The domestic dual listings on these two submarkets are 
also quite different from the U.S. domestic dual listing, the case where the shares 
traded on different markets are of the same share class and trading across the 
exchanges is allowed (Khan et al., 1993).  
 
4.2.2 Sample selection and data sources  
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows the number of listed companies that issued A-shares 
or/and B-shares on China’s stock markets. As can be seen from the Panel A, the 
number of A-share companies increases gradually while B-share issues are 
clustered in the early years. There is no B-share issuance in the years 2001-2003 
and after the year 2000 the number of B-share companies even decreases, as two 
companies were delisted in 2001 and one company was delisted in 2002.27  
 
                                                 
27 Three companies were delisted from both A and B-share markets: Shanghai Narcissus 
Electric Appliance on 23 April 2001, Shenzhen Zhonghao (Group) on 22 October 2001 




Number and Distribution of Listed Companies on 
China’s A and B-share markets (1992-2003) 
 
 
Panel A: Number of Listed Companies Issued  
A-shares or/and B-shares by Year 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
A-Share 53 177 287 311 514 720 825 921 1,058 1,184 1,199 1,261 
B-Share 18 40 58 70 85 101 106 108 114 112 111 111 
A and B-Share  18 34 54 58 69 76 80 82 86 88 87 87 
 
Panel B: Frequency Distribution of Newly Dual listings by Year 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
A-Share 18   17 19 4 11 7 4 2 4 4 0 0 
B-Share 20 19 21 4.4 12 7.8 4.4 2.2 4.4 4.4 0 0 
 
Panel C: Frequency Distribution of Time Duration  
between A and B-share Listing Dates (for dually listed companies) 
 
  Number Percentage 
Listed at the same time  17 18.9 
A-share listed first Dual-listing date   
 - within 1 month  2 2.2 
 - 1 to 3 months later  7 7.8 
 - 3 months to 1 year later 6 6.7 
 - 1 to 2 years later 8 8.9 
 - more than 2 years later 7 7.8 
Subtotal   30 33.3 
B-share listed first Dual-listing date   
 - within 1 month  7 7.8 
 - 1 to 3 months later  9 10.0 
 - 3 month to 1 year later 14 15.6 
 - 1 to 2 years later 3 3.3 
 - more than 2 years later 10 11.1 
Subtotal  43 47.8 
Total  90 100.0 
 




To construct the sample companies for this study, I first consider all China 
domiciled companies that once went for domestic dual listing on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange before the end of 2003. There 
are 90 firms in this initial sample, 50% listed on SHSE and 50% listed on SZSE. 
Panel B of Table 4.1 demonstrates the frequency distribution of the number of 
firms that went for dual listing for the years 1995-2003. It is noteworthy that the 
dual listings are concentrated in the early years, with 76 out of 90 fall on the 
period from 1992 to 1997, and the number dwindles to a few or none in the later 
years.  
 
Panel C of Table 4.1 provides a summary description of the frequency distribution 
of time duration between the A-share and B-share listing dates for dually listed 
companies. Of all 90 dually listed companies, 18.9% listed their shares on the A 
and B-share markets at the same time, 33.3% initially listed their shares on the A-
share markets first and 47.8% initially listed their shares on the B-share markets 
first. For those companies that listed on the A and B-share markets at different 
times, lengths of time durations between the two first listing dates vary. There is a 
reasonable balance between the firms with a relatively long A or B-share trading 
history and those with relative short trading history. For example, 27.8% of the 90 
shares had traded on the A or B-share markets for less than three months while 
31.1% have traded for more than one year before the dual listings of the 
companies. Those listed on the A and B-share markets at the same time or have 
time durations less than three months are excluded from the original sample of 




Earlier empirical research examining the market reactions to dual listings focuses 
on the effects around the dual listing dates (see, e.g., Jayaraman et al., 1993). 
Recent studies demonstrate the importance of utilizing the announcement dates 
rather than the listing dates as the valuation effects are most likely to be noticeable 
on listing announcement dates (Miller, 1999).  
 
Therefore there are two dates of interest in this study, namely TA0, the dual listing 
announcement date (hereafter ‘announcement date’), which is taken as the earliest 
press release date that confirms the company will list another class of shares on 
the second listing market, and TL0, the dual listing date, (hereafter ‘listing date’), 
defined as the actual first trading date of the shares on the second listing market.  
 
As noted in Section 4.2.1, upon receiving exchange’s approval, the company must 
publish a notice to announce that it has been approved to go dual listing and a 
prospectus to give the pubic all detailed information regarding share offering.  In 
this study, I take the earlier date that the company makes public (a) exchange 
approval notice or (b) prospectus or summary of prospectus, as the dual listing 
announcement date.    
 
The data of announcement dates are results of searching three official publishers, 
China Securities, Securities Times and Shanghai Securities, which are authorized 
by the CSRC to release official stock market information, such as the exchange 
approval notice and prospectus. I also cross-check the data using some online 
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databases, including the website www.chinastock.com.cn provided by China 
Galaxy Securities Co. Ltd.28  The data of listing dates is easily obtained from 
Datastream International Database.  
 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-share index, Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Composite A-share index, Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite B-share index, or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite B-share index is used to calculate the 
market return for sample companies that are traded on the corresponding 
submarket.  
 
Daily A (B)-share closing prices and trading volumes of the sample companies, 
corresponding submarket index data are collected from the 150th trading day 
before the B (A)-share announcement dates to the 150th trading day after the B 
(A)-share listing dates from Datastream International Database, whenever data is 
available (at lease starting from the 85th trading day before the B (A)-share 
announcement dates, as discussed in next paragraph).29  The three-month time 
deposit rates in China and Treasury bill rates in U.S. are also collected from 
Datastream International Database as proxies for risk free rates.  
                                                 
28 The online databases provide archive of prospectus or ‘Summary of Prospectus’.  For 
most cases, the prospectus was released the same day the company announced the 
exchange approval notice. For only two cases, the companies announced the dual listings 
in ‘Summary of Prospectus’ which was released on the local newspapers one or two days 
before the formal exchange approval notice or prospectus was posted on China Securities, 
Securities Times and Shanghai Securities. For such cases, announcement date refers to the 
date ‘Summary of Prospectus’ was released by local newspapers.  
 
29 The stock prices are adjusted to reflect capital distributions such as stock splits, rights 





In order to generate the proper market model parameters with enough data in the 
estimation period, I include in the final sample only the companies of which the 
shares’ daily closing prices, trading volumes and corresponding submarket index 
closing prices are available at least starting from 85 trading days before the 
announcements date.30 Two companies are subsequently deleted from the sample 
due to the short history of corresponding daily trading data in the estimation 
period.31  The sample therefore reduces to 36 firms, among which 17 firms listed 
its A-shares first and 19 firms listed its B-shares first. 
 
The names, securities codes, dual listing announcement dates TA0 and listing dates 
TL0 of all sample companies are presented in Appendix 4.  
 
The mean and median differences between the A-share announcement dates and 
listing dates are 20.58 and 18 days, respectively. The mean and median 
differences between the B-share announcement dates and listing dates are 17.24 
and 13 days, respectively. The average time lag between the B-share dual listing 
announcements and listing dates is shorter than that of the A-shares.  
 
                                                 
30 As the estimation period is set to be [-150, -25] relative to event dates in this study, so it 
ensures that there are at least 60 daily trading days in the estimation period.  
 
31 For example, Shanghai Vacuum Electron Devices is excluded from the sample as it 
became dually listed companies by listing its B-shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
on 21 February 1992 while the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-share index is 
available only after 1 January 1992. 
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4.3 Review of literature and development of hypotheses  
The unique institutional characteristics of China’s dual listing system implies that 
some dual listing theories can not be applied in China, while certain theories can 
be ‘borrowed’ to explain the impacts of domestic dual listings by China domiciled 
firms. In this section, I first review the literature on the motivation and market 
response of dual listing, followed by a brief survey of the related empirical 
research on China’s segmented A and B-share markets. Based on the previous 
studies and the particular situation in China, the research hypotheses for this study 
are formulated.  
 
4.3.1 Previous studies on dual listings  
Three traditional theories  
Three traditional theories (1) market segmentation theory, (2) liquidity theory and 
(3) investor recognition theory have evolved to explain the rational and market 
response of dual listing.  
 
International dual listing can be rationalized in terms of market segmentation 
theory as dual listing circumvents market segmentation caused by investment 
barriers. The theory indicates that when investment barriers are asymmetric, the 
stock traded on the market accessible only to local investors should command a 
risk premium. Once the stock becomes dually listed on the market more accessible 
to foreign investors, the risk premium would disappear and thus result in lower 
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capital cost and higher share price (see, e.g., Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977;   
Errunza and Losq, 1985; Alexander, Eun and Janakiramana, 1987).   
 
The explanations for dual listing are also rooted in theories of stock market 
microstructure. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) develop the liquidity theory in 
which gross return of securities follows an increasing and concave function of the 
securities liquidity. This theory suggests that for firm listing on another stock 
exchange, the positive (or negative) abnormal returns around the dual listing are 
associated with increase (or decrease) in securities liquidity, measured by stock 
trading volumes or bid-ask spreads. Based on the assumption of incomplete 
information, Merton (1987) provides the rational basis for the greater investor 
recognition of the company going dual listing. The investor recognition theory 
predicts that an increase in the ‘degree of investor recognition’ will lower 
investors’ required returns and therefore increase the market value of the 
company’s stocks.  
 
The hypotheses arising from these three theories have inspired extensive empirical 
studies. Alexander et al. (1988) investigate the valuation effect with a sample of 
34 companies from six countries going dual listings in U.S. and find that for non-
Canadian sample firms, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) increase in the 
pre-listing period and fall in the post-listing period, while for the Canadian sample 
companies, CARs are considerably smaller and statistically insignificant. Lau et al. 
(1994) examine the market reactions to U.S. firms’ dual listings on overseas 
markets and present positive abnormal returns around the dates of acceptance, 
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negative abnormal returns on the first trading dates, and negative post-listing 
abnormal returns for firms listed on the Tokyo or Basel stock exchange. With a 
sample of 181 companies involving 35 countries, Miller (1999) examines the 
market reactions to the announcements of American Depositary Receipt (ADR) 
program. He finds an average abnormal return of 1.15% around the announcement 
dates but reveals statistically significant differences across countries in market 
reactions, which are associated with barriers to capital flows and proxies for 
investor recognition. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find a positive relationship 
between the abnormal returns and increases in shareholder bases for foreign 
stocks with ADR listings.  
 
Corporate governance hypothesis 
According to corporate governance hypothesis, dual listing company can benefit 
from higher corporate governance standards, which enhance firm’s ability to raise 
cheaper external finance, attract more investors and result in higher valuation of 
dual listing firm. And Coffee (1999) proposes that dual listing may be a bonding 
mechanism by which company incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak protection 
of minority rights can voluntarily subject itself to higher disclosure standards and 
stricter enforcement mechanisms to attract more investors. Reese and Weisbach 
(2002) attribute the benefits to the enhancement of protection of minority 
shareholders’ interest and consequent reduction of agency costs of controlling 
shareholders. Doidge et al. (2004) suggest that listing abroad may help controlling 
shareholders commit to limit their expropriation from minority shareholders and 




Order flow migration hypothesis  
Khan et al. (1993) examine the market behavior of the stocks originally listed on 
the AMEX or the NYSE that dually listed on the PSE or the MSE and document 
negative post-dual listing returns of stocks already in circulation. They attribute 
the lower share return and liquidity to the ‘fragmentation effect’ – fragmenting the 
order flow between two exchanges, i.e. the order flow migration from the AMEX 
or the NYSE to the second listing market. Therefore, the cost of dual listing 
outweighs its benefit of inter-market competition. Baker et al. (1994) extend the 
study of Khan et al. (1993) and support their findings by documenting the 
negative post-listing returns caused by fragmentation effect. Baker et al also find 
stronger negative valuation effect for low liquidity stocks which are most severely 
affected by order flow migration.  
 
Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1998) demonstrate that the impact of dual listing 
on liquidity is complex, balancing the cost of order flow migration against the 
benefit of increased inter-market competition.  
 
4.3.2 Relevant studies on China’s segmented stock markets 
Previous studies on China’s segmented stock markets have focused on the puzzle 
that the B-shares are traded at discounts compared to the A-shares issued by the 
same dually listed company.  Bailey (1994) initiates the research by analyzing 
eight Chinese dually listed companies and attributes the B-share discounts to 
Chinese citizen’s lower investment opportunity costs due to lack of outlets for 
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their savings. Fernald and Rogers (2000) use higher return rates required by the 
foreign investors to explain the B-share discounts and attribute an average 4% 
difference in expected return rates of foreign versus domestic investors to the 
limited investment opportunities available for Chinese citizen. In addition to the 
required rate of return difference, various other explanations have been proposed 
for the B-share discount puzzle.  
 
Chakravarty et al. (1998) postulate that one reason for the large B-share discount 
is that foreign investors have less information about Chinese stocks than the 
domestic investors. Sun and Tong (2000) argue that demand curve for B-shares is 
elastic as H-shares and red-chip shares listed in Hong Kong are close substitutes 
for B-shares. When more shares are listed on the H-share and red-chip share 
markets, the B-share discount becomes larger. Chen et al. (2001) find that the 
relative trading volume and turnover of B-shares are negatively associated with 
the B-share discount and propose that the B-share discount is “primarily due to 
illiquidity of the B-share markets” as illiquid B-share stocks have a higher 
expected rate of return and are priced lower to compensate the investors for higher 
trading costs. Mei et al. (2005) attribute the A-share price premium to the 
speculative trading by overconfident domestic investors as there is a large non-
fundamental component in the A-share prices.   
 
As for the impacts of domestic dual listings on valuation and liquidity of China’s 
stock markets, so far the most notable study is by Poon, Firth, and Fung (1998), 
which provides empirical evidence that the dual listing of B-shares have 
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statistically significant negative effects on the share price and liquidity of their 
corresponding A-shares. It is, however, limited by the one-way impact of B-share 
listing on the A-share counterparts, and the short estimation period and event 
period.  
 
4.3.3 Research hypotheses  
Following the directions of the previous dual listing literature, the focus of this 
study is to investigate the valuation and liquidity effects of dual listings on 
China’s segmented A and B-share markets.  
 
(1) Do the A (B)-share prices react to the dual listings of B (A)-shares by the same 
China domiciled companies?  
 
Market segmentation theory stipulates that when a firm resides in a closed capital 
market with high investment barriers, the high price of market risk translates into 
high cost of capital.32 This provides a strong incentive for the company to mitigate 
investment barriers, such as by dual listing in another foreign exchange.  If this 
argument could be applicable to the case of China, it is reasonable to conjecture 
that China listed company with only A-shares could be able to benefit from lower 
capital cost and higher valuation by dual listing on the B-share markets. However, 
I doubt the plausibility of the argument due to the existence of the B-share price 
discounts for China’s dully listed companies.  
 
                                                 
32 Hietala (1989) among others find that domestic investors require higher rate of returns 
than do foreign investors in the partially segmented stock markets.  
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As discussed in Section 4.3.2, one finding from earlier research on China’s B-
share discount puzzle is that the required rate of return for foreign B-share 
investors is higher than the rate for domestic A-share counterparties. Studies have 
attributed the lower rate of return required by domestic investors to the capital 
controls which strictly prohibit domestic savings from leaving the country and 
limited investment opportunities available to the domestic investors (see, e.g., Ma, 
1996; Fernald and Rogers, 2002). Since the required rate of return is apparently 
higher for foreign B-share investors, the motivation of sourcing lower cost of 
capital fails to explain the rational behind Chinese A-share only companies go for 
dual listing on the B-share markets.  
 
Offering B-shares at a lower price to foreign investors who require a higher rate of 
return actually results in a higher weight average cost of capital and a lower 
valuation for the dual listing company, which has a negative impact on the price 
of existing A-shares. On the contrary, offering A-shares at a higher price to 
domestic investors who require a lower rate of return actually results in a lower 
weight average cost of capital and a higher valuation for the dual listing company, 
which have a positive impact on the price of existing B-shares. 
 
Due to the large and persistent B-share discount, there is a wealth transfer effect 
between the A and B-shareholders in response to dual listings on China’s 
segmented markets. In particular, when a company dually lists its shares on the B-
share market, there is a wealth transfer from A-shareholders to B-shareholders as 
both A and B-shares have the same rights to future cash flow and voting rights, 
 97
  
however, B-shares are offered at a lower price than their A-share counterparties. 
Therefore, the negative response in the A-share market is rationally expected 
when the dual listing is announced. Conversely, if a firm dually lists its shares on 
the A-share market, the positive response in the B-share market is rationally 
expected when the dual listing is announced since A-shares are offered at a higher 
price than the corresponding existing B-shares.   
 
The above arguments constitute the institution for the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1  
A-share prices react negatively to the announcements of B-share dual listings by 
the same China domiciled companies.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
B-share prices react positively to the announcements of A-share dual listings by 
the same China domiciled companies.  
 
Another notable benefit of dual listing is related to corporate governance 
hypothesis. As both A-shares and B-shares are traded on the domestic stock 
exchanges, China’s domestic dual listing on the B-share market is different from 
international dual listing which usually involves migrating to another regulatory 
regime. Therefore, even after dual listing foreign B-shares, the listed companies 
are still governed by the Chinese legal and regulatory systems with weak 
protection of minority rights. What’s more, as mentioned in Section 4.2.1, China 
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has unique institutional features including the existence of large portion non-
tradable shares and the restriction that an individual B-share investor is allowed to 
hold no more than 25% of a firm’s outstanding shares. Therefore, in most cases, 
the majority shareholders are state, state agencies or legal person while not foreign 
B-share investors.   
 
The major improvement in corporate governance following the dual listing is 
related to the increased and better quality information disclosure by adopting the 
IAS when A-share only listed company dually lists on the B-share markets. The 
IAS is undoubtedly a higher quality accounting standard as compared to the PRC 
GAAP. The implication from the corporate governance hypothesis is that by 
pledging to adopt higher disclosure standard, listed firm also commit to reduce 
information asymmetries and agency costs as controlling shareholders would 
minimize consumption of private benefits. These in turn result in better use of 
growth opportunities, lower cost of capital and eventually lead to higher valuation 
of the company.  
 
Consequently, I have the hypothesis that is contrary to Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 3 
A-share prices react positively to the announcements of B-share dual listings by 




(2) Is there any change in the liquidity of A (B)-shares in response to the dual 
listing of B (A)-share counterparties?  
 
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, liquidity hypothesis proposes that for company goes 
for dual listing on another stock exchange, the positive (or negative) abnormal 
returns around the dual listing are associated with the increase (or decrease) in 
liquidity. Therefore, if hypothesis 1 and 2 hold true in China’s segmented stock 
markets because the B-share discount and higher required rate of return are well 
within investor’s expectation upon the dual listing announcement date, I have the 
following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 4 




B-shares experience an increase in liquidity in response to the dual listings of A-
shares. 
 
The rational for Hypotheses 4 and 5 is as follows: the time when the lower priced 
B-shares are listed, A-share investors may lose their interests to trade the 
corresponding A-shares as they are uncomfortable for paying a higher price than 
B-share investors for the same rights to future cash flow and voting rights. While 
when the higher priced A-shares are listed, B-share investors may have stronger 
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incentive to trade as they can benefit from wealth transfer from the corresponding 
A-shareholders.  
 
As for dual listing on the B-share markets, if it is hypothesis 3 while not 
hypothesis 1 applies in China, as the higher valuation arising from better corporate 
governance is more than being offset by the lower valuation arising from higher 
cost of capital and wealth transfer effect, I formulate the following hypothesis 6 
that is contrary to hypothesis 4. It is possible if A-share investors feel that they are 
better protected as minority shareholders after the company adopts higher 
disclosure standard and so that they have more incentive to trade.   
 
Hypothesis 6 
A-shares experience an increase in liquidity in response to the dual listings of B-
shares. 
 
In terms of order flow migration hypothesis which explains the negative abnormal 
returns in the post domestic dual listing period in U.S., as China’s A and B-share 
markets are segmented, it is expected that dual listing of B (A)-shares should not 
result in a large amount order flow migration from the A (B)-share market. It 
implies that the order flow migration hypothesis may not be applied in China. 33
 
                                                 
33 Fernald and Rogers (2000) document that event before early 2001 some domestic 
investors can trade in the B-share markets illegally through their overseas relatives or 
other channels. However, order flow migration from the A-share markets to the B-share 
markets upon the dual listings of B-shares may be in small magnitudes as A and B-shares 




4.4 Event study of market responses to domestic dual listings 
4.4.1 Methodology for testing valuation effect 
To investigate the changes in existing A (B)-share price around B (A)-share 
announcement and listing dates, this study employs the classic event study 
procedure, which is widely used in the literature.34  The coefficients of single 
factor local market model are first estimated for every stock on the basis of daily 
log returns during a 125 pre-event period starting 150 trading days and ending 26 
trading days before the B (A)-share event dates - TA0 dual listing announcement 
date and TL0 dual listing date. 35  The abnormal returns are calculated as the 
prediction errors from the ordinary least squares (OLS) market model for the 
event period, a 176-day period starting 25 trading days before and ending 150 
trading days after the B (A)-share event dates. Abnormal returns are then averaged 
across sample firms to form the average abnormal return. The relevant formulas 
are listed below:  
 
The expected daily return of each stock i at time t in the event period is: 
ri,t = αi + βi * Rm,t ,                                                                                                          (4.1) 
                                                                               
where Rm,t = actual return of submarket index at time t; and  
αi, and βi = coefficients estimated from OLS market model  
 
                                                 
34  Please refer to MacKinlay (1997) for an in-depth review of the event study 
methodology and relevant empirical studies.  
 
35 For some listed companies, which have relative short A (B)-share trading history before 
B (A)-share event dates, the estimation period may be shorter. But there are at least 60 
daily data in the estimation period.  
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The abnormal return of each stock i at time t is:  
ARi,t = Ri,t – ri,t ,                                                                                      (4.2)        
where Ri,t = actual daily return of stock i at time t  
 
The average abnormal return (AAR) of the sample stocks at time t is calculated by 
averaging all individual abnormal returns:  







i,t                                                                                    (4.3)        
 
As traditional parametric test assumes normal distribution and there are evidences 
that stock returns are not normally distributed especially in the emerging stock 
markets. Maynes and Rumsey (1993) and Cowan and Sergeant (1996) suggest that 
the traditional parametric test is reasonably well-specified for thickly and 
moderately traded stocks but poorly specified for thinly traded stocks. The non-
parametric rank test, however, performs well for all trading frequencies. A 
solution for thinly traded stocks is the rank test (Corrado, 1989 and Corrado and 
Zivney, 1992). Also the rank test is nonparametric, not depended on the 
assumption of normality and suitable to assess the statistical significance for event 
study in this Chapter. To implement the rank test, for each sample stock, I treat the 
abnormal returns in estimation and event periods as a single 301-day time series 
and assign a rank to each daily return. Thus the values of ranks vary from 1 to 301. 
Following the notation of Corrado (1989), let  denote the rank of the time 






           = rank ( ), t = itK itAR 150− , -149…, +150                                            (4.4) 
where   implies , and 1itAR ≥ ijAR itK ≥ ijK ≤ itK ≤ 301.                                                       
 
I also adjust for missing returns by using the adapted rank test developed by 
Corrado and Zivney (1992). Ranks are standardized by dividing each rank by the 
number of non-missing daily returns in each stock’s time series plus one. Let  
represent the standardized rank, then 
itU
itU = )1( iit MK + ,                                                                                 (4.5) 
where  = the number of non-missing abnormal returns for stock .  iM i
 







)()21(1                                                               (4.6)      
 
The standard deviation  is:  )(US






















                                               (4.7) 
where  = the number of nonmissing returns across the stocks in the 




The percentage of nonnegative abnormal returns at time t in the event period is 
also calculated and generalized sign test is used to test whether it is statistically 
different from the fraction of nonnegative abnormal returns across stocks and 
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across days in the parameter estimation period. Cowan (1992) reports that 
generalized sign test is powerful under a variety of conditions and relative robust 
to variance change around the event date.  
 
The percentage of nonnegative abnormal returns in the estimation period for 











p ϕ                                                                                  (4.8) 
where itϕ  takes on the value of 1 when the abnormal return for stock i at 
time t is nonnegative and  itϕ  takes on the value of 0 when the abnormal 
return for stock i at time t is negative.  
 
Ti is the number of nonmissing returns for stock i in the estimation period. 
 









ϕ                                                                 (4.9) 
 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the event period is calculated as 





AA t                                                                            (4.10)     
where  = the beginning of the period of interest; and  1t




4.4.2 Empirical results of valuation effect  
The A (B)-share cumulative abnormal returns in the event period starting 25 
trading days before and ending 150 trading days after the B (A)-share dual listing 
announcement and listing dates are plotted in Figure 4.1. A (B)-share daily 
average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 
the days surrounding the B (A)-share dual listing announcement and listing dates 
are presented in Table 4.2 and 4.3 (Table 4.4 and Table 4.5),  respectively.36  
 
Figure 4.1 
A (B)-share Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) from Day −25 to 
+150 relative to B (A)-share Announcement and Listing Dates 
 
 
















B-share Offering Announcement Date
B-share Listing Date
 
                                                 
36 As discussed in Section 4.3.3, the hypotheses are that A (B)-share prices respond 
negatively (positively) in response to the announcements of B (A)-share listings by the 
same China domiciled companies. In this section, I follow the earlier empirical studies 
and also calculate AARs and CARs around the listing dates for comparison purpose.  
 
The results are robust when I change the interval for estimating the market model 
parameters. Sensitivity test using other event periods for calculating AARs and CARs 
yields qualitatively similar results. 
 106
  
Figure 4.1 (continued)  
A (B)-share Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) from Day −25 to 

























A (B)-share daily abnormal returns are market model adjusted using parameters estimated 
over the period starting -150 trading days and ending -26 trading days relative to the 
corresponding announcement or listing dates. Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A 
(B)-share index or Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A (B)-share index is used as a 
proxy for the market portfolio. The daily average abnormal returns are averaged across 
firms then cumulated.  
 
A-share valuation effect in response to B-share dual listings  
As for the impact of dual listings on A-shares in circulation, the value decreasing 
impact following the announcements of dual listings on the B-share markets can 
be observed visually in Figure 4.1 (a). A-share cumulative abnormal return drifts 
downward throughout the whole post-event period and reaches -11.6%, -16.4% 
and -25.4% (-17.1%, -20.5% and -27.8%) at the 1% significance level 50, 100 and 
150 trading days after B-share announcement (listing) dates, respectively37.  
                                                 
37 Following Kadlec and McConnel (1994), I also calculate the A-share average CAR 
from the B-share dual listing announcement dates to listing dates, which is -1.9% 




A-Share Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative 




  AAR Rank test    
  statistic 
Percentage 
Nonnegative 
Sign test  
statistics 
CAR 
-25  0.0115** 2.387  70.6%* 2.011  0.0115
-20  -0.0085 -1.149 41.2% -0.421  0.0361
-16  -0.0001 -0.331 29.4% -1.394  0.0546
-12  -0.0019 0.424 47.1% 0.065  0.0327
-10  -0.0005 -0.311 41.2% -0.421  0.0291
-8   0.0071 1.538 52.9% 0.552  0.0302
-6   0.0011 1.215 58.8% 1.038  0.0247
-5  -0.0030 -0.054 47.1% 0.065  0.0217
-4   0.0034 1.113 52.9% 0.552  0.0251
-3  -0.0008 0.477 58.8% 1.038  0.0244
-2  -0.0003 0.079 47.1% 0.065  0.0241
-1   0.0070** 2.784  70.6%* 2.011  0.0310
0   0.0015 0.413 52.9% 0.552  0.0325
1  -0.0016 0.446 41.2% -0.421  0.0309
2  -0.0020 -0.789 29.4% -1.394  0.0289
3  -0.0090** -2.192    17.6%** -2.367  0.0199
4  -0.0071 -1.408 29.4% -1.394  0.0128
5  -0.0037 -0.551 35.3% -0.908  0.0091
6  -0.0017 0.181 41.2% -0.421  0.0074
8   0.0099 0.976 47.1% 0.065  0.0208
10  -0.0018 -0.019 35.3% -0.908  0.0124
12  -0.0046 -1.061 29.4% -1.394  0.0037
16  -0.0079** -2.156 29.4% -1.394  -0.0046
20  -0.0065 -0.856 35.3% -0.908  -0.0191
25  -0.0091 -1.404 41.2% -0.421  -0.0419
50  -0.0067 0.001 47.1% 0.065  -0.1155
100  -0.0046 -1.022 35.3% -0.908  -0.1644
150  -0.0025 0.186 41.2% -0.421  -0.2543
 
Notes:  
1. A-share daily abnormal returns are market model adjusted using parameters estimated 
over the period starting -150 trading days and ending -26 trading days relative to the 
corresponding B-share dual listing announcement dates. Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite A-share index or Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A-share index is 
used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The daily average abnormal returns are 
averaged across firms or cumulated.  
2. Rank test is used to exam whether AAR is statistically different from 0.  
3. Sign test is used to exam whether the percentage nonnegative is statistically different 
from that in estimation period.  





A-Share Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative 




  AAR Rank test      
  statistic 
Percentage 
Nonnegative 
Sign test  
statistics 
CAR 
-25   0.0016 0.413 52.9% 0.644  0.0016
-20  -0.0038 -0.139 58.8% 1.132  -0.0058
-16   0.0026 1.192 52.9% 0.644  -0.0036
-12   0.0007 0.665 52.9% 0.644  -0.0009
-10  -0.0038 -0.797 41.2% -0.330  -0.0073
-8  -0.0033 -0.613 35.3% -0.818  -0.0141
-6  -0.0047 -1.123 41.2% -0.330  -0.0116
-5  -0.0018 0.270 47.1% 0.157  -0.0134
-4  -0.0039 -0.893 29.4% -1.305  -0.0173
-3  -0.0016 -0.071 41.2% -0.330  -0.0189
-2   0.0075 0.698 35.3% -0.818  -0.0114
-1   0.0026 1.319 64.7% 1.619  -0.0088
0  -0.0067* -1.905 29.4% -1.305  -0.0155
1  -0.0064 -1.039 47.1% 0.157  -0.0219
2  -0.0015 -1.031 23.5% -1.793  -0.0234
3  -0.0039 -1.639 23.5% -1.793  -0.0273
4  -0.0052 -0.927 35.3% -0.818  -0.0325
5  -0.0062 -1.698 35.3% -0.818  -0.0387
6  -0.0069 -1.485 41.2% -0.330  -0.0456
8  -0.0092** -2.325     11.8%** -2.767  -0.0578
10   0.0015 0.899 47.1% 0.157  -0.0615
12  -0.0054 -0.711 35.3% -0.818  -0.0683
16  -0.0119*** -2.924     11.8%** -2.767  -0.0806
20  -0.0043 -1.349 29.4% -1.305  -0.0762
25  -0.0003 0.341 35.3% -0.818  -0.0871
50  -0.0070 -1.443 29.4% -1.305  -0.1771
100  -0.0041 -0.568 23.5% -1.793  -0.2052




1. A-share daily abnormal returns are market model adjusted using parameters estimated 
over the period starting -150 trading days and ending -26 trading days relative to the 
corresponding B-share dual listing dates. Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-
share index or Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A-share index is used as a proxy 
for the market portfolio. The daily average abnormal returns are averaged across 
firms or cumulated.  
2. Rank test is used to exam whether AAR is statistically different from 0. 
3. Sign test is used to exam whether the percentage nonnegative is statistically different 
from that in estimation period.  





B-Share Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative 




  AAR Rank test   
  statistic 
Percentage 
Nonnegative 
Sign test  
statistics 
CAR 
-25   0.0080 1.377 68.4% 1.652  0.0080
-20  -0.0018 -0.552 42.1% -0.642  -0.0012
-16  -0.0021 -0.640 42.1% -0.642  -0.0084
-12   0.0057 1.026 63.2% 1.193  -0.0058
-10  -0.0018 0.170 63.2% 1.193  -0.0070
-8   0.0067 0.975 52.6% 0.276  -0.0002
-6  -0.0031 -0.930 31.6% -1.560  0.0038
-5  -0.0084 -1.174 36.8% -1.101  -0.0045
-4   0.0157 1.031 63.2% 1.193  0.0112
-3   0.0017 0.013 52.6% 0.276  0.0128
-2   0.0082 1.633 63.2% 1.193  0.0210
-1   0.0046 0.743 57.9% 0.735  0.0255
0   0.0266** 2.626    73.7%** 2.111  0.0522
1   0.0222** 2.634 68.4% 1.652  0.0743
2   0.0120 0.919 57.9% 0.735  0.0863
3   0.0099 1.491 63.2% 1.193  0.0961
4   0.0095 1.452 68.4% 1.652  0.1056
5   0.0082 1.007 57.9% 0.735  0.1138
6  -0.0049 -1.061 31.6% -1.560  0.1090
8  -0.0107 -1.546 31.6% -1.560  0.0840
10  -0.0034 -0.324 42.1% -0.642  0.0830
12   0.0017 -0.293 31.6% -1.560  0.0953
16  -0.0050 -1.037 52.6% 0.276  0.0812
20  -0.0053 -0.607 42.1% -0.642  0.0908
25   0.0050 0.871 68.4% 1.652  0.0969
50   0.0142* 1.951    73.7%** 2.111  0.1180
100  -0.0041 -1.471 31.6% -1.560  0.0984




1. B-share daily abnormal returns are market model adjusted using parameters estimated 
over the period starting -150 trading days and ending -26 trading days relative to the 
corresponding A-share dual listing announcement dates. Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite B-share index or Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite B-share index is 
used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The daily average abnormal returns are 
averaged across firms or cumulated.  
2. Rank test is used to exam whether AAR is statistically different from 0.  
3. Sign test is used to exam whether the percentage nonnegative is statistically different 
from that in estimation period.  





B-Share Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative 




  AAR Rank test    
  statistic 
Percentage 
Nonnegative 
Sign test  
statistics 
CAR 
-25  -0.0039 -1.165  42.1% -0.642  -0.0039
-20  -0.0007 -0.281  47.4% -0.183  0.0057
-16  -0.0011 -0.862  42.1% -0.642  0.0136
-12   0.0164** 2.678     78.9%** 2.570  0.0689
-10  -0.0008 -0.720  36.8% -1.101  0.0753
-8  -0.0097 -1.257  31.6% -1.560  0.0578
-6  -0.0057 -1.014  42.1% -0.642  0.0622
-5   0.0006 -0.441  36.8% -1.101  0.0628
-4  -0.0008 -0.554  42.1% -0.642  0.0619
-3  -0.0010 0.250  57.9% 0.735  0.0610
-2   0.0104 1.422  57.9% 0.735  0.0714
-1   0.0067 1.759  63.2% 1.193  0.0781
0  -0.0110* -1.985  31.6% -1.560  0.0670
1  -0.0136** -2.811        10.5%*** -3.395  0.0534
2   0.0041 0.781  52.6% 0.276  0.0575
3  -0.0003 0.307  52.6% 0.276  0.0573
4  -0.0033 -1.221  36.8% -1.101  0.0540
5   0.0104* 1.849  68.4% 1.652  0.0644
6   0.0100 0.912  52.6% 0.276  0.0743
8  -0.0067 -0.860  31.6% -1.560  0.0728
10   0.0020 0.321  47.4% -0.183  0.0745
12  -0.0081 -1.035  36.8% -1.101  0.0672
16   0.0007 0.617  57.9% 0.735  0.0638
20  -0.0001 -0.824  31.6% -1.560  0.0700
25  -0.0032 0.137  57.9% 0.735  0.0549
50   0.0101* 1.974  68.4% 1.652  0.0595
100  -0.0103 -1.384  31.6% -1.560  0.0241
150  -0.0013 -0.618  47.4% -0.183  0.0067
 
Notes: 
1. B-share daily abnormal returns are market model adjusted using parameters estimated 
over the period starting -150 trading days and ending -26 trading days relative to the 
corresponding A-share dual listing dates. Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite B-
share index or Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite B-share index is used as a proxy 
for the market portfolio. The daily average abnormal returns are averaged across 
firms or cumulated.  
2. Rank test is used to exam whether AAR is statistically different from 0.  
3. Sign test is used to exam whether the percentage nonnegative is statistically different 
from that in estimation period.  




As for daily average abnormal returns, Table 4.2 shows that three trading days 
after the companies announce the dual listings on the B-share markets, on average 
A-shares experience statistically significant negative return of 0.9% (rank test 
statistics of -2.2, and percentage of nonnegative returns statistically significantly 
lower than that in the estimation period). Interestingly, the statistically significant 
AAR does not occur on the announcement days but three trading days after the 
announcements. This may be due to the definition of the announcement date in 
this study - the earliest date of confirming the dual listing in the media. And 
general public A-share investors may have access to the announcement 
information content via their friends or securities house brokers with some time 
lag.   
 
There are also some evidences of A-share abnormal returns in the B-share pre-
announcement period. In particular, 25 trading days and 1 trading day before the 
dual listing announcement dates, A-share prices rise statistically significantly. The 
abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period indicate some investors in the 
A-share markets may have insider information about the dual listings before the 
formal announcements. Miller (1999) also finds statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns before the announcements of dual listings via ADRs in restricted 
emerging stock markets and attributes the phenomenon to information leakage in 
the pre-announcement period. Given the nature of China’s emerging stock 
markets, it is possible that B-share dual listing information has been leaked to and 
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used by some ‘insiders’ in pre-announcement period.38 While surprisingly, the 
signs of the statistically significant abnormal returns are positive, not in line with 
the expected negative valuation effect. I do not have a convincing explanation for 
this, it seems to imply that in China some big domestic investors not only know 
insider news but also actively influence price movements with their massive and 
coordinated buy and sell activities so that they can trade to take profit before A-
share prices drop following the official dual listing announcements. Heilmann 
(2002) indicates that in China the evidence for systematic insider collusion and 
market manipulation is particular impressive.   
 
Table 4.3 reveals that A-share prices also drop statistically significantly by 
approximate 0.7% on the first B-share trading days (rank test statistics of -1.9, and 
percentage of nonnegative returns statistically significantly lower than that in the 
estimation period). For most of the post-listing days, the A-share daily abnormal 
returns are negative (statistically significant on a few days).  
 
The overall results indicate that dual listings on the B-share markets have negative 
valuation consequence for the exiting A-shares. And the decrease in A-share 
prices appears persistent at least 150 trading days after B-share listing dates. The 
findings support Hypothesis 1 and reject hypothesis 3. The results are also 
consistent with the evidence of Pooh et al. (1998) who find that dual listings of 
                                                 
38 Before the announcements of B-share dual listings, the companies must apply for the 
approvals from the CSRC, the MOFTEC (or the MOF) and stock exchanges. Therefore 




China domiciled companies on the B-share markets have statistically significant 
negative impacts on the stock prices of corresponding A-shares.  
 
It seems that corporate governance hypothesis can not be used to explain the 
abnormal returns found in this study. But this does not necessarily mean that the 
better information disclosure after the dual listings on the B-share markets have no 
positive valuation effect in the long-run as the event period in this study ends 150 
trading days after dual listing dates. Its long term valuation effect is a topic for 
further study.  
  
B-share valuation effect in response to A-share dual listings 
Figure 4.1(b) indicates that for B-shares in circulation, prices run up sharply 
around the A-share dual listing announcement dates. On average, B-share 
cumulative abnormal return is -2.6% the days before A-share dual listing 
announcements but reaches 11.4% five days after the announcements. Following 
Kadlec and McConnel (1994), I also calculate the B-share average cumulative 
abnormal return from the A-share dual listing announcement dates to listing dates, 
which is 7.2% and statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 4.4 shows that B-
share prices rise statistically significantly on the announcement dates and one day 
after the announcements as the daily average abnormal return is approximate 2.7% 
and 2.2% (both rank test statistics of 2.6), respectively.  
 
However, it seems that the positive B-share valuation effect in response to A-
share dual listing announcements is transient. In Table 4.5, statistically significant 
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negative abnormal returns are detected on the first and second A-share trading 
days. Not only do the B-share prices drop by 1.1% and 1.4% on the first two A-
share trading days, respectively, the CAR curve relative to the A-share dual listing 
dates, after hitting a peak of 7.8% one day before first A-share trading days, then 
moves downward with some fluctuation and reaches 0.7% 150 trading days after 
the A-share dual listing dates.39  The B-share daily average abnormal return is -
0.04% which is not statistically significant in the sample post-listing period. The 
gains of the B-share prices around the announcement dates reverse if not 
disappear completely in the post-listing periods.  
 
Consistent with hypothesis 2, the results show the positive B-share valuation 
effect in response to the A-share listing announcements. Statistically significant 
B-share positive abnormal returns and the CAR curve hike could be found around 
the A-share announcement dates. However, the direction of the CAR curve is 
reversed beginning first A-share trading days, suggesting the positive valuation 
impact is not persistent in the post-listing period. The findings are similar to Lau 
et al. (1994), which documents that for U.S. companies dually listed on other 
countries’ stock exchanges, there are positive abnormal returns around the dates of 
acceptance on the foreign exchanges and negative average abnormal return on the 
first trading days. 
 
Another interesting finding is that unlike the case for A-shares in circulation, I do 
not find any statistically significant B-share abnormal returns in the pre-
                                                 




announcement period. This is not surprising, since the possibility for foreign B-
shareholders to receive and take use of dual listing ‘insider’ information before the 
official announcements is much lower than that of domestic A-shareholders.  
4.4.3 Methodology for testing liquidity effect 
The event study procedure is also used to investigate the liquidity effect. Due to 
the data availability issue with bid-ask spread, in this study the liquidity effect is 
measured by two similar measurements of trading activity in the event period – 
abnormal trading volume (AV) and standardized abnormal trading volume 
(SAV).40 Both proxies are on the basis of comparing average trading volume in 
the estimation period and event period.  
 
First, at event time t or sub-sample period within the event period, daily (average) 
abnormal trading volume for each stock i is: 
           AVi,t = Vi,t – NVi                                                                              (4.11)        
 where Vi,t = daily (average) trading volume for stock i at time t or in event 
period; and  
NVi = average trading volume for each stock i during the estimation period.  
 
The average abnormal trading volume of the sample stocks at event time t or in 
event period is:  







i,t                                                                              (4.12)     
                                                 
40 Datastream International Database does not provide the bid and ask price data for A 
and B-shares until 9 June 1995. 
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   The student- t test of statistical significance of abnormal trading volume is:  
 tt = ( ) nAVAV/σ                                                                                    (4.13)        
where )(AVσ = the standard deviation of the average abnormal trading 
volume  
 
Standardized abnormal trading volume (SAV) for each stock i at time t or event 
period is calculated as:  
         SAVi,t = AVi,t / σ (NVi)                                                                          (4.14)        
where σ (NVi)= the standard deviation of trading volume for stock i in 
estimation period. 
 
The standardized abnormal trading volumes are averaged across all sample stocks 
for each event day or period to get the average standardized abnormal trading 
volume, which is:  







i,t                                                                            (4.15)      
   
The student- t test of statistical significance of standardized abnormal trading 
volume is:  
       tt = ( ) nSAVSAV/σ                                                                                  (4.16)        
where )(SAVσ = the standard deviation of the average standardized 
abnormal trading volume.  
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4.4.4 Empirical results of liquidity effect  
Given the similarity of the results using two liquidity measurements, named the 
abnormal trading volume and the standardized abnormal trading volume, I only 
report the empirical results of the SAVs in the subsequent discussion. The daily 
average trading volumes (DTVs) and standardized abnormal trading volumes for 
various event periods are calculated and displayed in Tables 4.6. 41
 
A-share liquidity effect in response to B-share dual listings 
As shown in Table 4.6, the A-share liquidity declines after B-share dual listing 
event dates.  The daily average trading volumes in various post-listing periods are 
smaller than that in the estimation period, i.e. 3566 (3990) [−150, −26] day 
relative to the B-share announcement (listing) dates. For example, the daily 
average trading volume is 1599, 1564, 1509 and 1588 in the post-listing periods 
[2,150], [26,150], [51,150] and [101,150], respectively. And the average 
standardized abnormal trading volumes in the above post-listing periods and 
around the listing dates are all statistically significant negative.  The empirical 
evidence regarding this change of A-share trading volume is in line with that of 
Poon et al. (1998) and supports hypothesis 4 but not hypothesis 6. The finding of 
decline of A-share trading volumes accompanied by decline of A-share prices in 
response to dual listings on the B-share markets are consistent with the liquidity 
hypothesis of Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
 
                                                 
41 The results are robust when I change the interval for estimation period. Sensitivity test 





A (B)-share Daily Average Trading Volumes (DTVs) and  
Standardized Abnormal Volumes (SAVs) around 
B (A)-share announcement and Listing Dates 
 




(1,000)   SAV t-statistics 
DTV 
(1,000)
   
SAV t-statistics
Panel A: Announcement date 
[-150,-26]       3,566 (estimation period)       1,091 (estimation period) 
[-25,-2] 5,219 0.576 1.367 1,110 -0.034 -0.202 
-1 3,655 0.082 0.310 1,186 1.026 1.216 
0 5,297 0.218 0.711 2,387 1.907 1.481 
1 4,242 0.161 0.526 3,640 3.832 2.254** 
[2,25] 2,385 -0.161 -1.051 1,579 1.122 1.812* 
[26,50] 1,745 -0.217 -0.797 1,841 1.335 1.801* 
[51,100] 1,705 -0.378 -2.384** 2,636 1.766 2.892***
[2,150] 1,693 -0.366 -2.506** 1,859 1.180 3.023***
[26,150] 1,561 -0.405 -2.695** 1,913 1.191 2.877** 
[51,150] 1,515 -0.453 -3.583*** 1,931 1.155 2.664** 
[101,150] 1,324 -0.527 -4.458*** 1,226 0.545 1.797* 
Panel B: Listing Date 
[-150,-26]       3,990  (estimation period)       1,168 (estimation period) 
[-25,-2] 3,101 -0.193 -1.451 1,584 0.952 1.762* 
-1 1,813 -0.364 -2.119** 2,141 1.416 1.782* 
0 1,740 -0.399 -2.294** 2,299 1.663 1.759* 
1 1,863 -0.392 -2.347** 1,503 0.974 1.342 
[2,25] 1,781 -0.391 -2.711** 1,664 1.256 1.663 
[26,50] 1,783 -0.299 -1.468 2,456 1.450 2.486** 
[51,100] 1,430 -0.573 -4.913*** 2,063 1.313 2.298** 
[2,150] 1,599 -0.486 -4.013*** 1,700 1.001 2.785** 
[26,150] 1,564 -0.505 -4.247*** 1,706 0.952 2.668** 
[51,150] 1,509 -0.556 -5.244*** 1,519 0.827 2.181** 
[101,150] 1,588 -0.539 -5.172*** 975 0.342 1.650 
 





In general, prior research on international dual listing documents an increase of 
trading volume in post-listing period (McConnell, 1996). By contrast, I find a 
decline of A-share trading volumes in response to B-share dual listings. Since the 
A-share and B-share markets are segmented, dual listings should not result in 
order flow migration from the A-share to the B-share markets. A possible 
explanation is that A-share investors lose their interests to trade the corresponding 
A-shares as they are uncomfortable for paying a higher price than B-shareholders 
for the same rights to cash flow and voting rights.  
 
It is noteworthy that the average trading volume in the pre-announcement period 
[−25, −2] is 5219, higher than that in the estimation period [−150, −26] relative to 
announcement dates, which is 3613. Thus it shows that the A-share average 
trading volume surges before the B-share dual listing announcement dates. 
However, only 53% of the sample companies record positive abnormal trading 
volumes in the pre-announcement period, resulting in the statistical insignificance 
of the standardized abnormal trading volumes prior to the announcement dates. 
Similar to the discussion in Section 4.4.2 regarding abnormal returns in the pre-
announcement period, the finding of higher average trading volume prior to the B-
share dual listing announcement dates may also suggest that for some A-share 
sample companies, the B-share dual listing information has been leaked to some 





B-share liquidity effect in response to A-share dual listings   
In contrast to what has been observed for the A-share liquidity effect in response 
to the B-share dual listings, Table 4.6 shows a general increase of B-share 
liquidity after the A-share dual listing events. The daily standardized abnormal 
trading volume rises after the dual listing announcement dates and is positive for 
all periods afterwards. On top of that, daily standardized abnormal trading volume 
for the post-listing period [26, 50], [51, 100] and [101, 150] after the dual listing 
dates is 1.5, 1.3 and 0.3, (t-statistics of 2.5, 2,3 and 1.7), respectively, indicating 
that the increase of B-share trading volume is followed by a moderate reduction 
over 100 trading days after dual listing dates. In sum, the overall result is 
consistent with hypothesis 5 as there is an increase of the B-share liquidity after 
dual listings on the A-share markets, evident by statistically significant positive 
standardized abnormal trading volume in [2, 150] relative to A-share dual listing 
dates.  
 
Another interesting finding is the absence of B-share abnormal trading volume 
before the A-share dual listing announcements. The B-share average trading 
volume in the A-share pre-announcement period [−25, −2] is 1110, almost same 
as that in the estimation period [−150, −26] before the A-share dual listing 
announcements, which is 1091. In addition, the daily average trading volume 
hikes on the listing announcement dates and one day after the announcements, 
which indicates B-share investors’ strong reaction to the A-share dual-listing 
announcements. Similar to the discussion in Section 4.4.2 regarding the non-
existence of B-share abnormal return in the A-share pre-announcement period, the 
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finding here also implies that there is no evidence of information leakage about 
the upcoming A-share dual listings to the foreign B-share investors.  
 
4.5 Panel regression for valuation effect  
The empirical results for valuation effect presented in Section 4.4.2 are based on 
the standard event study methodology. This may be a limiting approach as the 
market risk might change due to the changes in firm-specific factors arising from 
domestic dual listing, such as the change in listing company’s market 
capitalization. To conduct a joint test of whether there are abnormal returns for the 
during-event period ([0, 1] relative to the event dates) and post event period ([2, 
150] relative to the event dates), and whether there are structural changes 
associated with domestic dual listings, we use a modified CAPM model with 
panel data, pooling the cross-section (17 companies that issue A-shares first and 
19 companies that issue B-shares first) and time series ([-150, 150] relative to the 
event dates) stock returns and corresponding submarket returns. This methodology, 
which measures the abnormal returns in the event period after adjusting for market 
covariance risk, can be used to supplement the conventional event study method 
(Foerster and Karolyi, 1999). Panel regression method can improve the precision 
of estimates derived from the model dynamics with short time-series (Domowitz 
et al., 1997)  
 
Let each stock have a return-generating process given by:  
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where =itR Daily return for stock i at time t;  
          Daily risk free interest rate at time t;=ftR 42  
          Corresponding submarket return for stock i at time t; =mtR 43
          =si 'α Constants in the modified CAPM model (abnormal returns);  
 =si 'β Beta coefficients on market excess returns; and        
          Period dummy variables for stock i at time t=sDit '  44
 
The regression results are presented in Table 4.7. The robust t-statistics and 
adjusted 2R are computed using White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard 
Errors & Covariance to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The 
last two columns report robust Wald test Chi-square and F-statistic for structural 
break of post-event coefficients derived from the modified CAPM market model, 
i.e. a joint coefficient test that whether = =0.  postiα postiβ
 
                                                 
42 It is derived from the U.S. 3-month Treasure bill rate for the B-shares and the Chinese 
3-month time deposit rate for the A-shares.  
 
43 It is measured by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A-share or B-
share indices.  
 
44 The dummy variable equals one if the observation is from pre, during or post-event 
period and zero otherwise. The superscripts ‘pre’, ‘during’ and ‘post’ indicate the 




Panel Regression Results for Domestic Dual Listings around Announcement and Listing Dates  
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1. The Wald test Chi-square and F-statistic are reported for structural break between the pre and post-event coefficients with associated p-value listed 
below.  




Empirical results for the A-share abnormal returns and betas around the B-share 
event dates are presented in Panel A of Table 4.7. I find that in the pre-event 
periods the betas on the market excess returns are very close to one (0.98 and 0.97 
for the pre-announcement period and pre-listing period, respectively). The 
coefficients  in the post-event periods indicate that the betas decrease by 
small amounts (0.04 and 0.01 for the post-announcement period and the post-
listing period, respectively) and the changes are not statistically significant.
sposti 'β
45 It 
may suggest that there are no changes in the systematic risk after dual listing on 
the B-share markets. Constant  relative to the listing date and constants 
 relative to the announcement and listing dates are all negative with 
statistically significant t-statistics, indicating the significant A-share negative 
abnormal returns after B-share dual listing announcements. The p-values for the 
Wald test of A-share structure change indicate that the overall changes in the post-





The regression results for the B-share abnormal returns around the A-share event 
dates are shown in Panel B of Table 4.7. Again I find that in the pre-event periods, 
the betas on the market excess returns are very close to one (0.97 and 0.98 for the 
pre-announcement period and pre-listing period, respectively). While in the post 
event periods, the coefficients show that the betas drop by small amounts sposti 'β
                                                 
45 is the estimated parameter of the incremental difference in beta from the pre-






(0.003 and 0.03 for the post-announcement period and the post-listing period, 
respectively), and the changes are not statistically significant. It may suggest that 
there are also no changes in the systematic risk after the dual listings on the A-
share markets. Constant  relative to the A-share announcement dates is 
positive and statistically significant. Constant  relative to the A-share listing 
dates is negative and statistically significant. And constant  for both post-
announcement and post-listing periods are negative but statistically insignificant. 
These findings of complementary panel regression confirm the results using the 
traditional event study method, which are presented in Table 4.2 to 4.5. The p-
values for the Wald test demonstrate that overall there is no structural change of 







4.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presents evidences on the stock reactions to domestic dual listings in 
China, a topic that is relatively unexplored till now. Unlike Poon et al. (1998), 
who only test A-share abnormal returns and trading volumes  [-5, +5] around the 
B-share prospectus and listing dates, in this study I conduct a more comprehensive 
study of B (A)-share valuation and liquidity effects in response to the B (A)-share 
dual listings by investigating longer event periods.  
 
The most interesting finding is the utterly different market responses to domestic 
dual listings in the segmented Chinese A and B-share markets. After dual listings 
on the B-share markets, the corresponding A-share prices decrease persistently, 
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with a structural change. The A-share cumulative abnormal return curve drifts 
downwards and reaches -27.8% 150 trading days after the B-share listing dates. 
On the contrary, on the A-share dual listing announcement dates, the 
corresponding B-share prices increase statistically significantly. But the B-share 
price hikes seem not persistent. No only do the B-share prices drop on the first 
two A- share trading days, but also the B-share abnormal returns in the post-event 
periods are negative but statistically insignificant. The panel regression also finds 
that no B-share structural change occurs after dual listing events. In addition to 
valuation effects, liquidity effects are also found to be different: For the shares 
already traded on the A-share markets, trading volumes drop statistically 
significantly in the post dual listing periods.  As for the shares already traded on 
the B-share markets, trading volumes rise statistically significantly in the post dual 
listing periods. These results are consistent with liquidity theory: the positive (or 
negative) abnormal returns around the dual listing are associated with the increase 
(or decrease) in liquidity. 
 
Market segmentation theory suggests that dual listing on the oversea market can 
lower cost of capital and increase share value. However, the implication that the 
B-share dual listing could result in lower capital cost and higher A-share value 
does not happen in China due to the large and persistent B-share discount, a 
phenomenon unique in China, as commented by (Baily et al., 1999).  
 
The remarkable different market responses in the A and B-share markets could be 
interpreted by the price discounts of B-shares versus their A-share counterparts 
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and higher rate of return required by foreign B-share investors than that required 
by domestic A-share counterparts. The dual listing on the B-share market would 
result in a higher cost of capital, lower enterprise value and a wealth transfer from 
the A-shareholders to the B-shareholders who are paying a lower price for the 
same future cash flow and voting rights. As these impacts could be expected when 
the dual listing is confirmed so that A-share price drops in response to the B-share 
listing announcement, and trading volume decreases in the post-listing period as 
some A-share investors may have less incentive to trade. On the contrary, dual 
listing on the A-share market is positive news for the valuation and liquidity of the 
corresponding B-shares.  
 
As the A and B-share markets are segmented, the order flow migration hypothesis 
can not be used in China’s case. And the hypotheses 3 and 6 deprived from 
corporate governance theory can not be supported by the results in this study. 
Adopting higher information disclosure standards does not necessarily mean being 
governed by higher corporate governance standards. In particular, after dual 
listings on B-share markets, the companies are still under Chinese legal and 
regulation systems. And agency cost problems are more complicated as majority 
shareholders are usually government and government agencies whose shares can 
not be traded on the secondary markets and managers are normally appointed by 
the government and government agencies. However, in this study the event period 
ends only 150 trading days after dual listing date, whether the higher corporate 
governance standards adopted by the dual listing companies have long-run 




Another interesting finding involves the A-share abnormal returns and increased 
trading volume before the B-share dual listing announcements, which may 
indicate information leakage to some domestic investors and the existence of 
insider-trading activities in the A-share markets. This is not surprising given the 
lack of strong supervisory system and loose insider trading constraints in China. 
While for the B-shares, there is no evidence of abnormal return and trading 
volume before the A-share dual listing announcements, showing that foreign B-
shareholders have no access to the ‘insider information’ for the coming 
information releases of A-share dual listings.  
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following areas. First it 
builds on and extends existing dual listing literature by documenting new 
evidences of market responses to domestic dual listings in China’s unique 
institutional context. Moreover, the finding here corroborates previous studies on 
the B-share price discounts and provides a unique insight pertaining to the 
segmentation of China’s A and B-share markets. Third, it also addresses the 
information leakage issues in China’s A-share markets.  
 
In addition to the theoretical significances, these results have normative 
implications.  For example, the dual listings on the B-share markets lower the 
corresponding A-share prices and consequently their shareholder wealth. So that 
corporate managers for A-share listed companies should avoid dual listings on the 
B-share markets if their goal is to increase shareholder wealth. And domestic A-
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share investors should pay special attention to the portfolio companies whose 
shares may be dually listed on B-share market.   
 
Giving the negative impacts on the A-share valuation and liquidity, why 
companies still issue B-shares? First, in China, going public is a highly political 
process, under tight government’s control and subject to aggregate quotas that 
bind for A-shares. Second, A-share listed firms may need to raise the foreign 
capital in the international capital markets and want to avoid currency conversion 
which is strictly controlled by the government authorities such as the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). Third, most B-share companies are 
technically joint ventures with some tax advantages and have more freedom to 






5.1 Summary and contribution of the studies  
In the past two decades, the Chinese economy has transformed from a central 
planned system to a market oriented system. Remarkable growth has been 
witnessed in China’s stock markets since their establishment around 1990. 
However, China’s stock markets differ from other mature stock exchanges along 
many dimensions, such as the segmented stock market structure characterized by 
investment barriers and capital control separating domestic investors from foreign 
investors in the A and B-share markets. A considerable amount of research has 
been done on the price differential between the foreign and domestic shares issued 
by the same China domiciled companies and the information linkages and 
asymmetries between the segmented A and B-share markets.46 However, what are 
the responses to regulatory changes and policy announcements and impacts of 
domestic dual listings on valuation and liquidity are two topics rarely tested for 
China’s segmented A and B-share markets. This thesis attempts to fill the research 
gaps.  
 
In Chapter 3, I find that about half of largest return outliers can be explained by 
regulatory events. A further modified GARCH (1,1)-M regression indicates some 
asymmetric market responses to certain categories of regulatory events. For 
                                                 
46 Please refer to Mei et al. (2005) for a review of studies on B-share discounts and Yang 
(2003) for a review of studies on information linkages and asymmetries.  
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example both the A and B-share markets respond positively to the market demand 
boosting policies and measures, while the B-share markets not only display 
stronger reactions but also rise one trading day before announcements. For stock 
market supply expansion, domestic investors respond negatively to the A-share 
market expansion news while foreign investors respond positively to the B-share 
market expansion news. Another finding is that the price limit has been associated 
with decreased volatilities in the A-share markets but not in the B-share markets. I 
also find a stronger spillover effect of regulatory impacts from the A-share 
markets to the B-share markets. In all, the results show that the foreign B-share 
investors are more sensitive to the regulatory events and have some information 
advantages about the regulation related public information over domestic A-share 
investors.  
 
In Chapter 4, I find utterly different market responses in the segmented A and B-
share markets. The A-share prices decrease persistently after the B-share dual 
listing announcements. While upon the announcements of the A-share dual 
listings, B-share prices respond with transient return hikes. The results of panel 
regression taking into account covariance risk are in line with those of event study 
and reveal there is (is no) structural change for A (B)-shares in the post event 
periods. The A-share liquidity decreases while the B-share liquidity increases after 
dual listings. The results can be explained by the B-share discounts and are 
consistent with liquidity hypothesis. Due to China’s unique institutional context, 
market segmentation, corporate governance and order flow migration hypotheses 
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are not applicable. I also find evidences of information leakage before the B-share 
dual listing announcements among domestic A-share investors. 
 
The work in this thesis contributes to the literature in the following respects:  
 
(1) It extends the existing literature by examining the impacts of regulatory events 
and domestic dual listings on China’s segmented A and B-share markets. In 
particular, the study in Chapter 3 adds to the growing public information 
literature by analyzing a special kind of market-wide pubic information - 
regulatory changes and policy adjustments in a unique case - China’s 
segmented markets which have reputation of ‘policy-driven’ stock markets. 
Chapter 4 builds on the existing dual listing studies, adds to the literature by 
investigating stock responses to the domestic dual listings on China’s A and 
B-share markets and documents that some dual listing theories, such as market 
segmentation hypotheses can not be automatically extended to China as the 
institutional characteristics of the Chinese stock markets differ from those in 
other countries.  
 
(2) The results in this thesis can corroborate with existing empirical studies 
pertaining to the market segmentation in China. Chapter 3 documents that A 
and B-share markets may be affected by different regulatory changes and 
policy adjustments 47  and have different responses to same category of 
regulatory events. Chapter 4 attributes the asymmetric market reactions in 
                                                 
47 Please refer to appendix 3 for the lists of different regulatory events that occur on the A 
and B-share markets.  
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response to domestic dual listings on the A and B-share markets to the 
persistent and large B-share discounts.  
 
(3) The findings also provide some evidences for the information linkages and 
asymmetries in China’s segmented markets. Chapter 3 shows that B-share 
investors are more sensitive to regulatory events and some information 
advantage in relation to the regulation related public information over 
domestic A-share investors. And there are stronger regulatory event spillover 
effects from the B-share markets to the A-share markets. In Chapter 4, 
information leakage and insider trading activities before the dual listing 
announcements are found among the domestic A-share investors while not 
foreign B-share investors.  
 
5.2 Limitation and extension for further studies 
The study in Chapter 3 only examines the responses of market returns to 
regulatory changes and policy adjustments. Whether are there changes of the 
trading volume on announcement dates or in the pre and post-event periods? This 
and other related questions I leave for further research.  
 
The return data used in Chapter 3 are calculated from the aggregate submarket 
index prices. A further analysis of regulatory event announcement effects on 
individual listed companies’ stock performance might enrich the study.  For the 
further research, the sample listed firms may be classified into different groups 
based on some prior sensitivities to different types of regulatory events and then 
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we can examine whether they have different responses to certain categories of 
regulatory events.  It will be interesting to go deeper to test whether the regulatory 
event impacts are related to some firm specific characteristics. The microstructure 
theories and panel regression could be taken up in the further study of this 
direction.  
 
As for the study of the valuation and liquidity effects in response to domestic dual 
listings in Chapter 4, I concede that the small sample size is a weakness. Because 
of the limited size of the sample, the results must be interpreted with caution. If 
not due to the sample size and data availability issues, the topic of dual listing 
deserves a further in-depth investigation, perhaps by a panel regression of sample 
companies’ abnormal returns on firm specific data, such as trading volumes and 
bid-ask spreads.  
 
When examining the impacts of dual listings on valuation and liquidity by 
conducting traditional event study analysis, event period ends 150 trading days 
subsequent to dual listing dates. Will the valuation and liquidity effects identified 
in this study change in a longer-term period? Mittoo (2003) documents that for 
Canadian companies dually listed on U.S. stock exchanges, the short-run and 
long-run effects on stock return and trading volume are different. The results 
suggest that determinants of long-run performance after U.S. stock exchange dual 
listings may be different from those in the short-run. As noted in Chapter 4, the 
findings in this study show that corporate governance hypothesis can not be used 
to explain the A-share negative abnormal returns after the B-share dual listing 
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announcements. But will the corporate governance hypothesis be able to explain 
long-term valuation effect for the companies adopting better information 
disclosure standards? The long-term and short-term valuation effect might be 
different given the time lag before there are the actual changes in corporate 
governance practice of dually listed companies.  This suggests a direction that 
deserves closer consideration and investigation.  
 
China’s A and B-share markets were completely segmented before early 2001. 
Regulatory changes occurred in recently years have relaxed the rigid restrictions. 
For example, the CSRC announced to allow domestic individual investors to enter 
B-share markets on 19 February 2001. The implementation of Qualified Financial 
Institutional Investor (QFII) program in 2003 allows foreign investors to invest in 
the once-restricted A-share markets, opening the door for a possibility of formal 
arbitrary between the A and B-share markets. With the growth of financial 
globalization, China’s entry into the WTO and ongoing reforms of China’s 
financial industry, the institutional features of China’s segmented stock market 
structure are subject to changes. These provide an interesting context for the 
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BOP  Balance of payment  
CIRC China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission 
GAAPs Generally Accepted Accounting Principles  
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IASs International Accounting Standards   
IPO Initial public offering 
MOC Ministry of Commerce  
MOF Ministry of Finance 
MOFTEC Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation  
PBOC People’s Bank of China 
PRC People’s Republic of China  
RMB Renmingbi 
QFII Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors  
SAFE State Administration of Foreign Exchange  
SAT State Administration of Taxation 
SC State Council  
SCRES State Commission for the Restructuring of the Economic Systems  
SCSC State Council Securities Committee 
SHSE           Shanghai Stock Exchange  
SOE State Owned Enterprise 
SOET State Office of Economics and Trade 
SPC State Planning Commission 
SSB State Statistics Bureau 
SZSE Shenzhen Stock Exchange
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Appendix 2 Index Return Outliers and Their ‘Causes’ 
Appendix 2.1 
Return Outliers of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers            
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event       
Date        
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
22/02/1995 9.87 7.03   
24/02/1995   -5.66 -4.03   
06/03/1995 6.79 4.84   
18/05/1995 27.8 19.80 18/05/1995 The CSRC issues an urgent circular suspending experimental futures trading in Treasury bonds nationwide.* 
19/05/1995 11.8 8.37 18/05/1995 Same as above. 
23/05/1995 -18.5 -13.15 23/05/1995 The SCSC says that new quota of A-shares will be announced soon.* 
25/05/1995 -6.56 -4.67   
15/06/1995 -6.62 -4.71 15/06/1995 The CSRC announces a new quota (RMB 5.5 billion) of A-shares and vows to strengthen supervision of the fledgling stock. 
17/07/1995    6.51       4.64   16/07/1995 The SAFE says that BOP condition is better than that in 1993.  
04/03/1996 8.81 6.28 04/03/1996 The first trading day after a-two-week-long Chinese New Year holiday.  
24/04/1996 6.55 4.66 24/04/1996 The SHSE cuts annual trading fees and other costs of dealing securities.  
26/04/1996 8.22 5.86   
30/04/1996 -8.45 -6.01 30/04/1996 Six companies are banned from trading shares for two days as a punishment for making losses last year.  
21/05/1996 -6.26 -4.46   
05/06/1996 6.97 4.96 05/06/1996 The satisfying performance of shares issued by Pudong-based (a district of Shanghai) companies. 
01/07/1996 -5.59 -3.98 01/07/1996 The PBOC says that a detailed set of rules for loans will be officially implemented nationwide on 1 August. 
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Appendix 2.1 (Continued) 
Return Outliers of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and 
Financial Analysis Articles 
23/09/1996 5.73 4.08 23/09/1996 Signs that the SHSE will lower transaction costs (announced on the next day).  
30/10/1996 -6.07 -4.32 30/10/1996 Rumors that the securities authorities will shortly announce new measures to crack down on trading on credit and a new quota for A-shares.  
18/11/1996 5.59 3.98 18/11/1996 Punishment meted out by authorities to banks and securities houses breaking the rules on stock trading is lighter than what investors expected.  
21/11/1996 -7.85 -5.59 21/11/1996 Rumors about possible government policy changes to be announced. 
02/12/1996 9.44 6.72 02/12/1996 Authorities announce that China is aim to channel huge bank deposit back into the economy and stabilize its volatile stock markets.  
12/12/1996 -5.61 -3.99 12/12/1996 Beijing authorities decide to tighten their monitoring of securities houses.
13/12/1996 -5.70 -4.06 
12/12/1996 
13/12/1996 
Same as above.  
The Chinese authorities announce to impose a 10% fluctuation ceiling system to stop 
extraordinary movements from 16 December 1996. 
16/12/1996 -10.50     -7.46 16/12/1996 The CSRC announces new share quota (RMB 10 billion) for A-shares.  
17/12/1996 -10.20 -7.24 16/12/1996 Same as above. 
18/12/1996    7.05        5.02 18/12/1996 Speech by the top executives of the SHSE and SZSE to confirm the speculation is under control.  
19/12/1996 -7.78 -5.54   
18/02/1997 -9.44 -6.72 18/02/1997 Rumors about the health of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.  
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Appendix 2.1 (Continued) 
Return Outliers of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
19/02/1997 7.42 5.28 19/02/1997 An official denial that there has been a major deterioration in the health of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. 
08/05/1997 -6.29 -4.48 08/05/1997 Concerns that authorities will act forcefully to cool the speculative frenzy gripping share prices recently.  
14/05/1997 -6.01 -4.28 14/05/1997 Rumor that Beijing is planning tough measures to cool down the over-heated stock markets.  
16/05/1997 -7.55 -5.37 16/05/1997 The CSRC announces a huge new quota for A-share issues in 1997 and suspends trading of four companies first time due to price fluctuations.  
22/05/1997 -9.36 -6.66 22/05/1997 The SCSC, the PBOC and the SOET jointly announce that the SOEs and listed companies are prohibited from trading stocks.  
06/06/1997 -6.54 -4.66 06/06/1997 The PBOC announces the prohibition of bank funds into stock markets. 
07/07/1997 -5.66 -4.03 07/07/1997 Weak sentiment after the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule. 
22/09/1997 -7.19 -5.12 22/09/1997 Beijing's plans of rapid market expansion marked by a proposition of diversified forms to restructure the SOEs.  
23/09/1997 -5.91 -4.21 22/09/1997 Same as above.  
24/09/1997 6.44 4.58 24/09/1997 Official assurance that the stock markets would not be flooded with new shares.  
17/08/1998 -8.83 -6.29 17/08/1998 Concerns over the impact of widespread flooding on China's economy. 
28/06/1999 6.01 4.28 28/06/1999 Vice premier Wen Jiabao pledges the support for the stock markets. 
01/07/1999 -7.95 -5.66 01/07/1999 The Securities Law enacts and confirms the segregation of banks and securities industry.  
20/07/1999    6.19 4.41 20/07/1999 Investors shrug off tense China-Taiwan ties.  
 150
  
Appendix 2.1 (Continued) 
Return Outliers of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite A-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
09/09/1999 6.35 4.52 09/09/1999 The CSRC grants the permission to the SOEs and listed companies to enter the secondary securities market.  
  14/02/2000 The PBOC and the CSRC jointly announce that brokerages are allowed to obtain loans from banks using securities as collateral. ** 14/02/2000 8.66 6.16 
  14/02/2000 First trading day after the Chinese New Year holiday. 
23/10/2001 9.36 6.67 23/10/2001 The CSRC declares to temporarily halt the proposal of reducing state shares.* 
23/01/2002 6.16 4.39 23/01/2002 Rebound after sharp decline due to investor jitters over government plans to eventually sell down large state holdings.   
28/01/2002 -6.54 -4.66 28/01/2002 A newly announced plan to sell state shares in listed firms. **  
31/01/2002 6.49 4.62 31/01/2002 China's top stock market regulator says that the plan to sell off government holdings has yet to be set in stone 
24/06/2002 8.81 6.27 24/06/2002 The SC calls for a stop to the sale of state-controlled shares in listed companies. The CSRC raises the bar for mainland-listed companies seeking to issue new shares. ** 
14/01/2003 5.59 3.98   14/01/2003 The PBOC announces nine commercial banks ratified to open QFII business.  
 
* The news is released to the public after the trading hours of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as 
‘Event Date’.  
**The event occurs during the non-trading day of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as ‘Event Date’.  
 
Sources (event & explanation):  
People’s Daily, China Securities, Securities Times, Shanghai Securities and China Securities Bulletin 
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Appendix 2.2  
Return Outliers of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
22/02/1995 10.70 7.13   
18/05/1995 25.90 17.28 18/05/1995 The CSRC issues an urgent circular suspending experimental futures trading in Treasury bonds nationwide.* 
19/05/1995 9.19 6.13 18/05/1995 Same as above.  
23/05/1995 -19.7 -13.12 23/05/1995 The SCSC says that new quota of A-shares will be announced soon.* 
20/10/1995 6.11 4.08   
04/03/1996 6.34 4.23 04/03/1996 The first trading day after a-two-week-long Chinese New Year holiday.  
24/04/1996 8.21 5.48   24/04/1996 The SHSE cuts annual trading fees and other costs of dealing securities. 
25/04/1996 -5.89 -3.93   
26/04/1996 11.00 7.35   
29/04/1996 7.91 5.28   
21/05/1996 -8.61 -5.74   
12/07/1996 5.76 3.84 12/07/1996 The authority officially denies rumors that it will list state and legal person shares. 
18/07/1996 5.60 3.73   
29/07/1996 6.38 4.26 29/07/1996 The PBOC renews its crackdown on commodities futures trading.  
17/10/1996 8.19 5.47   




Appendix 2.2 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and 
Financial Analysis Articles 
16/12/1996 -10.60 -7.05 16/12/1996 The CSRC announces new share quota (RMB 10 billion) for A-shares. 
17/12/1996 -10.60 -7.05 16/12/1996 Same as above. 
19/12/1996 -9.14 -6.10   
20/12/1996 -8.46 -5.64   
24/12/1996 -7.59 -5.06 24/12/1996
 
China will list more big companies next year, the China Securities newspaper 
reports.  
27/12/1996 6.16 4.11 27/12/1996 Authorities announce that speculation has slowed down as a result of a government crackdown launched last week.  
30/12/1996 6.96 4.64   
06/01/1997 -6.46 -4.31 06/01/1997 Rumors on the health of China's patriarch leader Deng Xiaoping. 
18/02/1997 -10.30 -6.88 18/02/1997 Repeated rumors about the health of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. 
19/02/1997 5.85 3.90 19/02/1997 An official denial that there has been a major deterioration in the health of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. 
08/05/1997 -6.20 -4.13 08/05/1997 Concerns that authorities will act forcefully to cool the speculative frenzy gripping share prices recently.  
14/05/1997 -6.15 -4.10 14/05/1997
 
Rumor that Beijing is planning tough measures to cool down the over-heated stock 
markets.  
16/05/1997 -9.84 -6.56 16/05/1997 The CSRC announces a huge new quota for A-share issues in 1997 and suspends trading of four companies first time due to price fluctuations.  
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Appendix 2.2 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
22/05/1997 -10.30 -6.85 22/05/1997 The SCSC, the PBOC and the SOET jointly announce that the SOEs and listed companies are prohibited from trading stocks.  
06/06/1997 -7.12 -4.75 06/06/1997 The PBOC announces the prohibition of bank funds into stock markets. 
20/06/1997 6.47 4.32 20/06/1997 
The return of the punished market giant - Shenzhen Development Bank to trading 
approved by the CSRC and investor optimism before the handover of Hong Kong to 
China.  
07/07/1997 -8.47 -5.65 07/07/1997 Weak sentiment after the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule. 
22/09/1997 -7.54 -5.03 22/09/1997 Beijing's plans of rapid market expansion marked by a proposition of diversified forms to restructure the SOEs.  
23/09/1997 -7.83 -5.22 22/09/1997 Same as above.  
24/09/1997 6.39 4.26 24/09/1997 Official assurance that the stock markets would not be flooded with new shares.  
13/01/1998 -5.80 -3.87 13/01/1998 Stock market turmoil in Hong Kong. 
17/08/1998 -8.72 -5.82 17/08/1998 Concerns over the impact of widespread flooding on China's economy. 
19/08/1998 5.65 3.77   
28/06/1999 6.58 4.39 28/06/1999 Vice premier Wen Jiabao pledges the support for the stock markets. 
01/07/1999 -8.37 -5.58 01/07/1999 The Securities Law enacts and confirms the segregation of banks and securities industry. 
20/07/1999 6.72 4.48 20/07/1999 Investors shrug off tense China-Taiwan ties. 




Appendix 2.2 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite A-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and 
Financial Analysis Articles 
14/02/2000 The PBOC and the CSRC jointly announce that brokerages are allowed to obtain loans from banks using securities as collateral. ** 14/02/2000 8.65 5.77 
14/02/2000 First trading day after the Chinese New Year holiday. 
30/07/2001 -5.81 -3.88 30/07/2001 China Premier Zhu Rongji orders commercial banks to pull out funds illegally channeled into the country's stock markets by the end of September.  
23/10/2001 9.20 6.14 23/10/2001 The CSRC declares to temporarily halt the proposal of reducing state shares.* 
23/01/2002 6.77 4.52 
28/01/2002 -6.79 -4.53 28/01/2002 A newly announced plan to sell state shares in listed firms. ** 
31/01/2002 6.83 4.55 31/01/2002 China's top stock market regulator promises stable markets, saying the plan to sell off government holdings had yet to be set in stone. 
24/06/2002 8.61 5.74 24/06/2002 The SC calls for a stop to the sale of state-controlled shares in listed companies. The CSRC raises the bar for mainland-listed companies seeking to issue new shares. ** 
 
* The news is released to the public after the trading hours of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as 
‘Event Date’.  
**The event occurs during the non-trading day of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as ‘Event Date’.  
 
Sources (event & explanation):  





Return Outliers of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite B-Share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
03/12/1996 9.76 5.40 02/12/1996 Authorities announce that China is aim to channel huge bank deposits back into the economy and stabilize its volatile stock markets. 
09/12/1996 11.70 6.43 09/12/1996 The SSB announces high growth rates in production. 
10/12/1996 12.10 6.65 09/12/1996 Same as above 
  12/12/1996 Beijing authorities decide to tighten their monitoring of securities houses.
13/12/1996 -15.10 -7.87   13/12/1996 The Chinese authorities announce to impose a 10% fluctuation ceiling system to stop extraordinary movements from 16 December 1996. 
16/12/1996 -10.50      -5.44 16/12/1996 Authorities further tighten the supervision.  
18/02/1997 -7.86 -4.35 18/02/1997 Rumors about the health of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. 
14/08/1997 9.01 4.94 14/08/1997 Stock market turmoil in Hong Kong & other regional exchanges and rumors of an easing of trading curbs.  
15/08/1997 8.39 4.60 14/08/1997 Same as above. 
02/09/1997 -7.18 -3.98 02/09/1997 Hong Kong stock market hits lowest point of 1997. 
28/10/1997 -7.75 -4.30 28/10/1997 Sharp plunge in U.S. & Hong Kong stock markets. 
12/01/1998 -9.63 -5.33 12/01/1998 Recent plunges of Hong Kong and other regional stock markets. 
15/01/1998 -7.59 -4.19   
09/02/1998 9.47 5.19 09/02/1998 The SCSC unveils a new list of 18 candidates who may issue B-shares. The first trading day after the Chinese New Year holiday. 
10/02/1998 7.97 4.37 09/02/1998 Same as above. 
15/05/1998 7.60 4.21 15/05/1998 Most investors believe that the government will soon act to enliven B-share trading. 
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Appendix 2.3 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite B-share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
05/08/1998 10.10 5.57 05/08/1998 The top securities regulator - Zhou Xiaochuan talks up the stock markets.  
18/03/1999 8.16 4.52 18/03/1999 Rumors that the central bank plans to trim domestic interest rates.  
22/03/1999 8.60 4.76   
29/03/1999 7.55 4.18 29/03/1999 Expectation of interest rate decrease.  
10/05/1999 -8.37 -4.64 10/05/1999 The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia. 
24/05/1999 7.86 4.35 24/05/1999 The CSRC allows securities firm to boost its capital in a move that is widely seen as bringing new financial muscle to the brokerage sector.  
01/06/1999 7.90 4.38 01/06/1999 China cuts the stamp duty on B-share trading to 0.3 percent from 0.4 percent, effective 1 June 1999.  
02/06/1999   9.27  5.11   01/06/1999 Same as above.  
01/07/1999 -8.03 -4.44 01/07/1999 The Securities Law enacts and confirms the segregation of banks and securities industry.  
06/07/1999 -9.45 -5.23 06/07/1999 The CSRC clears two more companies for offers of domestic A-shares in a move widely seen as signaling further market expansion ahead.  
19/07/1999 -9.07 -4.96 19/07/1999 Fears over worsening tension with Taiwan. 
20/07/1999 9.33 5.06 20/07/1999 Investors shrug off tense China-Taiwan ties.  
21/07/1999 9.34 5.12 20/07/1999 Same as above. 
23/07/1999 8.47 4.69 
19/08/1999 8.45 4.68 19/08/1999 Rumors of further market-boosting policies by the government 
23/03/2000 7.38      4.09 23/03/2000 Rumors the government will allow B-share funds.  
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Appendix 2.3 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite B-share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
29/05/2000 8.63 4.78 29/05/2000 Renewed rumors that the government may allow domestic investors access to hard currency shares through B-share mutual funds.  
31/05/2000 8.81 4.88 29/05/2000 Same as above.  
25/10/2000 8.99 4.98 25/10/2000 Chinese securities authorities' commitment to allow foreign securities firms to trade B-shares directly after entry to the WTO. 
28/02/2001 9.44 5.17 28/02/2001 The CSRC Spokesman announces China's opening B-share markets to domestic investors.* 
01/03/2001 9.45 5.12 28/02/2001 First trading day after B-share’s opening. 
02/03/2001 9.34 5.06 01/03/2001 Local investors snap up shares because they are cheaper than their domestic share counterparts. 
05/03/2001 8.75 4.79   
07/03/2001 -7.59 -4.20   
23/03/2001 -9.15 -5.01   
26/03/2001 7.59 4.16 26/03/2001 China will increase the number of B-share initial public offerings and allow existing B-share companies to issue new shares, a top securities regulator says. 
11/06/2001 -7.94 -4.40   
06/08/2001 -10.20 -5.62 06/08/2001 A clampdown on illegal use of bank funds for stock trading.  
09/08/2001 8.24 4.56   
20/08/2001 7.47 4.14 20/08/2001 Market talk that regulators will cut the stamp duties on transaction of the hard-currency B-shares 
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Appendix 2.3 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite B-share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
  Event       
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
23/10/2001 9.65 5.35 23/10/2001 The CSRC declares to temporarily halt the proposal of reducing state shares.* 
22/01/2002 -7.58 -4.19 22/01/2002 Investor jitters over government plans to eventually sell down large state holdings in listed companies 
28/01/2002 -8.55 -4.73 28/01/2002 A newly announced plan to sell state shares in listed firms. ** 
31/01/2002 9.20 5.10 31/01/2002 China's top stock market regulator promises stable markets, saying the plan to sell off government holdings has yet to be set in stone 
24/06/2002 9.04 5.01 24/06/2002 The SC calls for a stop to the sale of state-controlled shares in listed companies. The CSRC raises the bar for mainland-listed companies seeking to issue new shares. ** 
 
* The news is released to the public after the trading hours of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as 
‘Event Date’.  
**The event occurs during the non-trading day of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as ‘Event Date’.  
 
Sources (event & explanation):  




Appendix 2.4  
Return Outliers of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite B-share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
12/06/1996 9.86 5.16 12/06/1996 
Senior securities official says that Shenzhen government and securities regulators are 
drafting a new series of measures to remove various obstacles to trade at B-share 
markets. 
13/06/1996 12.20 6.41 12/06/1996 Same as above.  
18/06/1996 9.74 5.10   
19/06/1996 -16.60 -8.68   
01/07/1996 -10.60 -5.64 01/07/1996 The CSRC issues an order to the country's two stock exchanges to ban Chinese citizens from opening B-share trading accounts. ** 
12/08/1996 -8.11 -4.30 12/08/1996 Rumors that Beijing has drafted rules stating that mainland Chinese investors who have entered the B-share markets may only sell, and not buy class B-shares. 
25/11/1996 11.40 6.02 25/11/1996 Rumors of official steps to boost the B-share markets. 
02/12/1996 8.63 4.57 02/12/1996 
Authorities announce that China is cleaning up its markets for mutual funds to 
prepare them to become a key vehicle to channel huge bank deposits back into the 
economy and stabilize its volatile stock markets. 
09/12/1996 8.80 4.66 09/12/1996 The SSB announces high growth rates in production. 
  12/12/1996 Beijing authorities decide to tighten their monitoring of securities houses. 13/12/1996 -15.10 -7.87   13/12/1996 The Chinese authorities announce to impose a 10% fluctuation ceiling system to stop extraordinary movements from 16 December 1996. 
16/12/1996 -10.50      -5.44 16/12/1996 Authorities further tighten the supervision.  
17/12/1996 -9.98 -5.16 16/12/1996 Same as above.  
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Appendix 2.4 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite B-share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and 
Financial Analysis Articles 
18/12/1996 10.40 5.42 18/12/1996 The speech by the top executives of the SHSE and the SZSE. 
27/12/1996 9.57 5.01 27/12/1996 Authorities announce that speculation has slowed down as a result of a government crackdown launched previous week.  
30/12/1996 9.66 5.05   
18/02/1997 -10.00 -5.30 18/02/1997 Rumors about the health of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. 
16/05/1997 -9.07 -4.80 16/05/1997 The CSRC suspends trading of four companies first time due to price fluctuations.  
22/05/1997 -8.52 -4.51 22/05/1997 The SCSC, the PBOC and the SOET jointly announce that the SOEs and listed companies are prohibited from trading stocks.  
14/08/1997 8.35 4.43 14/08/1997 Stock market turmoil in Hong Kong & other regional exchanges and rumors of an easing of trading curbs. 
09/02/1998 8.59 4.55 09/02/1998 The SCSC unveils a new list of 18 candidates who may issue B-shares. The first trading day after the Chinese New Year holiday. 
15/05/1998 8.54 4.53 15/05/1998 Most investors believe that the government will soon act to enliven B-share trading. 
14/06/1999 8.83 4.62 14/06/1999 Supportive remarks from a top market regulator.  
15/06/1999   -9.06      -4.68   
16/06/1999 8.76 4.59  16/06/1999 An official editorial gives the government stamp of approval to a recent bull run. 
28/06/1999 7.90 4.18 28/06/1999 Vice premier Wen Jiabao pledges the support for the market. 
06/07/1999 -8.84 -4.68 06/07/1999 The CSRC clears two more companies for offers of domestic A-shares in a move widely seen as signaling further market expansion ahead.  




Appendix 2.4 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite B-share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and 
Financial Analysis Articles 
19/07/1999 -8.59 -4.49 19/07/1999 Fears over worsening tension with Taiwan. 
20/07/1999 9.41 4.86  20/07/1999 Investors shrug off tense China-Taiwan ties. 
21/07/1999 10.00 5.26  20/07/1999 Same as above.  
14/02/2000 The PBOC and the CSRC jointly announce that brokerages are allowed to obtain loans from banks using securities as collateral. ** 14/02/2000 9.01 4.77 
14/02/2000 First trading day after the Chinese New Year holiday. 
23/03/2000 9.06 4.80 23/03/2000 Rumors the government will allow B-share funds. 
29/05/2000 9.67 5.13 29/05/2000 Renewed rumors that the government may allow domestic investors access to hard currency shares through B-share mutual funds. 
25/10/2000 9.66 5.12 25/10/2000 Chinese securities authorities' commitment to allow foreign securities firms to trade B-shares directly after entry to the WTO. 
28/02/2001 9.26 4.85 28/02/2001 The CSRC Spokesman announces China's opening B-share markets to domestic investors.*  
01/03/2001 9.32 4.82 28/02/2001 First trading day after B-share’s opening. Local investors snap up shares because they are cheaper than their domestic share counterparts. 
02/03/2001 9.30 4.81   
05/03/2001 9.31 4.81   
06/03/2001 9.93 5.20   




Appendix 2.4 (continued) 
Return Outliers of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite B-share Index and Their “Causes” 
 
Index Return Outliers           
   Date             Size       T-value 
 Event        
Date         
                                   Event or/and Explanation in News Reports and  
Financial Analysis Articles 
22/03/2001 8.59 4.49   
23/03/2001 -10.10 -5.27   
29/03/2001 -8.54 -4.52 29/03/2001 Two Shenzhen-listed firms separately reveal their major overseas foreign investors have unloaded at least five percent stakes during a rally this month. 
09/08/2001 8.40 4.45   
17/09/2001 -8.23 -4.35 17/09/2001 In the wake of terror attacks on the United States.  
23/10/2001 9.30 4.93 23/10/2001 The CSRC declares to temporarily halt the proposal of reducing state shares.* 
28/01/2002 -9.32 -4.94 28/01/2002 A newly announced plan to sell state shares in listed firms. ** 
31/01/2002 9.26 4.91 31/01/2002 China's top stock market regulator promises stable markets, saying the plan to sell off government holdings has yet to be set in stone.  
24/06/2002 8.74 4.63 24/06/2002 The SC calls for a stop to the sale of state-controlled shares in listed companies. The CSRC raises the bar for mainland-listed companies seeking to issue new shares. 
10/10/2003 8.12 4.31 09/10/2003 H-share index hits highest point for the past five and half years.  
 
* The news is released to the public after the trading hours of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as 
‘Event Date’.  
**The event occurs during the non-trading day of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as ‘Event Date’.  
 
Sources (event & explanation):  
People’s Daily, China Securities, Securities Times, Shanghai Securities and China Securities Bulletin 
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Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents  
 
Panel 1: Market Demand Boosting Policy and Measure 
Event date Content Market 
18/05/1995 
The CSRC issues an urgent circular suspending experimental futures trading in Treasury bonds 
nationwide.* 
A 
25/10/1995 The CSRC publishes a series of rules aimed at limiting risks in commodities futures trading.  A 
06/05/1996 




Senior securities official says that Shenzhen government and securities regulators are drafting a new 
series of measures to remove various obstacles to trade at the B-share markets. 
B 
29/07/1996 The PBOC renews its crackdown on commodities futures trading.  A 
02/12/1996 
Authorities announce that China is aim to channel huge bank deposits back into the economy and 
stabilize its volatile stock markets. 
A B 
08/10/1997 Beijing approves temporary regulations on establishing securities investment funds. A 
04/11/1997 Beijing's announcement of new rules easing some foreign exchange controls for B-share trading.  B 
24/05/1999 
The CSRC allows securities firm to boost its capital in a move that is widely seen as bringing new 
financial muscle to the brokerage sector.  
A 
09/09/1999 




China's top securities official, Zhou Zhengqing, says that firms listed on the B- share index would be 




Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents (continued) 
 
Panel 1: Market Demand Boosting Policy and Measure (continued) 
Event date Content Market 
27/10/1999 The SC authorizes the insurance companies to enter the security market.  A 
20/01/2000 The governor of the PBOC says to increase the short-term financing to the securities companies. A 
14/02/2000 
The PBOC and the CSRC jointly announce that brokerages are allowed to obtain loans from banks 
using securities as collateral. ** 
A 
25/07/2000 Securities officials say to absorb the qualified foreign institutional investors.  A 
14/08/2000 




Chinese securities authorities' commitment to allow foreign securities firms to trade B-shares directly 
after entry to the WTO.  
B 
28/02/2001 The CSRC spokesman announces China's opening B-Share market to domestic investors.* B 
02/03/2001 The CIRC announces that China's securities market opens wider to insurance funds. B 
06/06/2002 
China is set to encourage more institutional investors in coming years to stabilize its securities market 
and improve investment portfolios, regulators say.  
A 
04/11/2002 
China lifts a ban on the transfer of state-owned and corporate shares of listed firms to investors from 
overseas. ** 
A 
14/01/2003 The PBOC announces nine commercial banks ratified to open QFII trust business. A 
11/06/2003 The entry of the China's social security fund into the domestic A-share markets.  A 
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Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents (continued) 
 
Panel 2: Disciplinary action and strength in supervision that reduces demand 
Event date Content Market 
09/01/1995 The PBOC and the MOF issue a joint statement requiring the separation of financial securities institutions from the MOF and Commercial banks.  A 
10/05/1995 The CSRC strengthens the supervision of illegal actions in the stock markets.  A B 
30/04/1996 Six companies are banned from trading shares for two days as a punishment for making losses last year. A 
01/07/1996 The CSRC issues an order to the country's two stock exchanges to ban Chinese citizens from opening B-share trading accounts. ** B 
01/07/1996 The PBOC says that a detailed set of rules for loans will be officially implemented nationwide on 1 August 1996. A 
25/07/1996 The CSRC issues an urgent notice to protect state assets in listed companies and prevent firms from giving over-generous returns to investors. A 
30/07/1996 The PBOC announces measures forcing the four state banks (and its own branches) to divest their trust banks of all securities operations by year-end. A 
01/11/1996 The CSRC issues a circular to prevent manipulation acts in A-share markets. A 
11/12/1996 Renewed ban on Chinese buying B-shares by securities regulators. B 
12/12/1996 Beijing authorities decide to tighten their monitoring of securities houses. A B 
16/05/1997 The CSRC suspends trading of four companies first time for investigation into price fluctuations and manipulation.  A B 
22/05/1997 The SCSC, the PBOC and the SOET jointly announce that the SOEs and listed companies are prohibited from trading stocks.  A 
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Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents (continued) 
 
Panel 2: Disciplinary action and strength in supervision that reduces demand (continued) 
Event date Content Market 
06/06/1997 The PBOC announces the prohibition of bank funds into stock markets. A 
18/12/1998 
The CSRC requires further licensing of securities institutions on laws and regulations of securities 
industries.  
A B 
01/07/1999 The Securities Law enacts and confirms the segregation of banks and securities industry. A 
16/03/2000 Premier Zhu Rongji says that China will further strengthen management in the banking sector.  A 
22/08/2000 Supervision of the SC and the CSRC on financial institutions.  A B 
24/11/2000 The CSRC strengthens the supervision and takes action against the market manipulation.  A B 
15/01/2001 
China's securities regulator vows to step up efforts to crack down on fraud, price manipulation and 
other irregularities.  
A B 
25/04/2001 




China Premier Zhu Rongji orders commercial banks to pull out funds illegally channeled into the 
country's stock markets by the end of September.  
A 
06/08/2001 A clampdown on illegal use of bank funds for stock trading.  A 
08/01/2002 The CSRC explicitly bans Chinese securities houses from using their own money to trade B-shares. B 
06/06/1997 The PBOC announces the prohibition of bank funds into stock markets. A 
18/12/1998 





Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents (continued) 
 
Panel 3: Market supply expansion  
Event date Content Market 
23/05/1995 The SCSC says that new quota of A-shares will be announced soon, curbing market speculation.* A 
15/06/1995 The CSRC announces a new quota (RMB 5.5 billion) of A-shares.  A 
12/07/1996 The authority official denies rumors that it will list state and legal person shares. A 
10/09/1996 
The CSRC plans to list a second batch of companies that have issued shares through private 
placements by the end of 1997.  
A 
10/10/1996 
Securities regulators deny rumors that they will announce the size of the 1996 quota for new A-shares 
issues soon.  
A 
16/12/1996 The CSRC announces new share quota (RMB 10 billion) for A-shares.    A 
24/12/1996 
Regulator announces that China will list more big companies next year, the China Securities 
newspaper reports. 
A B 
30/12/1996 The SCSC announces a new list of 38 candidates who may issue B-shares. ** B 
07/01/1997 Securities authorities announce the names of 33 more enterprises approved to issue B-shares. B 
16/05/1997 The CSRC announces a huge new quota (RMB 30 billion) for A-share issues in 1997.  A 
09/09/1997 
China will expand its B-share markets to pump needed cash into state enterprises and boost trading of 
stocks aimed at foreign investors, government and industry officials say.  
B 
22/09/1997 
Beijing's plans of rapid market expansion marked by a proposition of diversified forms to restructure 
the SOEs.  
A 
24/09/1997 Official assurance that the stock markets would not be flooded with new shares.  A 
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Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents (continued) 
 
Panel 3: Market supply expansion (continued) 
Event date Content Market 
29/09/1997 
China's quota for A-share issues for 1998 is estimated to be set at RMB 50 billion, compared with 
RMB 30 billion for 1997.  
A 
16/10/1997 The SCSC head Zhou Zhengqing rules out the possibility of large-scale A-share issues. A 
09/02/1998 
The SCSC unveils a new list of 18 candidates who may issue B-shares. A spokesman with the CSRC 




The CSRC issues ‘the Interim Measures on the Increase in Capital through the Issuance of B-Shares by 
Companies Limited by Shares’.  
B 
06/07/1999 
The CSRC clears two more companies for offers of domestic A-shares in a move widely seen as 
signaling further market expansion ahead. 
A 
02/12/1999 




China will allow the listing of rights shares given up by state and institutional shareholders and then 
taken up by retail investors.  A start to getting rid of residual non-tradable shares.  
A 
26/03/2001 
China will increase the number of B-share IPOs and allow existing B-share companies to issue new 
shares, a top securities regulator says. 
B 
14/06/2001 China unveils rules aimed at cutting the state's holdings in firms to raise funds for social security.  A 
24/07/2001 
The government begins to sell state shares equivalent to 10 percent of their IPO proceeds at the same 




Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents (continued) 
 
Panel 3: Market supply expansion (continued) 
Event date Content Market 
23/10/2001 The CSRC declares to temporarily halt the proposal of reducing state shares.* A 
28/01/2002 A newly announced plan to sell state shares in listed firms. **  A 
31/01/2002 




The CSRC cuts flow of additional share offers to halt a slide in stock prices caused mainly by the 
rapid pace of new domestic share issues. 
A 
24/06/2002 
The SC calls for a stop to the sale of state-controlled shares in listed companies. The CSRC raises the 
bar for mainland-listed companies seeking to issue new shares. ** 
A 




Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents (continued) 
 
Panel 4: Transaction cost cut (stamp duty and commission etc) 
Event date Content Market 
24/04/1996 The SHSE cuts annual trading fees and other costs of dealing securities. A B 
24/09/1996 The SHSE announces to reduce A-share commission and transfer fee, effective from 23 October 1996.  A 
05/11/1997 
The CSRC announces to reduce its supervisory management fee charged to securities and futures 
exchanges from 1 January 1998.  
A B 
12/06/1998 
China cuts the stamp duty on stock transactions, both buying and selling, to 0.4 percent from 0.5 
percent.  
A B 
28/05/1999 China cuts the stamp duty on B-share trading to 0.3 percent from 0.4 percent, effective 1 June 1999. B 
16/12/2000 
The SHSE announces to decrease the B-share trading commission from 0.6 percent to 0.43 percent, 
effective from the beginning next year. ** 
B 
16/11/2001 The MOF announces the stamp duty for A and B-shares reduced to 0.2 percent.  A B 
05/04/2002 
The CSRC, the SPC and the SAT jointly declare that brokerage commission will be lowered to a 
range between 0.3 percent and a lower percentage from the current fixed fee of 0.35 percent beginning 




Appendix 3 Event Dates and Contents (continued) 
Panel 5: Interest rate cut 
Event date Content 
30/04/1996 The PBOC announces to lower bank savings and loan interest rates from 1 May 1996.  
22/08/1996 The PBOC announces to lower bank savings and loan interest rates from 23 August 1996.  
22/10/1997 The PBOC announces that interest rates on bank loans and deposits would be lowered effective 23 October 1997.  
24/03/1998 The PBOC cuts bank deposit and lending rates effective on 25 Mar 998. 
01/07/1998 A cut in both bank deposit and lending interest rates.  
13/07/1998 The PBOC announces a new package of interest rate cuts that will take effect 7 December 1998. ** 
10/06/1999 The PBOC announces a hefty interest rate cut effective from 10 June, 1999. * 
15/10/1999 China will impose a 20 percent tax on bank interest from 1 November 1999, an official at the SAT say.  
21/02/2002 China slashes deposit (lending) interest rates by 0.25 (0.5) percentage points effective from 21 February 2002.* 
 
* The news is released to the public after the trading hours of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as 
‘Event Date’.  
**The event occurs during the non-trading day of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, so the next trading day is referred as ‘Event Date’. 
 




Codes, Announcement and Listing Dates of Sample Companies 
 


















1.Huaxin Cement 600801 900933 28/11/94 09/12/94 03/01/94 
2.Jinan Qinqi Motorcycle 600698 900946 29/05/97 17/06/97 06/12/93 
3. Shanghai Lianhua Fiber 600617 900913 18/09/93 28/09/93 13/10/92 
4.Shanghai Lujiazui Finance &Trade 
Zone  Development 600663 900932 08/11/94 22/11/94 28/06/93 
5.Shanghai Narcissus Electric 
Appliance 600625 900931 05/11/94 10/11/94 06/01/93 
6.Shanghai Posts    


















7.Changchai 000570 200570 27/08/96 13/09/96 01/07/94 
8.China Vanke 000002 200002 06/04/93 28/05/93 29/01/91 
9.Dalian Refrigeration 000530 200530 02/03/98 20/03/98 08/12/93 
10.Foshan Electrical and Lighting 000541 200541 13/07/95 08/08/95 23/11/93 
11.Gintian Industry (Group) 000003 200003 30/04/93 29/06/93 03/07/91 
12.Guangdong Electric Power 
Development 
000539 200539 30/05/95 28/06/95 26/11/93 
13.Hainan Pearl River Holdings 000505 200505 12/04/95 29/06/95 21/12/92 
14.Hefei meiling 000521 200521 14/08/96 28/08/96 18/10/93 
15.Hubei Sanonda 000553 200553 29/04/97 15/05/97 03/12/93 
16.Jiangling Motors 000550 200550 13/09/95 29/09/95 01/12/93 





Appendix 4 (Continued) 
Codes, Announcement and Listing Dates of Sample Companies 
 


















 1.Hainan Airlines 600221 900945 08/10/99 25/11/99 26/06/97 
 2. Huangshan Tourism 600054 900942 11/04/97 06/05/97 22/11/96 
 3.Inner Mongolia Eerduoli Cashmere  
    Products 600295 900936 14/03/01 26/04/01 20/10/95 
 4.Jinzhou Harbor (Group) 600190 900952 04/05/99 09/06/99 19/05/98 
 5.Shanghai Kaikai Industry 600272 900943 09/01/01 28/02/01 08/01/97 
 6.Shanghai Matsuoka 600555 900955 06/03/01 28/03/01 18/01/99 
 7. Shanghai New Asia (Group) 600754 900934 10/09/96 11/10/96 15/12/94 
 8.Shanghai Worldbest 600094 900940 20/06/97 03/07/97 26/07/96 


















10.Boe Technology Group 000725 200725 12/12/00 12/01/01 10/06/97 
11.Chongqing Changan Automobile  000625 200625 20/05/97 10/06/97 08/11/96 
12.Guangdong Provincial 
Expressway Development           000429 200429 06/01/98 20/02/98 15/08/96 
13.Lutai Textile Joint Stock 000726 200726 29/11/00 25/12/00 19/08/97 
14.Shandong Chenming Paper 
Holdings 000488 200488 24/10/00 20/11/00 26/05/97 
15.Shenzhen Internation Enterprise 000056 200056 18/06/96 08/07/96 30/10/95 
16.Shenzhen Seg 000058 200058 09/12/96 26/12/96 22/07/96 
17.Weifu Fuel Injection 000581 200581 25/06/98 24/09/98 11/09/95 
18.Wuxi Little Swan  000418 200418 12/03/97 28/03/97 18/07/96 
19.Yantai Changyu pioneer Wine 000869 200869 10/10/00 26/10/00 23/09/97 
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